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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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5 MAY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

| | |
|--|----|
| USSR: Need To Open Space Research Laboratories for Inspection (Lev Semeyko; Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 2, Jan 87)..... | 1 |
| Moscow on SDI as New Stage in Arms Race (Yuri Lebedev, Aleksei Podberezkin; Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, 1987)..... | 3 |
| Soviet Scientist Describes SDI-Related Weapons Technologies (Sergey Rodionov; Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 6, Dec 86)..... | 11 |
| Soviet Observer Contrasts SDI, Nuclear Deterrence (Manki Ponomarev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Apr 87)..... | 13 |
| USSR: Radiological Effects of Atmospheric Dispersion of Plutonium-239 (Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 6, Dec 86)..... | 16 |

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

| | |
|--|----|
| USSR: ACDA Document on NST Round Seven Criticized (Nikolay Chervov; Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 2, Jan 87)..... | 19 |
| PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY on 'Sincerity' of U.S.-USSR Arms Talks (Chi Li; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 1 Apr 87)..... | 24 |
| Peru's Garcia Supports Soviet Peace, Arms Limitation Proposals (Paris AFP, 31 Mar 87)..... | 26 |

SALT/START ISSUES

| | |
|--|----|
| Soviet Colonel Discusses Stealth Technology (V. Nazarenko; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Apr 87)..... | 27 |
|--|----|

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

| | |
|---|----|
| USSR: Coverage of Gorbachev Visit to Czechoslovakia (Various sources, 10-13 Apr 87)..... | 30 |
| Talks With Husak 10 April, by G. Husak | 30 |
| Gorbachev Dinner Speech | 30 |
| Gorbachev 10 April Rally Speech | 32 |
| Western Reaction to Speech | 38 |
| Gorbachev-Husak Talks 11 April | 40 |
| More on 11 April Meeting | 40 |
| Joint Communique on Visit | 41 |
| Moscow Radio Talk Show, by Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, et al. | 42 |
| USSR: Coverage of French Premier's Visit to Washington (Various sources, various dates)..... | 49 |
| Discusses INF, by Igor Ignatyev | 49 |
| 'Backed Away From Zero Option' | 49 |
| Anti-Soviet 'Spy Sagas', by Yu. Kovalenko | 50 |
| Chirac 'Realism,' by Viktor Levin | 51 |
| West 'Complicating' Path, by Stanislav Kondrashov | 52 |
| Belgian Government May Delay U.S. Missile Deployment (Paris AFP, 20 Mar 87)..... | 53 |
| Canada: Women's Meeting Urges End to Cruise Testing (Vancouver THE SUN, 16 Mar 87)..... | 54 |
| XINHUA Report: Reagan Sees 'Promise' for INF Agreement (Beijing XINHUA, 16 Apr 87)..... | 55 |
| PRC Army Paper Roundup of U.S.-USSR INF Talks (Chen Xueyan; Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Apr 87)..... | 56 |
| PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentary on Thatcher's USSR Visit (Chen Tean; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 3 Apr 87)..... | 58 |
| XINHUA Roundup on Euromissile, Zero Option Accord Situation (Xia Zhimian; Beijing XINHUA, 1 Apr 87)..... | 61 |
| XINHUA Analysis of West Europe's Reaction to Arms Proposals (Beijing XINHUA, various dates)..... | 63 |
| 'Mixed Feelings,' by Xia Zhimian | 63 |
| West on 'Defensive', by Cheng Kexiong | 64 |
| FRG Discord Over 'Zero Option,' by Xia Zhimian | 65 |

| | |
|---------------------------|----|
| Briefs | 67 |
| Alfonsin on Arms Proposal | |

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

| | |
|--|----|
| TASS: U.S. Continuing Work on Germ Warfare Weapons (Leonid Ponomarev; Moscow TASS, 8 Apr 87)..... | 68 |
| Soviet Army Paper Hits U.S. 'Hypocrisy' on Verification (P. Filippov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Apr 87)..... | 70 |
| Moscow on U.S. Push To Destroy Outdated Chemical Weapons (Moscow Domestic Service, 8 Apr 87)..... | 72 |
| Moscow Report on BW Convention Review Conference (Moscow Domestic Service, 10 Apr 87)..... | 73 |
| Soviet Virologist Denounces Chemical Weapons (Votyakov ; Moscow TASS, 9 Apr 87)..... | 74 |
| PRC Urges Elimination of Chemical Weapons (Beijing XINHUA, 16 Apr 87)..... | 75 |

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

| | |
|---|----|
| PRAVDA Hits Pentagon Retraction on Warhead Standards (Yu. Zhukov; Moscow PRAVDA, 5 Apr 87)..... | 76 |
| PRAVDA Hits Adelman Comments on Soviet Testing Position (P. Lukin; Moscow PRAVDA, 10 Apr 87)..... | 78 |
| PRAVDA on U.S. Report of Overstated Soviet Test Yields (V. Sukhoy; Moscow PRAVDA, 16 Jan 87)..... | 80 |
| USSR: Scientist on U.S. Reasons for Continued Testing (Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 2, Oct 86, No 1, Jan 87)..... | 83 |
| Reliability Testing Said Unnecessary, by Vitaliy Goldanskiy | 83 |
| X-Ray Laser Development, by Vitaliy Goldanskiy | 84 |
| TASS Examines U.S.-Japanese 'Secret Agreement' (Moscow TASS, 7 Apr 87; Moscow to Japan, 7 Apr 87)..... | 87 |
| 'Scandal' Exposed, by Askold Biryukov | 87 |
| Moscow Japanese Commentary, by Kalinin | 88 |
| TASS: CPSU Official Discusses INF, NFZ Issues With Danes (Moscow PRAVDA, 29, 30 Mar 87)..... | 90 |
| Copenhagen Press Conference | 90 |
| Lukyanov Completes Visit | 92 |

| | |
|--|----|
| Bulgarian Official Discusses Balkan NFZ on Moscow Radio (Igor Surguchev, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 10 Apr 87) | 94 |
|--|----|

RELATED ISSUES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Moscow: Bloc Foreign Policy Journals on International Security (Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, 1987)..... | 96 |
| Realities of Nuclear Space Era, by Shalva Sanakoyev | 96 |
| Military, Political Aspects, by Wolfgang Kubiczek | 100 |
| U.S. Military Doctrines, by Laszlo Tolnai | 104 |
| Confidence-Building Measures, by Helga Schirmeister | 108 |
| Problems of European Security, by Yevgeni Silin | 111 |
| USSR Coverage of UN Asia-Pacific Disarmament Parley (Moscow IZVESTIYA, 25, 31 Mar 87)..... | 113 |
| Speakers Cited | 113 |
| Issues Under Discussion, by Yu. Savenkov | 114 |
| BEIJING REVIEW Discusses UN Conference (Jiang Wand; Beijing BEIJING REVIEW, No 14, 6 Apr 87)... | 117 |
| PRC Premier Reiterates Disarmament Stand (Beijing XINHUA, 3 Apr 87)..... | 119 |
| PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY on Waste of Resources in Arms Race (Yi Yun; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 13 Apr 87)..... | 120 |

/12223

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: NEED TO OPEN SPACE RESEARCH LABORATORIES FOR INSPECTION

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 2, Jan 87 pp 13-14

[Article by Lev Semeyko, "expert" with the USSR Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute: "Verification of Space Laboratories"]

[Text] Soviet space research laboratories are closed to foreigners. They conduct research to upgrade missile attack warning systems and control, communication and navigation systems. They also study possibilities for developing a land-based ABM system within the limits set by the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union does not conduct any research to develop space-based ABM systems.

The Soviet Union is prepared to open its laboratories for verification. The only condition for this is an agreement to ban space weapons. If such an agreement is reached, Western inspectors monitoring compliance with such an agreement will be allowed to inspect Soviet laboratories to make sure the Soviet Union conducts space research for peaceful purposes only. To ensure reciprocity, the United States also should allow Soviet inspectors to visit American laboratories.

Agreements on laboratory inspection may be different. This is a negotiable issue. But the problem must be solved in principle. The Soviet Union is convinced that severe control over compliance with agreements is necessary. Disarmament is impossible without verification, while verification without disarmament is senseless. The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate the most stringent measures of verification.

Our idea of verification is that experts should be able to visit each other's research laboratories and nuclear testing grounds to make sure that no military research is conducted there. It is very important that the development of new weapons of mass destruction should be banned at the earliest possible stage, that is in the laboratories.

Judging by everything, the United States has a different position on verification. It invited Soviet experts to visit its nuclear testing sites in Nevada only to see that the yield of the nuclear explosions conducted there does not exceed the agreed limit.

Washington's position is not conducive to disarmament. In fact, it sanctions the nuclear arms race and the development of new weapon systems. As regards the Americans' invitation to share in the technological secrets in the area of Strategic Defence Initiative, it is no more than propaganda and demagoguery.

I think that the difference in the Soviet and American positions on the verification issue results from the fact that the U.S. administration ignores the simple fact that security is a political rather than military or technical problem. And verification is a test of one's real intentions and willingness to comply with agreements.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW ON SDI AS NEW STAGE IN ARMS RACE

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 2, 1987 pp 60-67

[Article by Yuri Lebedev and Aleksei Podberezkin]

[Text]

Today there is probably no political problem surrounded with as much conjecture, speculation and flagrant disinformation as the problem of the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI), or, to be more precise, the character and essence of the US plans to militarise outer space. This problem has become more acute after the Reykjavik summit, which convinced even the doubtful that the US administration is not only a zealous proponent of SDI but is also prepared to sacrifice for its sake the most important agreements ever on limiting and ending the arms race, the very chance to save the world from the horrors of a nuclear war.

The inevitable question is: why is Washington ready to sacrifice all for SDI? What is it about SDI that makes the USA willing—as Reykjavik showed—to derail the entire process of curbing the arms race for its sake? It is obvious that Washington must link SDI with very important, strategic goals. The question is—what are they?

Of course, the officially announced goals of SDI—to create a large-scale stepped-up anti-missile defence guaranteeing US security—has nothing in common with the real objectives of Washington's ruling quarters; it has been pointed out more than once that it is not feasible to create such a defence even against the presently existing nuclear missile systems¹. It will be all the more ineffective because the Soviet Union will naturally do everything necessary to neutralise the US actions. The officially declared goal of SDI is therefore unconvincing but it hides the real intentions which are much more dangerous and inimical to peace.

The real goal of SDI is military, scientific and technical superiority over the Soviet Union and the development of fundamentally *new types and systems of weapons and the means of their control*, that would be much more effective in their fighting characteristics than existing arms. SDI is therefore a qualitatively new stage of the arms race through which Washington plans to achieve military-strategic superiority in every area of military confrontation, in all types and systems of weapons and materiel, in all forms of military activity, and to turn the competition with the USSR into "technological" rivalry. That was what Ronald Reagan had in mind when he said shortly after Reykjavik: "We can either bet on American technology to keep us safe, or on Soviet promises... and I'll bet on American technology any day". Thus, it is only the far-reaching goals

which the United States connects with SDI to make a "technological" breakthrough in the latest weapons that can explain Washington's conduct on arms race limitation and show the logic behind the US administration's behaviour before, during and after Reykjavik.

WASHINGTON'S "TECHNOLOGICAL DREAM"

Throughout the postwar decades the USA has banked on a qualitative arms race, on developing a "super weapon" that would make victory in war with the USSR "automatic". This policy has been obvious in recent decades and in that sense there is nothing fundamentally new in Washington relying on the latest technological achievements. On the contrary, it has been a feature of every stage of the US propelled arms race.

At the same time, a new feature of the present period of the arms race is that the political and military ambitions of the right wing of the ruling American elite to attain world domination coincide with revolutionary changes in science and technology which make it possible to speak of a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution that is radically changing society's productive forces. These revolutionary changes give humanity unprecedented possibilities for making use of the results of the scientific and technical revolution. Unfortunately, Washington plans to use them primarily for military and aggressive purposes.

It is important to stress that the work being conducted as part of SDI and other scientific and technical programmes is already yielding concrete results that are expressed in a whipping up of the arms race. Thus, one's attention is drawn to US military R & D. For example, continuing the trend of the 1980s, the increase in Washington's military budget for 1986 was largely due to greater military R & D spending, which went up by 24 per cent in just one year. The main increment was due to financing the development of fundamentally new types and systems of weapons: SDI financing rose by 75 per cent; the Midgetman programme got a 136 per cent boost; anti-satellite weapons 46 per cent, and strategic detection, warning, command and control systems 52 per cent.²

The US administration has thus planned the most rapid growth rates for military budget appropriations which ensure R & D and priority growth rates for high technology. Under way is a kind of integration of the leading lines of military technologies based on the high tech scientific and production base. In this sense SDI is a major organisational undertaking uniting most important technological lines, scientific and technical resources, and creative potential (in the USA and in other Western countries as well) to achieve military scientific and technical superiority over socialism. This conclusion is borne out by many statements and most importantly, by US policy. Carl Haussmann, an employee at Lawrence Livermore Labs, admits: "And frankly, if SDI goes away tomorrow, some of these concepts [he means the use of some STR developments for military purposes] will find other applications outside the SDI envelope... there are technological paths opening up that will have a multitude of potential applications."³

In fact, the military and technical effects of work on SDI are already being felt long before this brainchild of the American President is embodied in a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. In other words, the results of the work on SDI are being embodied in concrete types and systems of weapons before any decision on developing anti-missile defence is taken. This actually stimulates an arms race in new areas—in most advanced technologies—so as to leave the USSR many years behind in the use of STR achievements for military purposes. The American physicist Tom Weaver has spoken quite bluntly on this score: "I think if there was a particular narrowly focused technology, they [the USSR] could either develop it or steal it. What they would have the most

trouble with is something that required a *number of integrated technologies* [our italics—Authors]. And to some extent, X-ray lasers in particular and space defense require a number of highly developed integrated technologies: integrated electronics, optics, and materials.”⁴

Under the American plans, SDI will therefore be a project that brings together a number of integrated technologies: laser technology, engines, particle beam weapons, optics, and, most importantly, highly productive computers, sensors, means of communication, etc. That is why one cannot but describe as an obvious attempt to mislead the public President Reagan's statement shortly after Reykjavik in which he said: “I discovered that many people aren't quite sure of what we're talking about, it hasn't been explained to them—SDI. It is exploring a purely defensive, purely peaceful technology”.

Of course, the whipping up of the “technological” arms race behind the screen of “defensive” phrases has another aspect, namely a non-military one: work on SDI helps Washington to realise its strategy of US “technological” leadership among other states. SDI is expected to increase American political, economic and trade might in the world. What is more, by carrying out this programme in the name of “defending the West”, Washington will be able to use the latest scientific and technological achievements and the best minds of the leading capitalist countries in its own interests and to the detriment of its partners. The whipping up of the “technological” arms race is therefore an attempt by Washington to attain a whole package of major objectives⁵: secure technological leadership in the world and step up military scientific and technical competition with the USSR so as to turn military technical superiority into military strategic one. Talk about SDI being a defensive project is nothing but a flagrant attempt to mislead the public of the United States and the other NATO countries.

FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS

As was stated above, the latest technologies developed as part of SDI will make it possible to create fundamentally new types of offensive arms—strike space weapons, i. e. laser, particle beam and kinetic (electromagnetic guns, homing missiles, shells) weapons which are highly destructive and capable of hitting targets thousands of kilometres away both in outer space and on earth in a very brief period, in huge quantities and selectively. These weapons are global in their range: deployed in near earth orbits and capable of manoeuvring, they may pose a danger to the security of any state at any moment.

Strike space weapons (SSWs) are primarily offensive arms designed to deliver a first strike against the USSR and its allies. This follows from their military and technical specifications and their possibilities. Thus, for example, strike space weapons can be effectively used to destroy *the other side's space objects*, i. e., space satellites which fulfill important security functions: early warning, communication, control, and the like. If they are suddenly put out of operation the opposing side would be “blinded” and rendered less able to respond or totally incapable of responding to a nuclear attack.

SSWs can also be used to destroy important targets *in the atmosphere and on the surface of the Earth*. Experts believe that, using strike space weapons, it is possible not only to destroy planes and missiles at takeoff, fuel storages, etc., but also to cause large fires and create electromagnetic fields that paralyse or upset people's activity and the functioning of materiel.

Finally, SSWs used as an “integrated” potential can sharply increase the *offensive force* of nuclear weapons and give them a dangerous quality—the ability to deliver a first strike in the hope of impunity, in the hope that the other side's weakened counter strike can be repulsed with anti-

missile defence weapons. In other words, there is an objective interconnection between defensive and offensive potential which is expressed in the fact that a greater ability to neutralise a counter strike means a simultaneous increase in offensive force. Both the USSR and the USA have acknowledged this interconnection on more than one occasion. Suffice it to say that the ABM Treaty signed by the two countries' leaders at the 1972 summit says that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."⁶

This view is shared by most authoritative researchers, including some in the USA itself. For example, experts from Harvard University write: "A defense-dominated world might also be less stable depending on how perfect defense systems were believed to be. In such a world, there might be heightened incentives for surprise attack, or for efforts to develop new, more decisive offensive systems."⁷ This is in fact an admission that there is a close interconnection between offensive and defensive potential, a connection that means an undoubted increase in the possibility of the party which has a defensive component to deliver a first nuclear strike.

It should be recalled that the SDI programme calls for research into various directions in the development of weapons and the concepts of their usage. It is proposed to develop a highly effective large-scale anti-missile defence system for the country, including both land and space echelons. The decision on practical realisation of this or that ABM concept is to be taken in the mid-1990s, but—and this is particularly important—before that time the bulk of R & D work will be done and a number of tests carried out on individual components and elements of the ABM system. As a result, by the time a choice is to be made between this or that ABM deployment concept, i.e., when a *political decision* is to be taken, the most important types and systems of weapons and materiel for the ABM system will already have been developed. In other words, a long road will have been travelled towards large-scale production and deployment of qualitatively new types and systems of weapons and materiel.

Already today, for example, land-based anti-missile missiles are at the stage of full-scale development. Tests have been completed on a long-range interceptor anti-missile missile with the umbrella-type warhead and tests continue on a low-altitude anti-missile missile. The USA is going to do further work on near-, medium- and long-range interceptors until 1990, and their deployment could take place in the first half of the 1990s.

Work is currently going ahead at full speed to develop detecting and tracking systems, directed energy weapons (lasers and accelerators of elementary particles), and kinetic weapons. New energy sources, means of transport, etc., are being developed. Of particularly great importance is the work on highly productive computers whose data processing rate, memory stock and "intelligence" far exceed those of existing computers.

SDI is thus a purely military programme to develop fundamentally new types of weapons—strike space weapons—which will be many times more effective than the nuclear offensive weapons systems. Indeed, strike space arms are, by their possible usage, typical offensive weapons.

At the same time—and this aspect is not always noted—work on SDI is greatly accelerating the arms race in every other area of military and political competition. The weapons systems being developed can be used not only for ABM purposes but also in a very broad spectrum of military operations—using both nuclear and conventional weapons. In addition,

SDI R & D is making the already existing types and systems of weapons qualitatively much more effective. For example, the system of combat control, communication and reconnaissance being developed as part of the Star Wars programme (which, incidentally is an important direction of the work on SDI) is drastically increasing the possibilities for combat controlling US offensive nuclear forces, is making them more effective and giving them the ability to deliver a first, "crippling" nuclear strike.

A good example of how work on SDI promotes the appearance of new types and systems of weapons is the results of US efforts to develop anti-satellite weapons. These are going ahead in three main directions.

First—and this is perhaps the best known direction—since 1977 work has been under way on the ASAT aircraft anti-satellite complex, which is intended to destroy artificial earth satellites not more than 1,000 kilometres in orbit. It comprises the modernised F-15 fighter and the two-stage SRAM-ALTAIR missile, which is equipped with a small interceptor with an infrared homing warhead. A number of tests have been conducted on this weapon, including against real targets in outer space (the SOLWIND satellite). These complexes are expected to come into use as early as 1987, and by 1992 there should be 40 planes and 112 SRAM-ALTAIR missiles of the ASAT anti-satellite complex in the US armed forces.

It is important to stress that while these complexes are tested, a number of elements of a future large scale anti-missile defence system, including orientation and guidance systems, are also being developed.

The second direction of the work on anti-satellite weapons, which is presently at the stage of elaborating concepts and conducting research, includes the creation of an artificial earth satellite equipped with missiles with fragmentation warheads. In addition, a study is being made of the possible use of mine satellites which the control centre could command to approach and blow up enemy satellites. These weapons could be developed using available technology and with little technical risk.

Finally, there are plans to develop anti-satellite systems using sources of directed transfer of energy (high power lasers, superhigh frequency generators, particle accelerators), and electrodynamic accelerators.

These, therefore, are Washington's extensive efforts to develop anti-satellite arms, which are going ahead at a stepped up pace using all the latest achievements of science and technology. There is no doubt that they have a military thrust: the task that is actually being set is that of ensuring the most favourable conditions for delivering a first nuclear strike. That is precisely why experts regard the use of anti-satellite weapons as a prelude to a "major" war, as part and parcel of the US efforts to gain a first strike potential.

Thus, according to one first strike scenario, anti-satellite systems and space-based X-ray lasers are to destroy the Soviet early warning systems and communication satellites, while Pershing-2 and cruise missiles are to strike the command, control, communication, and political centres of the Soviet Union and other countries. Then, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLMBs) and inter continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will destroy Soviet ICBM launchers and strike space weapons will "finish off" the survived Soviet missiles and vital targets on the Earth surface⁸. Anti-satellite weapon systems and strike space arms therefore have an important role to play in a potential US first strike, and their development is a priority of American imperialism under the SDI programme.

This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that by themselves anti-satellite weapons or strike space weapons cannot be used in a local conflict or for limited warfare. Their use will inevitably lead to a rapid escalation of a conflict into a global one, into a world war, above all because of the extre-

me importance of the military and other installations against which space weapons are to be used. An attack against them is justly regarded as the first phase of a global war using all forces and means and not as a limited operation. Furthermore the nature of these arms indicate that their use cannot be localised in any individual region nor can they be used to fulfil one specific mission. Soviet experts rightly point out that "this stems, in part, from the fact that, because of the laws of astrodynamics, anti-satellite operation cannot be localised (according to the location of targets and the means used to destroy them) and will immediately take on a global character. The situation is aggravated by the fact that anti-satellite actions are bound to affect the space elements of the strategic forces control and communication subsystem. And that is a sure way to set off an exchange of nuclear strikes"⁹.

Finally, this conclusion is borne out by the diametrically opposed positions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States on prohibition of anti-satellite weapons systems. As is known, the USSR wants a complete ban on the development, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems, liquidation of the existing systems of such weapons on both sides, and an international agreement on immunity of artificial earth satellites. To make this easier, in 1983 the USSR unilaterally declared a moratorium on anti-satellite weapons tests until other states, including the USA, refrain from the deployment of antisatellite weapons in outer space.

By contrast, the United States opposes a ban on anti-satellite systems and an agreement on immunity of artificial earth satellites, has been doing everything to speed up the development of such weapons, and refuses to follow the Soviet example by introducing a moratorium on anti-satellite weapon tests.

STAR WARS IS THE PRINCIPAL BARRIER TO DISARMAMENT

As is known the compromise Soviet proposals made at the meeting in the Icelandic capital offered a real possibility for agreement on very important questions—liquidation of nuclear weapons, ban on nuclear tests, and prohibition of arms in space. However, the agreement that had been virtually reached on major questions of the day did not materialise in binding accords because of Washington's categorical unwillingness to drop the idea of militarising outer space, a concrete expression of this being its refusal to strengthen the ABM Treaty, which impedes realisation of SDI.

It should also be stressed that realisation of the SDI programme is already at variance with that Treaty, which is the most important agreement on limiting and ending the arms race. For example, the 1972 ABM Treaty says: "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based" (Art. V, Point 1).¹⁰ Furthermore, the Treaty says that, "Each Party undertakes... not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory, and oriented outward" (Art. VI).¹¹ Finally, SDI contradicts the very foundation of the ABM Treaty—the provision prohibiting the deployment of ABM systems of the national territory, which the USA plans to undermine.¹²

Indeed, as has been shown, the United States is *already developing* the elements and components of a future large-scale (i. e. covering the na-

tional territory) ABM system, and is *already modernising* its early warning radars situated on the territory of other countries. Washington is therefore *already in breach* of a number of ABM Treaty provisions. Finally, the United States is *already testing*—and not in laboratories either—individual elements of a large-scale defence of the national territory including in outer space. In other words, Washington is *already failing to fulfill* its treaty commitments, and is trying to get out of them under the most various pretexts. More proof of that is the US violations of SALT-2. The Soviet government's statement of December 5, 1986 said: "After SALT-2, the ABM Treaty is a prospective target. The US administration has started to gradually shatter it too".

This very important document has a restraining influence on the preparations under way to deploy weapons in outer space, and binds the hands of those who would like to sweep away the last obstacles to a qualitative arms race. That also explains the categorical unwillingness of the American President and those quarters which back him to undertake (along with the USSR) not to pull out of the ABM Treaty over the next 10 years. This unwillingness thwarted agreement in Reykjavik on a broad range of vital questions: major reductions in strategic offensive arms and liquidation of medium-range nuclear missiles, agreement which the Soviet side had proposed.

And however hard the USA may try to sell the President's stance in Reykjavik, it has become especially clear since the summit that progress in curbing and ending the arms race requires that the United States drop its dangerous "strategic defense initiative", for it means another spiral of the arms race. Otherwise, the world is in for an even more dangerous stage of military preparations which could bring all the peoples to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Such a renunciation calls for a review of a number of fundamental propositions of American political thinking, above all reliance on military force as the decisive instrument of foreign policy, calls for the recognition not in words but in deeds of the principle of equality and equal security, and for abandoning the illusion that it is possible to achieve military technical and military strategic superiority over socialism. Of course, it is extremely difficult for the US ruling elite to take this step but it will eventually have to do so since the objective course of humanity's development is forcing Washington's ruling quarters to renounce the idea of military and technological superiority, which today underlies American policy.

Unfortunately, all indications are that there have been no appreciable changes in Washington's foreign policy. Quite the contrary. Judging by American administration actions, the US is even more convinced, and is now trying to convince others as well, that SDI is the only real way to ensure American security and guarantee that US interests are kept intact. They even go so far as to say—as, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski did, that in Reykjavik "President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was the principal catalyst" of any progress reached and called on the US President to immediately "make some strategic-defense deployment decisions".¹³ Now that is logic for you!

For that reason it is particularly relevant to ask what consequences await humanity if such an irrational policy is continued. The answer is quite simple: if SDI is not halted, humanity will enter a new, even more dangerous spiral of the arms race, which will most profoundly affect all types of weapons and forms of military activity. A qualitative arms race will be of a pace and inertia that could forever prevent us from curbing or even controlling that process. With the unprecedented complexity of

weapons and materiel and a blurring of the distinction between individual types and systems of weapons, international supervision of arms limitation agreements will be difficult.

The development of "defensive" arms will continue parallel with qualitative improvement and quantitative buildup of offensive nuclear weapons. One does not need to be a prophet to predict such consequences. It is already obvious that if the US continues with its "strategic rearmament" programmes (which Washington is now trying not to say much about) in the next decade the US will have thousands of new delivery vehicles and tens of thousands of nuclear armaments in its strategic offensive arsenal alone. In other words, behind the desire in words "to make nuclear weapons outdated", large-scale work is under way to develop a qualitatively new offensive strategic potential in addition to that which already exists in the USA. This means new types of MX and Midgetman ICBMs, Trident-2 SLBMs, cruise missiles of all basings, and B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers. All these systems are to be deployed in the next decade. And despite the successful (or so Washington claims) realisation of the SDI programme, no one has halted these programmes; rather they are being accelerated.

It is obvious that such prospects cannot enhance international security. But the situation will worsen still further if a new unknown factor—a large-scale anti-missile defence—is added to the existing strategic parity. A strategic situation in which both sides have both offensive and defensive weapon systems is much more dangerous and unstable than one in which they have only offensive arms. Calculations show that even insignificant advantages on one side in the effectiveness of its defensive system immediately destabilise the entire strategic situation and lead to the provocation of nuclear war¹⁴. Such a situation obtains even if there is a substantial cut in offensive arms, i. e. a cut in those weapons while maintaining defensive systems does not guarantee stability.

The notorious "strategic defense initiative" is not only actual deception of the peoples but, as Mikhail Gorbachev said in his November 21, 1986 interview to Indian journalists, "the main obstacles to the agreements which we were just about to reach in Reykjavik".

Further Mikhail Gorbachev noted that militarily SDI is a new stage of the arms race and means the development of new types of weapons—space weapons. Clearly, far from easing international tension, this will heighten it still further. Politically, if SDI is to be implemented, then what sense is there in holding talks? And who is going to agree to that so as to make things easier for the military-industrial complex and the militarist adventurers? SDI destabilises the strategic situation, undermines rather than builds confidence and will sow suspicion. There will be greater uncertainty. The situation which could arise might lead to hasty decisions. That is why the Americans and the entire world community should all look at where SDI is taking the world.

A new situation has taken shape in international relations since Reykjavik. The peoples have seen with their own eyes the real prospect and practical possibility of creating a nuclear-free world. They are convinced that there is no turning back. And there is only one way forward—via a new political thinking, via the awareness of realities in the present-day diverse contradictory and yet integral world.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET SCIENTIST DESCRIBES SDI-RELATED WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 6, Dec 86 pp 5-8

[Article by Sergey Rodionov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences: "Star Wars Technologies and Civilian Technologies"]

[Text] Anti-ballistic weapons analysed within the SDI framework may be classified as follows:

- 1) directional energy weapons, with energy absorbed in a thin surface layer of the target; this kind includes all types of laser weapons;
- 2) directional energy weapons with a deeper penetration of target material--particle beam weapons;
- 3) kinetic weapons--a variety of ballistic shells or homing shells, accelerated to high velocities and destroying their targets mechanically;
- 4) weapons similar to their effects to an electro-magnetic impulse from a nuclear explosion (EMI-weapons); these, for example, are bunched millimetre waves or strong-current beams of charged particles generating radiation in a wide frequency range.

Estimated damage thresholds of laser weapons amount to something like 10-20 kJ/sq.cm. The most important characteristic of a laser source is its "brightness"--the energy emitted in a unit of solid angle. Combination of brightness and damage threshold determine the radius within which a laser weapon can act. The most powerful laser systems on hydrogen fluoride (most sophisticated at present) ensure at best a brightness of 10 to the power of 18 J/steradian, which is about 1,000 times smaller than the level required for SDI components.

A combat space platform with laser weapons to knock out missiles in the active phase of their trajectory must have an ammunition totalling up to 1,000 rounds and have the rate of fire of the order of 10 shots a second. The amount of energy in each shot of a laser weapon must not be lower than 200 megajoules. For existing chemical lasers on hydrogen fluoride the specific energy emission is assessed in hundreds of joules per gramme of working agent. Thus, the total weight of the necessary chemical fuel for a combat laser platform must be several thousands of tons. (One shot requires several tons of fuel.)

Although the physical principles of laser weapons are well defined, their technical execution would lead to very bulky and heavy systems containing a large number of unreliable and vulnerable elements.

The damaging effect of particle beam weapons is due to the release in target volume of a considerable quantity of energy, which disrupts the operation of electronics and may even melt down structural elements. Typical damage thresholds are within the range of several hundreds of joules per gramme. In view of the fact that in near-Earth space it is impossible to use charged particle beams (they are subject to the action of electromagnetic fields), the only practical possibility is the use of beams of neutral hydrogen atoms. Calculations show that particle beam weapons with a range of more than 1,000 km must be very large in size and consume hundreds of times more energy than laser weapons systems.

Similar difficulties beset systems of kinetic weapons. The vast linear dimensions (hundreds of metres) of electromagnetic accelerators of kinetic projectiles make re-targeting very difficult and consequently lower the rate of fire. Besides, such space systems are very vulnerable to enemy counterforce means. As with other types of space weapons, acceleration of kinetic projectiles required energy systems of excessively great weight.

EMI-weapons build up on a target surface a short-lived impulse of electromagnetic high-frequency energy which induces marked surface currents (up to hundreds of thousands of amperes). These currents, via capacitance and induction couplings, penetrate the central regions of a target and may cause electric surges that can knock electronic circuits out. As a result, the guidance system of a ballistic missile or a warhead may be put out of action. Evidently it is technically feasible to build EMI-weapons systems with a range of 100 km.

An analysis of the technical parameters of components incorporated in a large-scale anti-missile defence system with space-based elements demonstrates that the SDI programme is highly hypertrophied militarily. In this connection attempts by SDI supporters to show up some spinoffs and the stimulating influence of programmes to militarise outer space on civilian technologies are absolutely groundless. In the opinion of Academician Roald Sagdeev, it is hard to imagine that multi-billion injections into an oversized laser with a tremendous output or into a super-computer control complex can yield spinoffs for the numerous applications likely to result in science and practical work for multi-purpose lasers. It is difficult to imagine that for medical purposes it is necessary to be able to train a laser with an immense incinerating power of its flux on a spot one square meter in extent, and from a distance of several thousand kilometres at that.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET OBSERVER CONTRASTS SDI, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

PM121345 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Observer Manki Ponomarev article under the rubric "International Observer Replies to a Reader": "Safety Fuse, Not 'Safe-Conduct'"]

[Text] Here is what Reserve Lieutenant Colonel S. Nikulin wrote to the editorial office:

"I followed attentively the course of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher's visit to the USSR. And I was struck by her statement that 'a world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for us all.' Does this mean that the head of the British Government subscribes to the 'nuclear deterrence' doctrine? What, then, is the position with M. Thatcher's proclaimed allegiance to Reagan's SDI? For it seems to me that this doctrine and SDI are clearly at variance with each other. Or is there something I do not understand here?"

You have raised an acute question, Comrade Nikulin. It is a pity it was not asked by our observers who conducted the television interview with Mrs M. Thatcher. It would have been interesting to hear how she would have answered it.

Indeed, you have only to give careful thought to this, and it will turn out that the very widespread Western belief in "nuclear deterrence" is quite incompatible with President R. Reagan's so-called SDI. What is more, they are really mutually exclusive. But with one reservation: If you take into account only the interpretation of SDI disseminated for propaganda purposes by the head of the White House himself, his immediate entourage, and certain very close allies, including in the British Isles.

What do the ideology and policy of "nuclear deterrence" boil down to? To the claim that nuclear weapons -- readiness to use them and the fear that the opposing side will resort to them to inflict a counterstrike -- are the only means of preventing war in our time. And there are many people in all the world who are sincerely convinced that an undoubted evil -- nuclear weapons -- is needed to prevent a still greater evil -- nuclear war. Those who regard the pursuit of a military superiority and the policy of blackmail and threats as of paramount importance in their activity play on this conviction.

Here, for example, is what the brochure "Soviet Military Power," now being published by the Pentagon for the sixth time, says: "The United States proceeds in its defense policy from the need to ensure nuclear deterrence." And NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington declares: "Possession of nuclear weapons is the only thing that makes us confident that we can prevent war. And it would really be very stupid to abandon them."

The British prime minister adheres to the same position. In your letter, Comrade Nikulin, you cited M. Thatcher's actual words in this regard. Here are two more statements attributed to her. "We are not prepared to agree to the idea of a nuclear-free Europe," she declared at the Moscow press conference. And the same idea was repeated in her speech to the British Parliament: "The government will not agree to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe."

In fact, the desire to pass off "nuclear deterrence" as a kind of "safe-conduct" for mankind cannot be justified from either the political or the moral viewpoint. It is a product of the old thinking which regards armed force as a means of achieving a political end. With the emergence of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles this idea does not stand up to criticism. No ends at all can be achieved by means of nuclear weapons, and their use will inevitably result in disaster.

M.S. Gorbachev made a well reasoned criticism of the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine in his speeches at the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" and at the 30 March dinner in the Great Kremlin Palace. Reliance on nuclear weapons leads only to an ever increasing risk of nuclear conflict and is comparable not with "safe-conduct" but, rather with a safety fuse leading to a charge capable of destroying civilization. The gamble on the force of nuclear weapons is a constant source of continuing the arms race and of increasing tension. And the very logic of "deterrence" means the subordination of politics to the interests of militarism with all the ensuing consequences.

Thus, if we examine "nuclear deterrence" from a historical perspective, this doctrine not only does not reduce but even increases the possibility of military conflicts. This was why the CPSU Central Committee Politburo confirmed at its 2 April session the Soviet leadership's resolute disagreement with the position according to which the conduct of international affairs and national security are only conceived of with reliance on nuclear weapons, although this encourages their spread and is fraught with universal catastrophe. This is why the Soviet leadership is striving so persistently to assert new thinking in the world arena. This is why it advances such large-scale peace initiatives and struggles consistently for their implementation.

What bearing does SDI have on all this? If we take its authors' claims on trust, the whole purpose of SDI is supposedly to reduce the role of nuclear missile weapons to naught, make them worthless, and deprive them of any effectiveness. They say they will create a "space shield" over America, and no one's nuclear weapons will pose even the slightest threat to it. They also promise to place West Europe under this shield.

And here the question arises: How will things stand then with "nuclear deterrence," without which they cannot imagine life in the NATO countries' capitals on both sides of the Atlantic? And it would be interesting to learn how the question would be answered by Mrs. Thatcher, who advocates both "nuclear deterrence" and Reagan's SDI.

However, the explanation is quite simple. "Nuclear deterrence" is by no means an instrument of mutual deterrence but a concentrated expression of the "policy of force" based on nuclear intimidation.

And the notorious SDI is not at all a defensive program aimed at making nuclear weapons worthless but something quite different. Here is what that same American brochure "Soviet Military Power" says: "If the Soviets acquired a monopoly on the latest ABM defense in addition to their large and growing offensive forces, they might consider it possible to inflict a strike on the United States or our allies without fearing an effective counterstrike." You have only to swap over the words "Soviets" and "United States" in that quotation, and everything at once becomes clear.

And in conclusion, Comrade Nikulin, another sentence from the same Pentagon brochure: "Neither the potential of strategic defense nor the bright prospects of a considerable arms reduction eliminates the need to maintain the strength of our (that is, American -- M.P.) nuclear deterrent force." It seems to have been left in the text through an obvious oversight by the editors. For it prints in black and white what you and I discerned long ago and what the transatlantic propagandists hide so diligently from the public. Not even the full implementation of SDI will lead to the elimination of the U.S. nuclear forces but will serve as both a cover for them and a substantial addition to them. This is precisely the point.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION OF PLUTONIUM-239

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 6, Dec 86 pp 8-11

[Unattributed item by "Observer": "Is It Possible To Disprove Calculations?"]

[Text] A little over two years ago Amadei D'Adamo published in THE NEW YORK TIMES preliminary calculations on the formation of a plutonium cover injurious to nature and people following the operation of a space missile defence system. This professor of biology, citing the laws of gravitation, claimed that in the event of even ten percent of existing missiles being destroyed, the atmosphere could be poisoned with plutonium equivalent in its effect to ten billion pounds of cyanide, with a half-life period of 120,000 years.

D'Adamo's statements were qualified by SDI supporters as futurological conclusions far divorced from reality and were repudiated not only with words, but also with public demonstrations of laser techniques that destroyed targets with invisible rays seemingly harmless for people and the Earth's biosphere.

It appears however that the American professor is right in the main thing--a strategic defence system with space-based elements is capable of producing the same result as a nuclear war, that is, it can lead to the perishing of all life due to radioactive contamination.

Let us try to analyse this by taking as our point of departure the calculations of American scientists engaged in the SDI programme. According to their estimates, the first echelon of a global ABM system (a total of 5 to 7 echelons are planned) would be penetrated by about 30 percent of the enemy missiles launched. The missiles that would leak would ensure their warheads a speed necessary for flight along the calculated ballistic path. Hitting and destroying of these warheads by the subsequent echelons of the ABM system would not be able to alter the flight trajectory and these warheads or their fragments would inevitably reach the calculated spot. In addition, fragments of ICBM warheads hit at the closing stages of the boost phase which nevertheless gained enough speed to reach their targets would fall on the Earth. In that way, some 60 to 70 percent of the warheads containing nuclear ammunition with plutonium-239 would burn over or fall on the Earth.

Under American nuclear war scenarios, a massive strike may involve no less than 6,000 enemy warheads. Proceeding from this, it may be assumed that given a highly effective ABM system the enemy's territory would be reached by fragments of some 4,000 warheads with a total amount of plutonium-239 in the order of 25 to 40 tons.

The principal mass of the plutonium-239 would burn up in the atmosphere, producing fine-dispersed aerosol particles of plutonium dioxide with linear dimensions of the order of one micrometre, while part of that mass would fall on the Earth's surface in the form of relatively large chunks that would get oxidised in the air as well.

Since the aerosol particles so formed may be regarded as distributed more or less evenly in the atmosphere at altitudes of up to 10 km from the Earth's surface, then the concentration level of plutonium-239 in the air would exceed 10 to the inverse 13th power g/litre, which would be a thousand times more than the permissible norm. Besides, it should be taken into consideration that during approximately one to two years aerosol particles would be deposited from the upper layers of the atmosphere into the lower ones directly near the Earth's surface. The dust of plutonium-239 dioxide that would be deposited on the Earth would be partly lifted into the air by winds. All that could lead to a considerable local increase in the plutonium content in near-Earth air layers, up to a concentration of the order of 10 to the inverse 11th or 12th power g/litre.

The inhalation path of plutonium-239 is most dangerous for human health and life. Plutonium particles, once inside the human organism, are practically not removed. They would accumulate predominantly in the lungs. In the course of two years (the time when high concentrations of plutonium-239 in the lower layers of the atmosphere would be retained) the lungs of a person in, for example, the U.S. or Europe would receive more than 6×10 to the inverse 6th power gramme (6 microgrammes) of plutonium dioxide.

The effect of such an amount of plutonium in the human organism may be illustrated with the following calculations. A dioxide particle with a content of plutonium-239 of the order of 10 to the inverse 11th power grammes found in the lunge alveoli has an activity of 2.3×10 to the inverse 2nd power becquerel (one becquerel is equal to one disintegration of second). The penetration depth of alpha particles with an energy of 5.5 MeV emitted during the decay of plutonium-239 nuclei is about 40 micrometres in the lung substance. Thus, every plutonium particle would in the course of two years create a dose of absorbed radiation over 100 rad in the tissues surrounding the lung within a radius of 1 mm. With time the dose would grow.

As is known, the effect of alpha radiation is about ten times higher than gamma and beta radiations, which are the main radiological effects in nuclear explosions and in subsequent radioactive contamination. Accordingly, the equivalent dose to each particle of plutonium-239 dioxide would be more than 1,000 rem over the two years, which would result in serious radiation lesions and necrosis of lung tissues in a locally exposed zone.

The volume of a lung zone affected by each particle of plutonium-239 dioxide is approximately 4×10 to the inverse 3rd power cu.cm, and for the total number of particles accumulated over two years (600,000 particles) up to 2,500 cu.cm or 2.5 litres, which is about half of the lung volume. It should be remembered that the lethal nature of such an effect would be determined not only by the size of the affected part of the lung tissue, but also by attendant lung bleeding and infectious lung diseases.

In a number of instances the effect of plutonium-239 on the organism would not be confined only to the lungs, but may also lead to disturbances in the blood formation system, to blood diseases and to the damage of the organism's immune system. Other long-term effects of radiation contamination with plutonium-239 would be an increased incidence of cancer disease, cirrhosis of the liver, and pneumosclerosis. Of particular risk is the long-term effect of plutonium-239 on the growing organisms of children.

The above calculations may cause a controversy among experts and be adjusted either way. But the main conclusion remains unchanged: the ultimate result of the actual use of SDI would be comparable to the result of the use of radiological weapons, which are known to have been banned.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ACDA DOCUMENT ON NST ROUND SEVEN CRITICIZED

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 2, Jan 87 pp 1-7

[Article by Col-Gen Nikolay Chervov, USSR General Staff department chief:
"At Round VII in Geneva the United States Has Considerably Departed from
the Reykjavik Understanding"]

[Text] The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency published late in
January "United States and Soviet Union NST Proposals--Round VII."
This is the American interpretation of the sides' common approach to the
issue. Talking to Military Bulletin, Colonel-General Nikolai Chervov
sets forth a Soviet viewpoint on the matter.

MB. Does the US approach to the nuclear and space weapon talks (NST
Round VII), as expressed in the above document, reflect the mutual under-
standing reached in Reykjavik?

Chervov. It doesn't. Judging by the document, at Round VII the US has
substantially deviated from the Reykjavik understanding. This document
distorts the proposals the USSR advanced in Reykjavik and at NST. Here
are facts.

The US document attempts to set the Soviet package tabled at Round VII
against the Soviet proposals made at the USSR-US summit Geneva in November
1985. It is pretended that the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik
is of no significance.

The Agency's document alleges that whereas at the Geneva summit the USSR
did not link strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles to other
issues, at Round VII the Soviet side sees these weapons in package. A
primitive trick designed for the ill-informed.

First, before, during and after the Geneva summit, that is from the NST
start, the Soviet proposals as regards strategic offensive arms have been
linked to the space issue. The Soviet Union has always held that space
should remain peaceful and there should be no weapons, Soviet or American
there if we want to see major cuts in strategic offensive arms. It is
strange that the Agency does not know of this Soviet stand. They don't
even know that at the Geneva summit the sides interpreted a 50 percent cut

differently. While the United States applied a 50 percent cut only to strategic offensive arms, the Soviet Union extended it to all strategic weapons reaching the other's territory. Overlooking this "minor detail," the United States is presenting things topsy-turvy.

The Soviet position with regard to medium-range missiles has also been distorted. At the Geneva summit the USSR wanted this problem to be resolved out of contact with other issues, provided Britain and France did not increase the corresponding weapons and the United States undertook not to transfer strategic missiles to other countries. In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union even agreed with the US zero option. Why then does the Agency hush up the package of major, unprecedented concessions made by the USSR?

It is simply because it would be disadvantageous for them to speak about the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik in general now that the Americans are returning to their pre-Reykjavik stand. Hence, attempts to keep the public in the dark as regards the Reykjavik accords and "to ennoble" the US destructive attitude to Round VII.

The USSR considers that the Reykjavik summit was a major event which ended one stage in our campaign for disarmament and opened another. The Soviet proposals tabled in Reykjavik remain in force. For all resistance on the part of the US right-wing extremists, it is now impossible to get away from what was achieved in Reykjavik.

MB. Since the Agency's document does not say anything about the results reached in Reykjavik, will you kindly tell us on what points the sides agreed and disagreed in Iceland? From what specific accords the US is currently departing?

Chervov. Two positions were discussed in Reykjavik. The Soviet position took the form of a package of new major proposals to slash down and fully abolish nuclear weapons and not to orbit strike space weapons. The US stand was reduced to the proposals Washington advanced at the Geneva talks earlier and aimed to develop, test and orbit strike space weapons. The United States did not make a single new proposal. Nevertheless, insistent and flexible, the USSR succeeded in leading the US right up to an agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms and liquidate medium-range missiles in Europe.

On strategic offensive arms, the USSR offered the US a new formula for a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons: to halve over the next five years, by the end of 1991, the strategic triad encompassing intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The sides agreed to effect the reduction to allow each of them to keep 1,600 carriers with 6,000 warheads (about 50 percent of the current US stocks of warheads). An understanding was reached that the sides would themselves determine the structure of their strategic offensive arms after the 50 percent cut, i.e. the mix of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The sides agreed that all strategic offensive arms would be fully abolished in the subsequent five years (by the end of 1996).

On strategic offensive arms, the USSR went to major concessions. First, it removed the earlier demand of the US medium-range missiles and forward-deployed weapons reaching Soviet territory being included in the strategic count. Second, the USSR, taking into account the US concern as regards Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, agreed to cut them by halve. Third, the USSR agreed to see, within the fixed carrier and warhead levels, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear bombs and SRAM missiles as single warhead missiles (i.e. one carrier, one unit).

On medium-range missiles, the USSR also made concessions, considering the importance of the issue for Europe. The USSR proposed fully eliminating SS-20s, Pershing-2s and cruise missiles in Europe, while leaving the British and French nuclear armaments intact. It agreed to reduce its medium-range missiles in Asia to 100 warheads. In that case the United States would have as many warheads with its missiles on its territory, Alaska excluded. The Soviet compromises made an agreement possible also on medium-range missiles.

In this way, in Reykjavik an understanding was reached both on strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles. A realistic prospect thus emerged for major cuts in nuclear weapons. The new situation shifted the emphasis onto the strict observance of the AMB treaty so that the US would not employ strike space weapons to prevail over the Soviet Union militarily. The Soviet Union insisted on a reinforced ABM treaty, the signatories not using for ten years their right to withdraw from the treaty and on banning tests for space-based components of an anti-missile defence system. The United States wanted the Soviet Union to agree with SDI deployment, steering for a revision of the ABM Treaty. The US President proposed, while reducing strategic offensive arms, replacing the termless ABM treaty with a temporary scheme. This was an attempt to get a Soviet go-ahead for dismantling the AMB Treaty and allowing the Pentagon to take weapons to space. The Soviet Union would not agree to such things. SDI blocked a realistic solution for the nuclear weapons issue.

All blame for the chance lost in Reykjavik goes to the United States. The US President brushed aside all Soviet proposals and rejected nuclear disarmament in favour of its Star Wars.

Judging by the Agency's document, the US has, first, toughened its stand on SDI. Alleging dedication to the ABM treaty, the US Administration is seeking Soviet consent to space tests for space-based components of an anti-missile defence system, along with a 50 percent cut in Soviet and US ballistic missiles. The aim?

While formally sticking to the ABM treaty, the United States wants, with Soviet consent, to develop and test over a fixed period (10 years) all the hardware for a major anti-missile defence system with space-based elements. Those projects completed and SDI feasibility confirmed, the United States would start deploying a space-based anti-missile defence system and scrap the 1972 treaty. However, in the meantime, Washington expects the sides would have made major cuts in their ballistic missiles, bringing the level

of warheads down to 4,500 under the US 50 percent-cut variant. In such a case SDI would be dealing with just 4,500 warheads. This would facilitate a space-based anti-missile defence system, enhancing confidence as regards its effectiveness.

The USSR won't help the United States disarm itself. There cannot be any compromises here. Radical cuts in nuclear armaments would be possible if the ABM Treaty's provisions banning the space tests of components of an anti-missile defence system were strictly complied with, i.e. the arms race not transferred to space. Tests of space-based components of an anti-missile defence system, in violation of Article 5 of the ABM Treaty, would make the treaty meaningless, not worth the paper it has been written on. In the absence of the ABM Treaty, considering the fact that the United States discarded SALT-2, strategic offensive arms development would proceed chaotically, as a game without rules, to make any nuclear arms reductions impossible.

Second, the US is departing from the Reykjavik accords on strategic offensive arms. The Agency's document says that only offensive ballistic missiles, not all strategic offensive arms as was agreed, in principle, in Reykjavik, should be fully abolished by the end of 1996. What's behind this? This would leave the USSR without strategic hardware to counteract Washington. As for the United States, it wants to have more than a 5-time superiority over the USSR in nuclear weapons for heavy bombers and a multiple increase over us in sea-launched cruise missiles. Further, the United States wants to preserve some 3,000 warheads with the US forward-based nuclear weapons and carrier-based aircraft capable of hitting Soviet territory. In other words, the United States would like to return to the 40s and 50s when US territory was invulnerable, while Soviet territory was exposed to a massive threat on the part of the US strategic and tactical strike airforce. No man in his senses would accept such a proposal.

At the Geneva talks, as the Agency's document plainly states, the US has returned to its old proposals as regards throw weight, limits and sub-limits for strategic offensive arms, having thus breached the Reykjavik accords. If the United States is really interested in preserving the mutual understanding recorded in Reykjavik and not just paying lip-service to the matter, such possibilities do exist. In Geneva on November 7, the Soviet delegation presented new proposals based on the Reykjavik agreements. The ball is now in Washington's court.

The dilemma is as follows: either progress towards real cuts in nuclear weapons or a Star Wars-related round in the arms race. The US right-wing extremists are urging the President to start deploying surface components, available with today's technology, of an anti-missile defence system, not waiting for the completion of its space-based elements. In the National Press Club in Washington recently, Caspar Weinberger said the Pentagon would orbit SDI weapons as soon as they were ready. On January 12, shortly before Round VII, the US President called for SDI's early implementation as if he

did not know that the ABM treaty was against the space-based components of an anti-missile defence system. That is probably why papers such as the Agency's document appear, muddling up the main issue, i.e. whether space will remain peaceful or will accommodate deadly weapons. This is the touchstone for the sides' allegations that they want to avert the nuclear threat from the world. All countries want to see the matter settled positively. They should work for disarmament more effectively.

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CSO: 5200/1424

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON 'SINCERITY' OF U.S.-USSR ARMS TALKS

HK031001 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 1 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Chi Li (6688 4539): "The Whole World Is Watching"]

[Text] How much sincerity do the United States and the Soviet Union have for reducing nuclear weapons? This is a question about which more and more people in the world are thinking.

The weekly "U.S. NEW AND WORLD REPORT" recently published an article entitled "Arms Control Talks Enter a Substantial Stage," saying that as the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles entered a substantial stage, both sides were arguing endlessly on some minor issues. It asked: Do the two sides really hope to reach an agreement or will they try to play some tricks in order to place the blame on the other side? This article showed that many people in the United States are still doubtful about the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles.

Such concerns are not groundless. Since the beginning of the medium-range missiles talks, the United States and the Soviet Union have added additional terms one after another to the basic agreement they reached at the Iceland summit meeting. The Soviet Union holds that the U.S.-Soviet talks on reducing medium-range missiles in Europe should be separated from the talks on limiting short-range missiles and conventional weapons, but the United States holds that this would represent "retrogression" and emphasizes that consideration should be given to the issue of limiting short-range missiles and conventional weapons at the same time. On the other hand, the United States has put forth a "detailed" verification scheme, while the Soviet Union has called for some "comprehensive and reliable" means of examination. The United States holds that it should have the right to transform the "Pershing II" missiles to "Pershing IV" short-range missiles, while the Soviet Union insists that it should have the right to rebuild the SS-20 missiles into intercontinental missiles.

All this has left an impression on people that the two sides are just playing tricks on each other rather than advancing step by step toward the objective of reaching an agreement. Therefore, they deliberately complicate things to outdo the other side and raise new obstacles to the talks.

A lack of sincerity and mutual trust is the main reason why no progress can be made in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks.

At present, it seems that the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles will return to the old track of their disarmament talks many years ago. In the talks, both sides are trying hard to maintain their respective strategic interests and to win strength superiority over the other side, but disregard the world's people's ardent desire for peace and security.

The recent UN disarmament conference in Beijing unanimously urged the United States and the Soviet Union to show sincerity and take actual steps to reduce their arms rather than merely putting forth some disarmament proposals or signing some disarmament agreements.

Will the two countries, which should bear special responsibility, for nuclear disarmament, accept this advice? The whole world is watching.

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CSO: 5200/4017

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PERU'S GARCIA SUPPORTS SOVIET PEACE, ARMS LIMITATION PROPOSALS

PY311404 Paris AFP in Spanish 0500 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Lima, 30 Mar (AFP) -- President Alan Garcia today said that he follows with interest the proposals of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in favor of the limitation of nuclear weapons. Garcia made this statement after meeting for 30 minutes with a Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by Grant M. Voskanyan, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

After the meeting held in the Government Palace, President Garcia indicated that the visit will strengthen trade between Peru and the Soviet Union.

Voskanyan stated that he conveyed to President Garcia the greetings of Andrey Gromyko, president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and former foreign minister.

The Soviet delegation was also received today by Senate President Armando Villanueva, and Chamber of Deputies President Fernando Leon de Vivero.

After the meeting with Voskanyan, Villanueva said that the Peruvian Government and people join with the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace and the limitation of the manufacturing and purchase of weapons so that these resources can be used to take care of the needs for food, education and the health of people throughout the world.

/12858

CSO: 5200/2006

SOVIET COLONEL DISCUSSES STEALTH TECHNOLOGY

PM091337 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

["Military-Technical Review" by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. Nazarenko:
"'Stealth': Program and Technology"; first paragraph is readers' letter]

[Text] "The foreign press has recently begun to use quite frequently the world combinations 'Stealth technology' and 'the Stealth program.' Could the newspaper not write about this in greater detail? T. Melnikov, V. Yesikov, A. Tsvylov."

The essence of Stealth technology consists in using scientific and technical achievements to sharply reduce the observability of aircraft (manned and unmanned) by radar or thermal (infrared) location. It is a question of reducing the airframe's effective scattering cross section and the radiation intensity of the propulsion system (engine).

The essence of the Stealth program, so called by analogy with the technology, is the creation of a new generation of models of "inconspicuous" aviation and rocket technology. Foreign commentators believe that this program will be one of the costliest.

So, what is the essence of the scheme? American specialists believe that in the future it will be possible to reduce the extent of the aircraft's effective scattering cross section to hundredths of a square meter (for the B-1A bomber it now stands at approximately 10 square meters). They propose to achieve this by improving the airframe configuration, replacing traditional materials with ones that do not reflect electromagnetic energy, and employing highly efficient antiradar coatings.

One of the difficulties the designers are encountering, the foreign press points out, is that of reaching a compromise between the shape of the aircraft and its flight and technical characteristics. Virtually all types of modern fighters and bombers make ideal radar targets, as they have large reflective surfaces. In addition, the majority of these aircraft have prominent [gabaritnyy] air intakes and exhaust units. They are "hung about" with bombs, missiles, and various containers which form "corner reflectors" of kind. Therefore the main principles of the design and aerodynamic configuration of Stealth aircraft consist in concealing all suspension elements inside the airframe. It is also sought to hide the engines behind special air intakes and to eliminate vertical surfaces.

Foreign specialists believe that it is possible to realize the idea of an airframe "integral layout," which will ensure less "conspicuousness" and greater lift for the aircraft while satisfying other requirements, only on the basis of machine design methods. This comparison is cited in the press: The American B-52 and F-4 aircraft, which were developed with a view, above all, to meeting aerodynamic, flight, and technical requirements, had effective scattering cross sections of 100 and 5 square meters respectively. The F-14 and F-15 fighters were created with regard to new requirements, and so with them this indicator is equal to approximately 3 square meters. The effective scattering cross section has been reduced for the F-16 fighter and the B-1A bomber.

According to foreign press reports, in creating the B-1B heavy bomber they have succeeded in significantly doing away with the so-called "resonating effect" (this arises when the length of the external airframe structural members is exactly divisible by half the wavelength of the radar signals sweeping the aircraft) and have secured an effective scattering cross section of approximately 1 square meter.

The aircraft's wave-shaped form, obtained by altering the curvature of the leading edge of the wings and improving the cut of the air intakes, as well as removing from the fin the antenna of the radioelectronic suppression station and replacing it with an antenna built into the fuselage, to a certain extent meets the requirements of Stealth technology. Nevertheless, foreign military experts point out, neither the B-1B bomber nor the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft with a "disproportionately small radar image" is what future aircraft will look like.

Specialists of the Northrop, Lockheed, Boeing, and other aviation firms believe that Stealth fighters and bombers will most likely be in the form of a "flying wing" without fuselage or tail units. The press has reported tests of several models of manned fighters designed with regard to Stealth technology -- the Kheyv blyu [as published] program. Radar operators were able to detect one of these aircraft "of strange external appearance," the foreign press points out, "only when it was so close that under real conditions there would not have been time to launch a missile."

The Lockheed firm has developed a new aircraft on the basis of Kheyv blyu [as published] models (the Western press calls it Specter, Ghost Rider, Frisbee, or the F-19) and has tested it. On the basis of those tests the U.S. Strategic Air Command concluded that, although the "flying wing" design has not been rid of shortcomings, priority must still be given to reducing the aircraft's effective scattering cross section over certain of its aerodynamic properties.

Developers of new-generation aircraft pin great hopes on special fuselage and wing coatings which absorb or dissipate the electromagnetic energy of radar signals. It is a question of complex multilayer materials of glass fiber and chemically processed foam, graphite and epoxy resin, rubber and ferrites, and others. Reports have appeared in the foreign press that the airframe's "visibility" can also be reduced by using superstrong light alloys (like kevlar) and aluminides, as well as by using new composition materials whose molecular structure helps to dissipate radar signals.

To disguise the engine's thermal radiation it is proposed to use ceramic shields and special exhaust units, to add various chemicals to the exhaust jet of gases, and to form "screens" of cold air and liquid nitrogen. The task of shielding has proved not only complex but also contradictory, because the introduction of additional shields into the aircraft's design affects its aerodynamic characteristics and entails an inevitable increase in the scattering cross section. This is why it is thought that the package of measures must also include the use of automated onboard systems of electronic equipment capable of substantially reducing the efficiency of radar and infrared means of detection.

Foreign specialists believe that the maximum effect can only be obtained if comprehensive use is made of all the Stealth technology methods aimed at sharply reducing the likelihood of aircraft being detected by enemy radar.

The Stealth program is not confined just to the creation of fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft. The General Dynamics firm is developing a Stealth cruise missile, which will become the chief armament of the B-1B strategic bomber. U.S. Navy specialists are also working on a Stealth cruise missile. All these programs are designed to give a new boost to a further arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1415

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COVERAGE OF GORBACHEV VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Talks with Husak 10 April

PM101112 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Talk With G. Husak"]

[Excerpts] Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met in Prague on 9 April with Gustav Husak, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and president of Czechoslovakia.

In a conversation marked by comradely trust and frankness, [otkrovyennost] they exchanged views on topical issues in the two parties' activity and major elements in the development of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.

Considering international issues, they gave special attention to the need for resolving the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe and strengthening peace and cooperation on the continent.

Gorbachev Dinner Speech

PM101108 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading "In a Cordial, Comradely Atmosphere": "Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's Speech"]

[Excerpt] Today we also discussed with Comrade Husak international affairs. Our opinions and approaches to problems and the entire philosophy of foreign policy are identical. We also have the same opinion of the main danger threatening mankind--the danger of nuclear war.

In this context I would like -- so to speak, hot on the heels of the latest meetings, talks, and addresses of Western politicians -- to give my opinion of nuclear weapons.

Now when there is real hope of starting the process of liquidating these weapons, some Western politicians began to literally eulogize them. They claim that it is only to these weapons that Europe owes the long period of peace and that, allegedly, only these weapons can guarantee security in the future.

Ours is a different opinion, we approach nuclear weapons and the ensuring of reliable security of nations in a different way. Banking on nuclear deterrence is extremely dangerous. It is enough to say that today more than 20,000 nuclear charges can be used at once, from the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the USSR alone. This unimaginably destructive force is kept in the highest degree of readiness and missiles with warheads are aimed at concrete targets. [paragraph continues]

At the same time, the Western states possessing nuclear weapons refuse, in contrast to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, to commit themselves to not being the first to use them.

Let us concede, however, that Western leaders will have enough sense and will not press the red button in order not to expose their own countries to a crushing retaliation. But what if the danger of a lethal explosion arises as a result of human error, a technical fault, or an evil intention of some individual? The possibility of such a tragic development of events has been spoken of often. This possibility will increase many times if nuclear weapons are deployed in outer space, according to the U.S. "Star Wars" concept.

It also is said that nuclear weapons are necessary for ensuring national interests. But what will happen then with the nonnuclear countries? They will either have to commit their fate into the hands of the nuclear states or seek ways of obtaining these weapons. It is not hard to imagine what a future would await mankind if they spread to all countries and continents.

The very idea of mankind being condemned to live in constant, inexorable danger of self-destruction seems criminal to us. Banking on maintaining nuclear weapons means depriving people of hope for the future. However, nations cannot and do not want to be hostages of selfish interests or of the madness of militaristic circles.

This is why we cannot agree with the concept of nuclear deterrence. This is why we speak of the need for new political thinking whose first and main requirement is to acknowledge the necessity and feasibility of creating a nuclear-free world for the sake of mankind's survival.

Where else but in Europe above all should the way to this thinking be paved?

Dear Comrades, I think that I express a common opinion if I say that the first day of the visit and its results justify our belief that our meetings and talks here in Czechoslovakia will be a good contribution to strengthening Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation and joint action, that they will help consolidate the positions of the forces of progress and socialism, that they will contribute to peace.

May the fraternity of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists, of the nations of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia develop and strengthen.

To the friendship of the nations of the socialist countries.

To the health of Comrade Husak and all those present.

The speeches of Comrades G. Husak and M.S. Gorbachev were heard with great attention and greeted with prolonged applause.

The dinner took place in a cordial, comradely atmosphere.

Gorbachev 10 April Rally Speech

PM131112 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 Second Edition pp 1, 2

["Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Rally"]

[Excerpt] Esteemed comrades! The time in which we live sets us complex and, if you like, even puzzling questions concerning the destinies of the world and the future of mankind. The mutual dependence of the present-day world is such that all peoples are similar to climbers roped together on a mountainside; they either can climb higher together to the summit or fall together into the abyss. To prevent a fall happening, politicians must rise above narrowly conceived, selfish interests and recognize the entire dramatic nature of the present situation. This is why the question of the need for new political thinking in the nuclear age is so acute. It is this new political thinking alone that is capable of leading all those who take part in international relations to take urgent measures to avert the nuclear catastrophe that threatens to destroy mankind. It cannot be said that the idea of new thinking has aroused no response. On the contrary, the number of people in the world who share it is growing. Among them are scientists, doctors, representatives of many other professions, the creative intelligentsia; it was possible to be convinced of this once again during the international forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, held recently in Moscow. On certain questions we also can see signs of a new approach to international affairs on the part of a number of eminent Western politicians and statesmen. But these are just the first shoots of growth.

The old stereotypes that put their imprint on foreign policy are still strong in the West. It will be possible to really speak of the new political thinking having been transformed into a real force only when the cause of disarmament has finally been moved out of a deadlock.

Is it possible to hope for this? What prospects are there today? I will reply immediately -- there are hopes, and it is possible to reduce the danger of war. This is our conviction. It is founded both on the growing understanding in the world of the fatal consequences to humanity of a nuclear conflict as well as on the opportunities that opened up in Reykjavik for achieving accords on a significant reduction and the elimination of the more destructive forms of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union responsibly states its desire to seek mutually acceptable solutions for the whole complex of nuclear disarmament. A radical reduction of strategic offensive arms remains a fundamental problem. We are, as is known, ready to take the most resolute steps with regard to this, both a 50-percent reduction of these arms over a period of 5 years and their complete elimination over a period of 10 years -- under the condition -- naturally an indispensable one -- that the ABM Treaty be strictly observed and that the arms race not start in space.

Striving to make, finally, the first and therefore extraordinarily important step along the path of disarmament, we proposed that a separate accord be reached on medium-range missiles. In this we took into account both the voice of the world public and the desire, voiced by our Western partners, to rid Europe completely of these missiles. However, a paradoxical situation has come about. Some politicians and even governments now are disowning their own zero option, as though it is the evil one, attempting to hedge in the solution of the question of the medium-range missiles with all manner of reservations and provisos.

Much is being written and said currently in the West about the problem of operational and tactical missiles. We are ready to solve this problem constructively, too, but to do this in such a way is not to complicate the achievement of an accord on what is at present the central question -- the medium-range missiles.

To make it easier to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe without delay, we propose to commence discussion on the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with ranges of between 500 and 1,000 km, deployed on the European Continent, without tying to this progress and results in solving the problem of medium-range missiles. For the period of the talks, the sides would pledge not to increase the number of operational and tactical missiles.

I stress that we are in favor of bringing this matter to a radical reduction and, ultimately, to the complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles in Europe. We consider it to be unnecessary to incorporate into a future accord various allowances for their build up and perfection.

Following the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles [rakety sredney dalnosti], and irrespective of the progress of discussion on the issue of operational and tactical missiles [operativno-takticheskiye rakety], the Soviet Union, after consultation with the Governments of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, will withdraw from those countries the missiles deployed there in response to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The implementation of an accord on operational and tactical missiles would, naturally, be carried out under strict verification [kontrol], just as is the case for medium-range missiles and strategic nuclear arms.

If we are talking about the reduction and especially the elimination of whole classes of nuclear arms in Europe, issues of the verification [proverka] of the observance of future agreements also acquires a qualitatively new significance.

Verification [kontrol] in these conditions becomes one of the most important means of guaranteeing security. This is why we will advocate the elaboration of very strict measures in this field, having in mind, of course, not verification for the sake of verification [kontrol], but monitoring [proverka] of the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the sides at all stages of nuclear disarmament.

Appropriate verification [kontrol], including the use of on-site inspection, must encompass the missiles and launchers remaining after reduction, both the operational ones and those at all other installations, test sites, production works, training centers and so on.

The admission of inspectors to the other side's military bases on the territory of third countries also must be guaranteed; this is essential to obtain total confidence in the fact that the agreement is being strictly observed.

Another urgent issue that is directly connected with European security: the concentration in that region of a huge potential of armed forces and conventional arms. Of course, for Europe, as for all the world, the elimination of nuclear weapons -- strategic, medium-range, and operational and tactical [likvidatsiya yadernogo orzhiya strategicheskogo, sredney dalnosti, i operativno-takticheskogo] -- is a priority task. It is doubtful whether anyone would argue with this. However, let us put the question in the following way: Does the huge concentration on the continent of

tactical nuclear and nonnuclear weapons as well as the armed forces confronting each other correspond to the idea of a safe world? I think that the answer to this question is clear. Unfortunately, as yet absolutely nothing has been done to remedy the extremely unsatisfactory situation that has unfolded here.

The situation must be changed abruptly by the adoption of measures to reduce, and, in the final analysis, to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, and to reduce radically armed forces and conventional arms in order to exclude the possibility of a sudden attack.

A major step in this direction would be the implementation of the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest program, in which it is proposed to resolve the issues of the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms as a set with tactical missiles, strike aircraft, nuclear artillery, and other tactical nuclear means. [voprosy sokrashcheniya vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzhenii predlagaetsya reshat v komplekse s takticheskimi raketami, udarnoy aviatsiyey, atomnoy artilleriyei i drugimi takticheskimi, yadernymi sredstvami.]

The need for such joint consideration is dictated by the fact that tactical nuclear weapons are, for the most part, dual-purpose weapons, that is, they can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. [neobkhodimost takogo sovmeznogo rassmotreniya diktuyetsya tem, chto takticheskiye yadernyye vooruzheniya v svoem bolshinstve yavlyayutsya oruzhiyem dvoynogo naznacheniya, to yest, mogut nesti kak obychnyye, tak i yadernyye zaryady]. Efforts by all European states, the United States, and Canada, are required to reduce armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Consultations are now underway in Vienna between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, the question arises: Has the time not come to gather all the foreign ministries of states participating in the CSCE and make a decision on the start of major talks aimed at radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional weapons?

It would also be possible at such talks to discuss a number of priority measures pertaining to reducing military confrontation and preventing the threat of sudden attack, as well as the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous kinds of offensive weapons from the immediate contact zone of the two military alliances.

The ultimate aim of these talks would be major reductions in armed forces and armaments, with the establishment of international verification [kontrol] and the application of on-site inspection. Last year's Stockholm conference provided experience of drafting such measures. Of course, this also would require the exchange of relevant data on the armed forces and armaments of the USSR, the United States, and other states in this region. In the West they talk about inequality, imbalance. Of course, there is asymmetry in the armed forces of both sides in Europe dictated by historical, geographical, and other factors. We are for eliminating any elements of inequality that have arisen, but not through a buildup by those who are behind, but through a reduction on the part of those who are ahead. We see the process of reducing military confrontation in Europe as a phased process, observing balance at each stage at the level of reasonable sufficiency.

These measures would make it possible to shift the entire bulk of the problems of armed forces and armaments that has built up in Europe. This is now a truly unique opportunity and it would be inexcusable to let it slip by.

The goals of strengthening European security also would be assisted by such measures as the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones which are free of chemical weapons. I would like to state that we support the address by the Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG Government, proposing the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. As is known, the SPD [Social Democratic Party] also made a contribution to developing the idea of such a corridor. All nuclear weapons would be subject to removal from that zone, including nuclear mines, operational and tactical and tactical missiles [operativno-takticheskiye i takticheskiye rakety], nuclear artillery, carrier aircraft of the tactical strike air force, and antiaircraft missile complexes capable of using nuclear weapons. Among these means, a significant proportion are so-called dual-purpose means, of which I have already spoken. For our part, we are prepared to withdraw from such a corridor all Soviet nuclear weapons. We are prepared to guarantee and respect the nuclear-free status of this zone. Of course, an accord on such a corridor must provide that there will be no nuclear weapons on the part of NATO in the corridor proposed by the Governments of the GDR and the CSSR. It seems to us that the implementation of the proposal by Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece on a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans would be of great significance.

The active position of Poland on questions concerning the raising of the level of trust on the European Continent is also worthy of attention, as well as the proposal by Finland and other northern European countries on a nuclear-free zone in that region.

Concerning another question that is certainly of no small importance, the banning of chemical weapons: We come out consistently in favor of working out as soon as possible -- even this year -- an appropriate international convention, and we are carrying out active talks on this account. I am able to announce that the Soviet Union has ended the production of chemical weapons. As is known, the other countries of the Warsaw Pact have never produced these weapons and have not had them on their territory. The USSR does not have chemical weapons beyond the bounds of its borders. As far as stocks of them are concerned, I would like to inform you that the building of a special enterprise for their destruction has been started in our country. Putting into operation an enterprise of that kind will make it possible to rapidly implement the process of chemical disarmament after the conclusion of an international convention.

Going back to problems of nuclear disarmament, I would like to say that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe is the one that is now closest to a possible solution. Appeals are multiplying throughout the world to the United States that it take that first truly major step in the area of disarmament and thereby contribute to the creation of a fundamentally new climate of mutual understanding between the West and the East. We consider it to be a factor of great political importance that Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Finland, and many other European countries have raised their voices in favor of a solution to problems concerning Euromissiles. We invite Paris, London, and Bonn to contribute, for their part, to ridding Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles and, finally, to go over to nuclear disarmament. Where else if not in Europe is it high time to carve the way to a new political thinking?

Let me speak in this regard about the role of Europe in today's world. It is more than appropriate to communicate thoughts on this topic exactly here, in Czechoslovakia, where the geographical center of Europe is situated and where there is even a stone indicating this point. We attach primary importance to the European direction of our foreign policy. Why so? First of all, our peoples live on this continent; together with other peoples, they are legitimate heirs to the civilization that was born here, and they make their inalienable contribution to its development.

Socialism has marked a crucial turn in the centuries-old history of this part of the world. From time immemorial, wars have been milestones here. The routing of fascism and the victory of socialist revolution in East European countries brought about a new situation on the continent. A powerful force arose here which set itself the aim of breaking the continuous chain of military conflicts. It is precisely to socialism that Europe is indebted for the fact that for over 4 decades its peoples have known no wars.

We now are resolutely coming out against the division of the continent into opposing military blocs, the buildup of arms arsenals here, against everything that is a source of the threat of war. In light of the new thinking, we have put forward the concept of a pan-European home. This is not a beautiful dream, it is the result of a serious analysis of the situation on the continent.

The concept of a pan-European home means, first of all, the recognition of a certain integrity, though we are speaking about states adhering to different social systems and belonging to opposite military-political blocs. In it urgent problems are combined with the existence of real possibilities for their solution. Given the high density of the population and the degree of urbanization, Europe is oversaturated with weapons. Three-million strong armies confront each other in it. Even a "conventional war" would be ruinous here, and not only due to the fact that "conventional" weapons are now exceeding many times over in destructive force the weapons used in World War II, but also because there are about 200 power sets of nuclear power stations on its territory, a ramified network of large chemical factories which, if hit, would make the continent unsuitable for life. Take also environmental pollution, for example. The scale of industrialization and transport development on our continent is such that ecological danger already has approached a critical point. This problem has spread far beyond national borders and has become a pan-European one. It is time to think how integration processes are going to develop further in both parts of Europe.

The laws of the world economy are objective; and scientific-technical progress also prompts us to seek some kind of forms of mutually beneficial cooperation. CEMA has given the signal for bridge-building in the interests of all European peoples. It can be expected that new processes in the economy of the countries of the socialist community will make it possible to activate, enrich, and fill with new content the economic cooperation of the two halves of Europe.

Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is also an historical and cultural category in a high, spiritual sense. Here world civilization has been enriched with the ideas of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The humanitarian tradition and the doctrine of socialism have been strongly developed. By the efforts of geniuses of all the European nations, a priceless fund has been created in all branches of scientific knowledge and of artistic comprehension of the world. So, instead of a nuclear crematorium for Europe, we propose the peaceful development of European culture, which has many faces, yet forms a single entity.

Our concept of a common European abode by no means implies an intention to slam doors in anyone's face. On the contrary, the progress of Europe would enable it to make a still greater contribution to the progress of the rest of the world. Europe must not avoid participation in solving the problems of hunger, debt, and underdevelopment or helping to wipe out armed conflicts.

We can be sure that the peoples of Europe, without exception, stand for the establishment on the continent of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and trust, coexistence and cooperation. That would be, in the full sense, the triumph of the new political thinking.

Movement toward that aim is dictated by no means only by moral considerations: It corresponds to the deep interests of all the European nations, for in our age of interdependence, more and more problems arise that can only be solved by the joint efforts of the European community and of the whole world community. Are we not compelled to unite if we are to fight such threats to civilization as the phenomena of terrorism, crime, and drug addiction? Is it not clear that if we do not combine our efforts today to combat that new calamity that has befallen mankind, AIDS, then tomorrow it may be too late?

That list could be extended. Literally scores of extremely difficult problems today are acquiring global status, in other words, only a united world community can hope to solve them.

Europe can set a worthy example, and our countries are fully determined to make a worthy contribution to this. It is in this context that we see Czechoslovakia's initiative for convening an economic forum. We are convinced that this can play a large role in consolidating the economic security of the states and in developing mutually beneficial cooperation.

Dictated by the same desire is our proposal to hold a conference in Moscow of the member states of the pan-European conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation. We feel that any idea which, be it only in some way, actually reduces the tension of confrontation, deserves to be put forward and discussed. Much already has been done jointly for the notion of the pan-European home to achieve general recognition. The Helsinki process is active; step by step it makes it possible to strengthen confidence among all European countries.

Working in this way, bringing out common interests, reducing the level of a military confrontation and striving for a nuclear-free world -- that is how we would like matters in Europe to be conducted.

Dear comrades! At the end of this year we will be celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and at the beginning of next year the 40th anniversary of the February Revolution in Czechoslovakia. These events are closely linked. They reveal the historic natural transition to socialism and the richness and variation of its forms. We have passed through many things and we have achieved much together, but no matter how great the tasks set by history before the countries of socialism, we are confident that we will be able to solve them. The guarantee of this is the will of our parties, the inexhaustible potential of the socialist social system and the friendship and comradeship of our peoples.

Long live our alliance! May the friendship and fraternity of the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples strengthen from year to year!

May their choice of socialism and close cooperation and interaction bring our peoples new rich fruits! May there be peace on earth!

The speeches of Comrades G. Husak and M.S. Gorbachev were heard with great attention and accompanied by prolonged applause.

The band played the party anthem, the "Internationale."

Western Reaction to Speech

PM101135 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "How Will They Respond? First Reaction to New Soviet Initiatives"]

[Text] When news agency correspondents have to convey something exceptionally important to their editorial offices and from these to the entire world they not only mark their reports "urgent" or "flash." They compress these reports down to a few lines to expedite their passage through all channels into the airwaves or into the pages of newspapers. These few lines have to encapsulate the essence of the event, all the main elements.

We look through the reports sent by Western agency reporters from Prague, reports about the rally speech delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. What is the main point singled out in these initial brief reports? Three factors: the proposal to start discussing the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km without linking this to the progress and outcome of the solution to the problem of medium-range missiles; the call for large-scale talks with a view to radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional arms; and the information that the Soviet Union has stopped producing chemical weapons and has begun to build a special enterprise to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Particular attention among reporters was also attracted by the following words from the Soviet leader: "We invite Paris, London, and Bonn... to promote the freeing of Europe from medium-range nuclear missiles and finally make the transition to nuclear disarmament."

What is the reaction in these capitals to what LE MATIN of Paris has called the Kremlin's "sensational initiative"? Extremely diverse and maybe even contradictory. The overall feeling you get is that the West has again proved to be unprepared for the Soviet leadership's bold and extraordinary steps.

London -- In the words of a Foreign Office spokesman, the proposal for talks between East and West "will not, of course, be rejected immediately, without thought. We will carefully study what he is proposing." If this quote, carried by the REUTER agency, is accurate, it is difficult to get away from the impression that it is almost predetermined that London will reject the proposal.

This impression is reinforced by yet another report, which states: "Official sources state that the Soviet Union seems to be trying to push Europe further along the path of nuclear disarmament /than the West is prepared to go."/ [slantlines denote boldface as published] In other words, the West is not ready for Europe to be completely rid of nuclear weapons. Incidentally, a statement made in Chicago by Sir Geoffrey Howe, secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, is very indicative in terms of its duplicity. In his words, the Soviet leader's proposal should not be allowed to... distract from the progress already achieved in the matter of arms control.

Where's the logic, one would like to ask.

Bonn--The reaction in official circles has been as follows: In the words of an FRG Government spokesman, Bonn intends to "carefully check out" the disarmament proposals put forward in Prague. [paragraph continues]

Bonn hopes that these proposals will be clarified in the course of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' upcoming visit to Moscow. The spokesman noted that the FRG wants the speediest signing of an agreement on the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons.

In FRG opposition circles the reaction to the Prague speech is more concrete: Egon Bahr, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, urged the West to give a constructive response to M.S. Gorbachev's proposals, noting that these proposals take account of all the main viewpoints expressed by the West. Bahr considers, REUTER reports, that the Prague speech opened up "the prospect of progress in the matter of disarmament in Europe."

In Paris the Defense Ministry assessed positively the plan for destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons. This is a very good idea, a ministry spokesman stated.

On the other hand, as can be judged from reports in the newspapers LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS and LE PARISIEN LIBERE, the proposal on short-range missiles has been greeted "with apprehension" in official circles.

And finally Washington, or rather Los Angeles, which is where President Reagan and his closest adviser are at this time -- in the words of the President himself, he "was glad to hear" that the Soviet leader advocated simultaneous talks on short-range missiles. But both Reagan and an unnamed high-ranking administration spokesman made it plain that Washington is still not prepared to abandon the numerous provisos and conditions that it is advancing in its patent desire to block the speediest achievement of accord on medium-range missiles.

At the same time reports coming out of the United States intimate that the Reagan administration's first reaction to the Prague speech is far from the final one and in this context Secretary of State Shultz' upcoming visit to Moscow is assuming additional importance.

Well, we won't have to wait long -- the visit begins on Monday, 13 April.

Gorbachev-Husak Talks 11 April

PM130905 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With G. Husak"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's final meeting with G. Husak took place in Bratislava 11 April.

Satisfaction was expressed with the results of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's visit to Czechoslovakia, and it was pointed out that it had been a major landmark in the development of all-around cooperation and strengthening of friendship between the two fraternal countries' peoples.

G. Husak reemphasized the full support of Czechoslovak Communists and the country's working people for the CPSU's innovative domestic and foreign policy. The CSSR wholly shares the new Soviet initiatives on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and on other disarmament questions advanced at the Prague rally.

M.S. Gorbachev voiced sincere gratitude for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome on Czechoslovak soil. He wished the Communists and the entire people of Czechoslovakia great successes in resolving the task set by the 17th CPCZ Congress and in further developing their socialist motherland.

More on 11 April Meeting

LD111536 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Bratislava, 11 April (TASS)--Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), today met with the leaders of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) at the KSS Central Committee.

They included Jozef Lenart, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSS) and first secretary of the KSS Central Committee, members of the Presidium and of the Secretariat of the KSS Central Committee and the chairman of the KSS Central Auditing Commission.

The meeting was also attended by Gustav Husak, general secretary of the KSS Central Committee, and Vasil Bilak and Milos Jakes, members of the Presidium and secretaries of the KSS Central Committee.

Vadim Medvedev, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Viktor Lomakin, a member of the CPSU Central Committee who is the ambassador of the USSR to Czechoslovakia, were also present.

Lenart briefed the Soviet leader on the progress of work by the Communists and all working people of Slovakia to fulfill the decisions of the 17th Congress of the KSS.

Joint Communiqué on Visit

PM121615 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 87 First Edition pp 1-2

["Soviet-Czechoslovak Joint Communiqué"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in the CSSR on an official friendly visit 9 through 11 April 1987 at the invitation of the CPCZ Central Committee.

M.S. Gorbachev had talks with G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, and meetings with other leaders of Czechoslovakia. M.S. Gorbachev spoke at a rally at the Prague Palace of Culture and visited the CKD compressors plant in Prague and the Mier unified agricultural cooperative named for Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship. The CPSU Central Committee general secretary visited the national monument on Zizkov Hill and the Olsany Cemetery in Prague and the Slavin and Slovak national uprising monuments in Bratislava, where he honored the memory of the heroes of the two fraternal countries.

During an exchange of opinions on fundamental questions of the present-day international situation, M.S. Gorbachev and G. Husak stressed the need for new thinking and a constructive approach to the complex and interconnected realities of the modern world in the interests of strengthening security for all.

The Czechoslovak side expressed a high opinion of the USSR's steps aimed at improving the situation in the world, particularly the program for eliminating nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the century. Exceptional significance is attached to the proposal for the conclusion without delay of a separate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. As soon as it is signed, the withdrawal of the increased-range operational and tactical missile complexes [raketnyye komplekсы operativno-takticheskogo naznacheniya povyshennoy dalnosti] sited in the CSSR as a countermeasure to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe will be ensured. A high assessment was made of the USSR's readiness to embark immediately on talks on the reduction and complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles [rakety operativno-takticheskogo naznacheniya] sited on the European Continent.

The strengthening of all-European security would be served by the implementation of the CSSR and GDR proposal for the creation in central Europe of a zone free from chemical weapons and of nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The Soviet Union is prepared to remove all Soviet nuclear means from this corridor on the basis of reciprocity and to respect [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 13 April adds the following variation at this point: "reciprocity and to guarantee and respect its nuclear-free..."] its nuclear-free status.

Broad prospects for improving the atmosphere on the European Continent are opened up by the proposal advanced by the Warsaw Pact member states in Budapest on considerably reducing armed forces and tactical nuclear and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Within the framework of lowering the level of military confrontation, the sides consider it important to implement measures making it possible to reduce or to eliminate altogether the possibility of a surprise attack by reducing first and foremost tactical nuclear weapons and strike aircraft [aviatsiya], reducing the concentration of troops along the line of contact between the military-political alliances in Europe, and removing the most dangerous, offensive types of arms from this zone.

Firm observance of the principle of the inviolability of the borders established as a result of World War II and postwar development is an immutable condition for maintaining stable peace in Europe. Any attempts by revanchist forces to destroy this principle cause serious damage to relations of trust and good-neighborliness.

Advocating the deepening of cooperation among European states in all fields, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will strive to ensure that the Vienna meeting makes a tangible contribution to the strengthening of security on the continent, the cause of arms reduction, and the strengthening of trust between the states.

Equal and mutually advantageous economic cooperation free from any forms of discrimination is one of the foundations of the all-European process. The USSR resolutely supports the CSSR's initiative on convening an economic forum in Prague which could promote the expansion of ties among European states and the restructuring of the entire system of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis.

The development of European and international cooperation would be promoted by the convening in Moscow of a conference of representatives of the state-participants in the all-European conference to examine in detail the entire package of mutual relations in the humanitarian sphere.

The strengthening unity and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact member states and the strengthening of the role of the socialist countries' military-political alliance in their elaboration and implementation of an agreed policy aimed at strengthening peace, security, and international cooperation were noted with satisfaction. The sides stressed the defensive nature of their military doctrine.

Moscow Radio Talk Show

LD122006 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 12 Apr 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, Central Television and All-Union Radio political observer; Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobyshev, international affairs journalist; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. We do not doubt at all that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia has been at the center of your attention all the time; you are familiar with all the addresses and speeches he made there, and with the speeches by Czechoslovak comrades. You already know what was talked about there, but nevertheless, today, of course, we will place this visit at the center of our attention. It is

noteworthy in a whole series of respects, and, first of all, we would like to dwell on the significance of this visit for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, between our parties, and, naturally, on the international significance of this visit.

[Zorin] An important problem discussed with our Czechoslovak friends was that of freeing Europe of medium-range missiles, a problem that is currently very important and very topical for the present point in international life, and with regard to this I want to draw the attention of our radio listeners to the unusual importance of this problem, and, I would even say, its uniqueness. Well, first of all, it's quite clear what the scrapping of a type of weapon such as medium-range missiles means for the security of peoples, and, primarily, the security of Europe, if one can manage to remove them from their launch sites. It is doubtful whether one needs to talk a great deal about this, our radio listeners know this and are very well aware of it.

[Levin] Valentin Sergeyevich, nevertheless, I think that it is worth recalling here the fact that, after all, overall, despite the fact that in the arms control process there are definite successes -- we remember the SALT I, and the SALT II treaties, the ABM Treaty -- but there has not yet been a single treaty that would lead to the elimination of arms.

[Zorin] This is precisely what I wanted to say. The uniqueness of the situation is evident in the fact that for four decades -- with greater success at some times, with lesser success at other times -- there has been a drive to limit the arms race, to establish some sort of ceiling on the development [sozdaniye] of given types of weapons, to lessen the pace of this race. For the first time, practically for the first time in history, the question of disarmament has been put forward specifically, not generally, as a proposal for the elimination of a definite, very dangerous, strike type of weapon. The question has not just been put. I think that we are at a point that could turn out to be the subject of historians' attention and enter history textbooks that our grandchildren will study, and they will read that in 1987 for the first time the most important turning-point was achieved in the arms race, an about-face. I am talking about this, although, of course, one cannot assert that this will take place, but it is practicable, because the proposal put forward on 28 February by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, is actually, after all, an agreed proposal. We have the agreement of the U.S. President; this proposal was agreed in the course of the meeting in Reykjavik; moreover, after Mikhail Sergeyevich had promulgated this proposal, President Reagan immediately spoke and said that this proposal is acceptable. This was the first reaction; you remember what the classical author said. Beware the soul's first stir, it can be noble. I don't know whether in the given present case...

[Levin, interrupting] But really in the present case that's how it is...

[Zorin, interrupting] Then some strange things, you can say, started happening in Washington -- an obvious move to win something back. In the first place, it was stated that the problem of medium-range missiles must be linked to the problems of limited-range missiles. They extracted the medium-range missiles proposal from the package. Washington was very persistent in reproaching us for that package, but as soon as we took a step to meet the U.S. position halfway, they set about inventing some artificial package in Washington.

A second -- and, in my opinion very dangerous -- idea that has surfaced these last few weeks is that there is no need to remove the Pershings from Europe; let the Russians remove their SS-20's, but all we need to do with the Pershings is modernize them: Take out one of their stages, and then they'll have a different range and all will be well. But for one thing, all the Pershing launching facilities will remain; and second, those who say that a stage can easily be taken out evidently also imply that it can just as easily be put back.

I want to say that a real possibility exists of achieving an important historic turning point beginning with the abolition of medium-range missiles; yet, at the same time, we observe recent maneuvers by Washington that are arousing a good deal of public alarm, and which are aimed at putting difficulties in the way of solving this problem.

[Kobysh] And it's not just Washington. I have the impression that Washington and Washington's NATO allies have predetermined their roles. Well, we recently heard the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher trying to convince us that without nuclear weapons there will be no security in Europe or in the world.

In the Bundestag, the CDU-CSU defense expert Wimmer has demanded that the concluding of a treaty to abolish medium-range missiles be made dependent on a reduction of Soviet conventional armaments:

He says the zero option on medium-range missiles would consolidate Soviet superiority in conventional armaments and make a war in Europe with such armaments likely. In other words there's a really massive assault being made on people -- on their minds, their knowledge, the information at their disposal.

[Zorin] Be it said in passing that in his speech in Prague, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has given a completely exhaustive answer to those who are trying to speculate on so-called conventional weapons and Soviet superiority in these conventional weapons: a reply that leaves such arguments and speculation without a leg to stand on.

[Kobysh] When Soviet and U.S. military experts get together, the Americans never say anything to our experts about any Soviet superiority in conventional armaments -- because they know that there is an asymmetry in armaments and they carry on a calm and business-like discussion which concludes with a general picture that approximate parity exists. But for the consumption of the broad public, the matter is presented as if there were an avalanche of Soviet tanks poised over Europe and ready to fall on her at any moment, and so forth.

[Levin] Yet as recently as last year, the Warsaw Pact countries submitted what is called the Budapest program, which sets forth concrete proposals for reducing conventional armaments. Now from Prague comes a new proposal, taking the Budapest program a stage further, a proposal of fundamental importance: that all the foreign ministers of the CSCE member states should gather together and make the decision to begin large-scale talks with the aim of radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional arms.

[Zorin] When Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proposes that the foreign ministers should now assemble to discuss this problem, our idea is not to impose our suggestions. If the West, the NATO countries, have constructive proposals, the Soviet Union is willing to discuss and examine them constructively. Passing proposals over in silence and ignoring them is not the way.

[Levin] I would like to get back to the problem of the West's attempts to link medium-range with reduced-range missiles [rakety ponizhennoy dalnosti]: Here again, there is complete speculation on the fact that people in Western Europe are insufficiently informed. The Soviet Union's position could not be clearer or more precise. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev reiterated it in Prague: We are ready to begin talks without delay on limiting and abolishing altogether -- we are willing to abolish altogether -- missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km sited on the continent of Europe; but these talks must not be tied to the progress and outcome of efforts to solve the problem of medium-range missiles. What is it, after all, that actually is being proposed? Today we have not once used the term zero option [nulevoye resheniye]. Yet this is the zero option. The zero option envisages zero Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and zero U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Here, you, Vitaliy Ivanovich, were quoting the Christian Democratic Union's expert on defense, who is against the zero option; but fortunately -- and here we must give due credit to the present FRG Government -- this is a voice that is out of tune with the opinion of the government: the opinion of the foreign minister, Genscher, and the opinion which Chancellor Kohl supports.

The FRG is in favor of the zero option. When Weinberger put forward the suggestion we have already mentioned -- remove one stage of the Pershing-2 missile and thereby make it into a reduced-range missile -- they were unanimous in West Germany that, excuse me, this not the zero option: it is a deception. Well, deception is a word that no foreign minister of a NATO country would ever use in addressing their U.S. partner, but it is what one has read and heard. I do want to draw attention to this element, though, at the same time, this latest message from Chancellor Kohl to President Reagan -- it was sent this week and widely reported in the West German press -- expounded the stance of the FRG on medium-range missiles which was in favor of their abolition, but simultaneously emphasized the idea that medium-range [promezhutochnyy] missiles cannot be abolished entirely. There was Kohl once again getting on to the same theme that we already have talked about, of the impermissibility of a nuclear-free Europe; in other words, nuclear weapons must be the guarantee, as they say, of peace.

One must take issue with this; these are not statements that should be passed over; but it seems to me that, quite honestly, I would not be inclined to give very much attention at present to that part of Kohl's message. Problems must be tackled in sequence; today the time is ripe for solving the problem of medium-range missiles; we must solve it, and we must not burden it with anything; we will not hold matters up; we approach the negotiations honestly. Today, regrettably, the same can't be said of the West; and what puts us very much on our guard is the fact that, well, you know, comrades, that U.S. Secretary of State Schultz is due in Moscow tomorrow, and it's matter of misgiving that just as he is about to leave for Moscow, Adelman has declared that the main question Schultz will raise is the question of strategic missiles! You see they had a lot of conceptions as to what Schultz would be talking about: He'll be talking about this, that, and the other -- human rights, regional conflicts. First there was the affair of the marines -- some fantastical business, half detective novel and half criminal matter -- then came the affair of the listening devices in the U.S. Embassy, though all that can be answered very clearly and concretely and we've given a very clear answer to it; but who is carefully whipping up this whole atmosphere of psychosis? What for?

[Kobysh] It is well known who it is, but it is interesting that a definite pattern can be traced. Let us recall how at the moment when the U.S. President was flying to Geneva that mysterious letter from Weinberger appeared.

[Zorin] It was provocative in character.

[Kobysh] Purely provocative.

[Zorin] And it was supposed to wreck the talks.

[Kolbysh] It was supposed to wreck the talks. It was at the time -- I was in New York then -- that Comrade Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, was going to very important talks with Shultz, to the United States...

[Zorin, interrupting] They provoked...

[Kobysh, interrupting] They provoked the so-called case with our spies there -- a huge number of individuals were accused -- and they made fools of themselves, because they ended up without service staff here in Moscow. Now there is this, right before Shultz' trip. What is it, an accident? No, it is a pattern, of course. It is an action by quite definite forces, which obviously are not even fully controlled by the administration.

[Zorin] I think the situation in Washington now is very complicated, and multifaceted. Well, I do not want to use the rumors that are being splashed across the pages of the U.S. press -- they claim that in discussions behind closed doors Shultz speaks in favor of signing an agreement on medium-range missiles and Weinberger speaks against it -- those are conjectures. But one can consider it to be a fact that a keen struggle is going on inside the Washington administration. There are things that can be traced in documents. The impression is created that the right-wing extremists -- you have just been talking about that, Vitaliy Ivanovich -- are stepping up their activities precisely now, in order to, well, practically prevent the U.S. secretary of state from conducting constructive work during his trip to Moscow, to place U.S. diplomacy in such conditions that it is impossible to achieve an agreement. Well, what is Shultz coming with? What instructions has he received? We will learn this during the coming week. But that there are serious, influential circles for whom the real prospects of a serious breakthrough in the matter of disarmament goes against the grain, and who are doing all they can to ensure that a possible agreement is torpedoed -- there is no doubt of that at all.

[Levin] But what is interesting, Valentin Sergeyevich, is that -- pay attention -- those circles are using such base methods. Why are they resorting to all this spy mania, talking about Marines? After all, they don't have any trumps.

[Kobysh] I don't really understand that.

[Levin] Well, I think it can be explained by the fact that earlier they had ready in hand certain postulates which they thrust upon us all the time. For example, the question of verification. They hindered the achievement of an accord on problems of arms limitation, citing the fact that we, the Soviet Union -- they said -- were against verification. Even when we proposed separating the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the overall package of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, as you recall, the U.S. delegation stated: We are introducing proposals in which, first and foremost, the issue will be verification. They will be strict measures, and they let it be understood that they would think up something that would stump the Soviet Union. What does the Soviet Union reply to that?

[Kobysh] Well, the Soviet Union has now replied, through Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the meeting in Prague, with something which will now, of course, force the military strategists of the West, of the United States, analysts, to really rack their brains, because he said something staggering, something which seemed wholly unthinkable to them. I recall that he said that all our activity to turn Europe into a peaceful home, a nuclear-free home, should be accompanied by corresponding verification [kontrol], including the use of on-site inspection, and the launchers remaining after the reduction of missiles also should be included in that inspection. Moreover, that went for operational ones and those at all other installations, test ranges, manufacturing plants, training centres, and so on. The right of entry of inspectors also must be ensured to the other side's military bases, to the territory of other countries. That is necessary to be completely sure that the agreement is strictly observed, Mikhail Sergeyevich said. I know for a fact that there is panic in America now.

[Zorin] Let's be accurate. Is there panic in the Pentagon?

[Kobysh] Yes.

[Zorin] Is there panic in the directorates of military-industrial corporation?

[Kobysh] Yes.

[Zorin] In California?

[Kobysh] Yes.

[Zorin] There the question arises: What, will there be Russian inspectors in our factories, in our laboratories? On no account! There you have it -- inspection -- with the aid of which demagogues have been busy for so many years and have shown that the Soviet Union is blocking a solution to the issue. But we are introducing this proposal not as a diplomatic move, not as a political game, but as a real proposal, which we are ready to embark on, inasmuch as we truly are striving to achieve the goals we proclaim. It turns out -- I think you are right, Viktor Nikolayevich -- that they have lost the arguments they have been accustomed to gambling on for many years, and, inasmuch as they have no arguments, they are resorting to little provocations.

[Levin] I would like to note one more point that Mikhail Sergeyevich talked about in Prague. The point in question is chemical weapons. There is also a lot of political speculation over that issue in the West and, incidentally, you, Vitaliy Ivanovich, mentioned Thatcher. She attempted to play upon that, too. Here again is our precise, absolutely clear answer.

We are not only confirming our readiness to sign a convention as soon as possible on banning and eliminating chemical weapons. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that the Soviet Union, first of all, has ended production of chemical weapons. Second, he noted that the other countries of the Warsaw Pact have never produced chemical weapons, nor have had them on their territory. Third, we in the Soviet Union already have started building a special enterprise for destroying chemical weapons. These are concrete steps, a concrete answer to one more issue that people in the West have been attempting to gamble on.

All this shows that actually a new way of thinking is not an invented term, but a program of actions, a program of actions full of concrete proposals, concrete ideas, honest ideas, ideas envisaging mutual security, taking into account the interests of the other side, ideas which are to open up the path toward real disarmament, the termination of the arms race.

[Kobysh] Generally, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech at the meeting in Prague, I think, contains the idea of universal humanism. It goes beyond European borders. It gives hope to all people. If you don't mind, I'll now read out these words which, I think, cannot leave anyone indifferent. He said:

In our age of mutual dependence more and more problems are emerging that can only be solved by the joint efforts of the European and, indeed, the whole world community. Doesn't the struggle against phenomena threatening civilization, such as terrorism, crime, drug addition really demand unity? Isn't it clear that unless we combine efforts now against such a new calamity as AIDS, which has stricken humanity, it already may be too late tomorrow? That list can be continued. Literally dozens of extremely complex problems are now acquiring the status of global problems; that is, only a united world community is up to resolving them. Europe can show a worthy example, and our countries are full of resolve to make their worthy contribution to that.

[Levin] There we will finish today, comrades. Thank you for your attention. All the best.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1417

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COVERAGE OF FRENCH PREMIER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Discusses INF

LD010619 Moscow TASS in English 0551 GMT 1 Apr 87

[Text] Washington 1 April TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

East-West relations and arms control dominated at White House talks between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, here on a two-day official visit Tuesday.

The talks also involved U.S. Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, the president's national security adviser Frank Carlucci and White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker.

U.S. officials said one issue that had been discussed in detail was the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) in Europe.

Judging by remarks by a high-ranking official spokesman, the U.S. Administration, which has been seeking to link an INF agreement artificially with the issue of shorter-range missiles, reaffirmed that posture.

It means in point of fact a renunciation of cuts in nuclear armories in Europe and an intention to beef them up by deploying American theater missiles.

In other words, Washington is again pressing its oft-repeated but absurd "bulldown" formula, meaning progress to arms reduction talks through an arms buildup.

The official U.S. spokesman reported agreement on this point at the White House talks.

'Backed Away From Zero Option'

PM061045 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 1

[Unnamed own correspondent dispatch: "Focusing on Bombs"]

[Text] Paris -- French Premier J. Chirac's visit to the United States, during which he held talks with President R. Reagan, Secretary of State G. Shultz, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, and other officials, is over.

The talks focused on the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. Observers are pointing out that the French premier decided while overseas to speak on

behalf of the West European governments, which are allegedly "concerned" about the prospect of U.S. cruise missiles and Pershings being removed. Paris, observers are noting, now heads the forces in Western Europe which are trying to link the question of the elimination of medium-range missiles with various conditions and demands on the Soviet Union, and in particular with the question of Soviet "superiority" in operational and tactical missiles and conventional arms and armed forces. To all intents and purposes France has backed away from the "zero option," which it had defended so ardently until quite recently.

President R. Reagan assured his guest that the United States is taking the "concern" of its NATO allies into consideration. On the conclusion of the talks J. Chirac noted with satisfaction that the White House is taking West European interests fully into account and that there are now no "reasons for alarm." "The current Euromissile talks will not lead to the creation of a nuclear-free Europe," the French premier stated in an interview with French radio. "Fortunately, a certain amount of nuclear weapons will remain in Europe."

"Saved!" was how L'HUMANITE summed up the results of the visit with bitter irony. "Europe will become a powder keg. We will be left with the means to destroy the old continent."

Anti-Soviet 'Spy Sagas'

PM061121 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "Like A Detective Story"]

[Excerpts] Paris -- Like the low-budget U.S. detective series swamping French television, the affair that is currently being whipped up by the local mass media also comprises many episodes. It has been concocted according to the classic spy-novel recipe in which the "Reds" play the bad guys.

Thus, whereas in the first episode it was a question of a group of Frenchmen handing the Russians secrets about the Ariane rocket (this has already been discussed in IZVESTIYA), new "revelations" followed later. It seems that the Soviets picked out many targets in France to satisfy their "colossal" needs in the economic and technological fields. Consequently, the photocopiers that were copying "secret documents" for Moscow went from red-hot to white-hot and the computers at the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, where the two engineers accused of espionage worked, already have been ravaged (Even though an institute representative pointed out that the data they contain are not secret, his words went unheeded).

This spy saga with an anti-Soviet slant has a long-term term aim: It is being used to discredit the USSR and, in particular, our proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, which many have attacked and assessed as a threat to West European, and particularly French, security. At the same time, steps are being taken to patch together a united allied front to oppose the Soviet initiative and call for "firmness" from Washington in the Euromissile talks with Moscow.

Chirac 'Realism'

LD022150 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Commentary by Viktor Levin]

[Text] French Prime Minister Chirac has finished his official visit to the United States. A news commentary by Viktor Levin who is at the microphone:

[Levin] Relations between France and the United States have lately become clouded by the existence of discord over such issues as international trade, Near East settlements, and ways of overcoming the huge foreign debt of the developing countries. On some of these issues -- first of all I would like to note the problem of the Near East settlement -- the French position is characterized by far greater realism than the United States' approach. So Prime Minister Chirac, at the final news conference in Washington, also spoke in favor of support for the idea of holding an international conference on the Near East with the participation of all the sides concerned.

Maybe the most poignant issues are those of trade-economic relations. Matters have reached a state where France openly expresses discontent at the economic policies of the power across the ocean, which persistently tries to crush its partners-competitors. During one of the days of Chirac's stay in Washington, the organ of business circles -- the newspaper LE MONDE -- openly wrote about the cynical policies in the sphere of trade of the U.S. Administration.

To iron out the trade-economic contradictions -- and in my view this task was a priority for Chirac -- judging by everything the French prime minister has made concessions to Washington in the sphere where France should have shown particular caution. We are talking about medium-range missiles and the problem of their liquidation. It is known that the Soviet Union has agreed at the present stage to take neither the French nor the British nuclear potential into consideration. One would imagine that this would have caused pleasure in Paris. As a matter of fact, French President Mitterrand assessed positively the Soviet proposal regarding isolating the problem of medium-range missiles from the general complex of questions on the limitation of nuclear and space weapons, and spoke in favor of the corresponding agreement between the USSR and the United States. I now have the impression that Chirac holds a different position.

During the talks in Washington he talked about the necessity to increase the number of U.S. shorter range missiles [rakety mensney dalnosti] in Europe. This demand is being submitted under the guise of leveling the number of such missiles between the USSR and the United States. In effect, if the question is put in this manner it creates new difficulties for working out an agreement on medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union meanwhile has proposed to accept a zero option as far as medium-range missiles are concerned, and this proposal is gaining more and more support in West Europe. Special attention is deserved by the fact that representatives of the FRG, on whose territory all the Pershing-2 and a large number of cruise missiles are found, are definitely in favor of the zero option.

The striving of Prime Minister Chirac to solve poignant problems regarding relations with the United States are quite understandable and easy to explain, but why in the meantime he is prepared to hinder the process of the limitation of nuclear weapons is impossible to understand.

West 'Complicating' Path

LD051950 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Apr 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Stanislav Kondrashov]

[Text] Washington had a visitor last week, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. He had a meeting with President Reagan on 31 March, at which they discussed East-West relations, arms control and issues connected with economic relations. They also spoke about our restructuring here in the Soviet Union and about its potential impact on the course of world affairs. As an official spokesman of the U.S. administration later stated, the two sides agreed that time is needed for impressions -- that is, their impressions of our restructuring -- to form and for assessments to be given.

It seems to me that beneath that diplomatic exterior of waiting a skeptical attitude is being deliberately cultivated, Washington is alarmed by the Soviet Union's growing prestige and would like to infect its allies with skepticism as well. This is not always successful. Thatcher, for example, has formed a fairly positive attitude. In Moscow she said that she welcomes the policy of openness, restructuring and democratization, and that these policies are paving the way to greater trust between East and West. She repeated those words in London after returning home, in her speech to the British parliament.

Chirac and Reagan also discussed the prospects for Soviet-U.S. accords on medium-range missiles, and it has to be said that in this their stance coincides with that adopted by Thatcher in Moscow. The West is complicating the path toward implementing the very zero option which the Americans themselves proposed 6 years ago and to which the Soviet Union has agreed. In the West they now want the agreement to include a limitation on Soviet shorter-range intermediate missiles and give the Americans the right to build-up such missiles until the start of subsequent talks.

CSO: 5200/1407

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BELGIAN GOVERNMENT MAY DELAY U.S. MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

AU200917 Paris AFP in English 0346 GMT 20 Mar 87

[Text] Paris, March 20 (AFP) — Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, speaking after a meeting here on Thursday with French President Francois Mitterrand, said that his country might put off deploying more U.S. missiles on its territory pending a U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate nuclear arms.

At a brief press conference, Mr. Martens said that Belgium had "laid down a procedure making it possible not to install the 32 American missiles which have not yet been deployed on its soil as a sort of moratorium which would favour a U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been deploying U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles in France, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and Britain to counter Soviet INF forces in Eastern Europe.

Last month Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed an agreement to scrap the INF missiles.

Mr. Mitterrand said after the three-hour meeting that he and Mr. Martens had "essentially similar views on disarmament and on Europe."

Mr. Mitterrand also said that the West European Union, which comprises Belgium, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Lux

embourg and the Netherlands, was a good framework for discussing defence issues.

However talks should not be restricted just to those seven states, he added.

The French leader said the talks had been "fruitful".

Commenting on a proposal by Jacques Delors, the chairman of the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission, to convene a special meeting of the 12-nation grouping to discuss defence issues, the two leaders stressed that the Community was not legally the correct forum for such talks.

"We will have to find a body qualified both from a legal and a treaty point of view" to discuss disarmament, Mr. Mitterrand said.

Mr. Martens, whose country currently holds the revolving chairmanship of EEC meetings, said he would not convene an EEC council meeting on the issue, but would instead see what could be done after his present round of bilateral contacts with EEC member-states.

He said his country's chairmanship was aimed at "avoiding a kind of dispersion of the Commission's proposals."

Mr. Mitterrand is due to meet British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on Monday, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl the following Saturday.

The INF arms talks are expected to be the main item on the agenda.

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CSO: 5200/2517

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CANADA: WOMEN'S MEETING URGES END TO CRUISE TESTING

Vancouver THE SUN in English 16 Mar 87 p A3

[Text]

B.C. women active in the peace movement are calling on the prime minister to take Canada out of the nuclear arms race and to turn the country into a zone free of nuclear weapons testing.

About 70 women — representatives from the Voice of Women, the Vancouver YWCA, the University Women's Club and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom — met Saturday to hear speakers from women's peace organizations developing in Canada and internationally.

In an open letter to Brian Mulroney written at the conference, the delegates ask for Canada to withdraw from the nuclear arms race by cancelling the treaty permitting cruise missile tests here.

The letter also asks the government to refuse permission to any country or company wanting to develop and test nuclear weapons and their support systems in Canada.

The document urges Mulroney to make it clear to the U.S. and the So-

viet Union that Canada wants an end to nuclear weapons testing.

"We Canadian women recognize that our government, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly, has avoided making an unequivocal commitment to immediate negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban treaty," the letter says.

"We are . . . prepared to pledge that in the next federal election we will support only those candidates committed to working for peace."

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CSO: 5220/41

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA REPORT: REAGAN SEES 'PROMISE' FOR INF AGREEMENT

OW160030 Beijing XINHUA in English 0011 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, April 15 (XINHUA) -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan said today he was "pleased" with progress being made in Secretary of State George Shultz' talks in Moscow, but he refrained from giving a formal response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest proposals on short-range missiles in Europe.

In a statement read to reporters by White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in Santa Barbara, California, where Reagan is taking an Easter vacation, the President said "reaching equitable, effectively verifiable and stabilizing arms reductions agreements has long been one of the primary objectives" of his administration.

As a result of Shultz' three-day talks in Moscow, he said, there is now "promise for an agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces at some point in the not-too-distant future," although "much more remains to be done."

He said the talks showed that agreements on strategic missiles and space defense "will be more difficult." "We will continue our efforts in these areas as well," he added.

However, Reagan withheld his comments on Gorbachev's latest proposals put forward during a meeting with Shultz in Moscow yesterday.

In a press conference in Moscow this morning, Shultz confirmed a report by the Soviet news agency TASS that Gorbachev offered to eliminate all short-range missiles in Europe within one year to remove the obstacle to an agreement on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The United States termed the offer as "interesting," but said it will not evaluate it before consulting with its allies.

Reagan said that "consultations with our allies, particularly on the Soviet proposals on short-range intermediate nuclear forces, are especially important."

"The President looks forward to meeting with Secretary Shultz tomorrow, at which time he will receive a full report on the details of the Moscow meetings and the briefings with our NATO allies," the statement said.

Shultz flew to Brussels today to brief NATO allies on his Moscow talks and is scheduled to return home tomorrow afternoon.

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CSO: 5200/4087

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC ARMY PAPER ROUNDUP OF U.S.-USSR INF TALKS

HK101531 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Apr 87 p 4

["News Roundup" by Chen Xueyan (7115 1331 3601): "New Troubles Emerge in the U.S.-Soviet Talks on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] The proposal put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev on 28 February which suggested that both the Soviet Union and the United States withdraw all their medium-range missiles from Europe once gave people a ray of hope. However, the recent disputes between the Soviet Union and the United States on this question have cast a shadow on this "hope."

Ten days after Gorbachev put his proposal forward, the U.S. representative to the Geneva disarmament talks put forward concrete proposals on supervising the withdrawal of the medium-range missiles from Europe. Both sides will supervise the withdrawal of the medium-range missiles by satellites, exchanging information and sending inspectors to examine the situation on each other's side. When the agreement goes into effect, both sides will send inspectors to inspect each other's installations, count the number of each other's medium-range missiles, and supervise the destruction and withdrawal of the medium-range missiles on each other's side. Although the Soviet Union agreed to the supervision of the withdrawal of medium-range missiles on the spot in principle, it insisted that "the U.S. arsenal that stores missiles and the U.S. enterprises that produce missiles should also be inspected."

As for the short-range missiles, at the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting held last October, the Soviet side once held that the agreement on medium-range missiles should also include some measures on limiting short-range missiles. Grasping this point, this year the United States proposed that the withdrawal of medium-range missiles and the issue of limiting short-range missiles should be discussed together. The United States also said that the standard of the U.S. short-range missiles deployed in Western Europe must be maintained at the same level as that of the Soviet short-range missiles stationed in Eastern Europe. However, the Soviet Union insisted that the United States and the Soviet Union should first reach an agreement on the withdrawal of medium-range missiles and then hold talks on the issue of short-range missiles. The United States was very dissatisfied with the position of the Soviet Union and accused the Soviet Union of "retreating from its position" on the question of prohibiting medium-range and short-range missiles deployed in Europe. The United States also said that if the Soviet Union does not agree to settle the issue of medium-range missiles and the issue of short-range missiles together, the United States will plan to refit its "Pershing II" medium-range missiles into the "Pershing-VI" short-range missiles. However, the Soviet Union did not want to give the impression of weakness. On

26 March, the chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Bureau under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union said that if the United States refits its medium-range missiles into short-range missiles, the Soviet Union will refit its SS-20 medium-range missiles deployed in Europe into intercontinental missiles.

It seems that there will be heated disputes and bargains between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of missile inspection, the question of short-range missiles, and other questions.

The above positions of the United States and the Soviet Union are based on their own strategic interests.

In the words of Henry Kissinger, what the United States is worried about is that the complete withdrawal of all U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe will "cause a political and psychological inequality because the possibility of a Soviet attack on Europe will not be greatly reduced, whereas the United States will lose its capability to launch a counterattack from Europe." U.S. public opinion holds that since the Soviet Union has deployed about 160 SS-12 "Scaleboard" short-range missiles and 240 SS-23 "Spider" short-range missiles in Europe while the United States has deployed only 50 old-style "Pershing VI" short-range missiles in that area, once it withdraws all its medium-range missiles from Europe, the United States will become incapable of action if Europe is attacked by nuclear weapons. This unbalanced situation has caused a lot of worries among Americans. World opinion believes that the Soviet Union's adherence to its present position on the question of short-range missiles might have two purposes: One is to use the short-range missiles as a "hidden restrictive factor" to bargain with the two nuclear powers, Britain and France; the other is to turn the talks on short-range missiles into a forum to discuss all short-range nuclear weapons, including those deployed in Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and use this forum to demand the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.

The attitudes of the Western European countries also have a great impact on the signing of the agreement on the total withdrawal of the medium-range missiles from Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the Western European countries resolutely oppose turning Europe into a base for a possible nuclear war and therefore welcome the proposal put forward by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. On the other hand, the Western European countries think that under the present circumstances, the regular forces and conventional weapons of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization are superior to those of the United States and NATO -- "it is quite necessary to deploy certain nuclear weapons in Western Europe so as to secure the reliability of the nuclear deterrent of the West." Therefore, the signing of an agreement on the total withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union "will make the West European countries skeptical about the U.S. commitment to defending its West European allies and preventing the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe."

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CSO: 5200/4081

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTARY ON THATCHER'S USSR VISIT

HK050646 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 3 Apr 87 p 6

["Commentary" by Chen Tean (7115 3676 1344): "A Difficult 'Mission' -- Thatcher's Visit to Moscow"]

[Text] Thatcher's 5-day visit to Moscow ended on 1 April. Judging from foreign news agency reports, we find that the British-Soviet summit was precisely like the spring in Moscow -- sometimes warm and sometimes cold. According to THE TIMES, leaders of the two countries held their talks with an uncompromising stand, holding back nothing they wanted to discuss. Eventually, they appreciated their debate and agreed to reserve their differences. Although this visit by Thatcher was regarded as "a crucial visit entrusted by various Western countries," the spring of East-West relations seemed slow in coming.

The first official visit by a British prime minister in 12 years reflects the fact that relations between Britain and the Soviet Union are progressing. Each side earnestly looked forward to and attached importance to the visit.

According to British press reports, the talks between Thatcher and Gorbachev centered on restriction of the arms race, and the agreement on medium-range missiles in particular. The British side tried to give impetus to reaching a "medium-range missile agreement" beneficial to the West. It told the Soviet Union that Western Europe is worried about the security in Europe after the removal of medium-range missiles and urged the Soviet Union to consider the interests of Europe when reaching a "medium-range missile agreement" with the Americans and holding other disarmament talks. In the meantime, the British prime minister also tried to "find out about" the "actual situation" of Gorbachev himself and reform in the Soviet Union, so that the West could adopt "proper countermeasures." There is no doubt that through her Moscow trip, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher also intended to play a further noticeable part as a "world statesman" and "spokesman of the West" in the interests of her "third term of office" and strengthening the position of the British Conservative Party in the general election. It is appropriate to say that this was her "mission" on the visit. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Gorbachev maintained that "Soviet-British dialogue is an inseparable and important part of the contemporary politics of Europe and the world" and that Britain might exert a certain influence over the United States. This would enable him to solicit support and understanding from other Western nations for the new Soviet disarmament proposal. Therefore, Gorbachev believed that "it is important and necessary for the British head of government to visit" his country.

Judging from the results of the talks, we know that there was an acute debate in the meeting, which lasted 7 hours. The open speeches published by both sides were unprecedentedly "frank." It was reported that Gorbachev's speeches "were the most strongly worded statements issued to a visiting Western leader," whereas Thatcher once again displayed her "iron lady" character. She spoke out without beating about the bush, showing no due respect for the feelings of her host. There was a very big gap between the two sides on some important international issues.

Regarding the removal of medium-range missiles in Europe, both sides agreed that this was "the most important issue" and that an agreement on medium-range missiles should be reached first under strict supervision, after which another agreement on short-range missiles would be concluded. [paragraph continues]

However, Thatcher insisted that the removal of medium-range missiles in Europe be linked with maintaining a quantitative balance between the short-range missiles of the Soviet Union and the West. Gorbachev accused the NATO alliance of retreating from its stand on a "zero option" and "imposing a full set of conditions to counter the demand of the Soviet Union." He also accused the West of trying to use U.S. short-range missiles as "supplementary equipment." He openly criticized the British prime minister for "failing to play her due role" in this regard.

Regarding the issue of arms control, although both sides held that it is necessary to take serious steps for arms control, each stuck to its version or argument. Thatcher persisted in the viewpoint that "security may be based on the policy of strength," saying that she is a "supporter of nuclear weapons and of the expansion of British nuclear potential." Gorbachev denounced that "policy of strength" as an "outmoded notion" and a "policy of using threat to blackmail." He said that he "resolutely rejected" the idea that the Soviet Union will gain an upper hand in conventional weapons after nuclear weapons in Europe are abolished. However, he accepted the view of holding "overall talks" on the issue of conventional weapons. He added that it is "not serious" for Thatcher to try to link the arms control issue of the East and West with the question of whether the Soviet Union respects human rights.

Regarding the problem of regional clashes, there was still a widely divergent view between the two countries. Thatcher pointed out: Whether the Soviet Union has withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan, the West will not judge by its promise alone. Gorbachev retorted that only after a political settlement of the Afghan issue would the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.

Of course, this visit by M. Thatcher has undoubtedly enhanced mutual understanding between Britain and the Soviet Union and promoted the development of their relations. After a profound exchange of views, both sides also discovered some points in common: Both sides are willing to continue to hold talks on the elimination of chemical weapons; both sides consider it necessary to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces stationed in Europe, and urge that problems related to this be resolved; both sides promoted to a certain extent their mutual understanding regarding the removal of medium-range missiles in Europe; and both sides are willing to expand and deepen their political dialogue to develop closer relations between the peoples of the two countries. During the visit, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed four agreements, including one on the peaceful use of and cooperation in outer space, and agreed to increase their total trade volume to 2.5 billion rubles by 1990. This shows that their bilateral relations have improved.

Notwithstanding, a river frozen 3 feet deep cannot be thawed overnight. In a "general atmosphere" in which East-West relations have not yet been substantially improved, it is impossible to dispel the fundamental differences in viewpoints and stand which have existed for a long time between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/4018

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ROUNDUP ON EUROMISSILE, ZERO OPTION ACCORD SITUATION

OW011150 Beijing XINHUA in English 1124 GMT 1 Apr 87

["Round-up: The Crisis of the Zero Option (by Xia Zhimian)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, April 1 (XINHUA) -- There are more and more signs that Bonn, an enthusiastic advocate of the "zero option" to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, is doubting whether the two superpowers can reach an agreement.

In his meeting with U.S. disarmament negotiator Maynard Glitman in Bonn Monday, Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized the "huge benefits" of elimination.

Genscher has repeatedly warned against any move that would make Euromissile negotiations more complex.

Bonn was encouraged by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's February 28 proposal on eliminating Euromissiles without linking it to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project.

Genscher predicted a superpower treaty would be reached this year. "The treaty is at hand," Genscher said, and that would be the "real first step" toward nuclear disarmament.

As some newspapers have noted, Bonn's joy has been replaced by doubt.

The reason is the superpowers are attacking each other on the issue of shorter-range missiles, confusing many people.

According to Bonn sources, Glitman complained that Moscow had backed away from its Reykjavik Summit position by declining to include limits to shorter missiles in a Euromissile deal.

Washington had been hindering a zero option deal by making up a new package plan.

The Soviets say the superpowers should first reach an agreement on intermediate missiles and freeze the number of the shorter missiles pending further negotiations.

The U.S. says the initial agreement should put limits on both intermediate and shorter-range missiles.

Washington's firm attitude on limiting the number of shorter missiles was reflected in a speech by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Allen Holmes in Brussels late last month. He said Moscow must come back to reason and the West should never compromise.

Washington obviously fears that freezing the number of shorter missiles in Europe would mean Soviet nuclear superiority as it has seven times as many shorter missiles as the United States.

If the limits are stipulated in an agreement, Moscow would face two choices: Radically reducing its shorter missiles forces or allowing the United States to catch up.

The latest American move is to suggest the 108 Pershing II missiles in Federal Germany be modified into shorter ones with a range of 800 kilometers. This would strike a balance with the Soviets' 130 missiles.

Refusing all this, Moscow denounced the U.S. for its "inconstructive stand" and "making up new problems" to scuttle the zero option at the outset.

The Soviets threatened to change its SS-20 missiles into intercontinental missiles that could reach the United States.

In addition, Washington and Moscow are continuing with their quarrel over the issue of nuclear verification.

Among Washington's requirements for verification are free use of monitoring equipment, reports on details of missile launches, deployment of missiles in appointed places, concrete measures on modifying, dismantling and eliminating missiles and on-the-spot checks.

Washington also suggested a major check every 10 years in all of each other's the military establishments and laboratories.

Some hardliners in the Pentagon have gone as far as saying that elimination of all the remaining 100 intermediate-range missiles would be a better choice than the overly-complex checks.

This was also rejected by the Soviets.

Of course, the difficult and unsteady Euromissile negotiations could hint at the real motives of the two superpowers.

In fact, reducing intermediate-range forces in Europe, only three percent of superpower nuclear warheads, would have little impact upon security.

That Moscow made much ado about intermediate missiles is aimed at propelling the desire for disarmament in both Western Europe and the U.S. and finally stopping SDI.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan obviously tried to use Euromissile negotiations, and even a treaty, to appease Western Europe and reduce domestic pressure on his SDI project.

In the final analysis, the progress in Euromissile negotiations is not determined by the security and desire of Western Europe. Rather, it is the strategic considerations of Washington and Moscow which are competing for superiority in Europe.

The current situation is not only disappointing but also subtle to Bonn, which has advocated the zero option.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYSIS OF WEST EUROPE'S REACTION TO ARMS PROPOSALS

'Mixed Feelings'

OW051658 Beijing XINHUA in English 1651 GMT 5 Apr 87

["News Analysis: Western Europe Showing Mixed Feelings Toward Nuclear Weapons (by Xia Zhimian)"]--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, April 4 (XINHUA) -- Western Europe is showing mixed feelings towards nuclear weapons. It insists on their presence as a deterrent on the one hand and on their elimination on the other.

West European leaders have been stewing over how to react to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's suggestion to remove medium-range missiles from Europe, since the proposal was made on February 28. The Soviet Union has retracted its longstanding demands that the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe be linked to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program, known as "Star Wars".

West European leaders want to see the total withdrawal from Europe of American and Soviet Pershing-2 missiles, cruise missiles and SS-20 missiles. However, if these missiles are indeed removed from Europe, Soviet superiority in short-range missiles and chemical and conventional weapons could pose a threat to the security of Western Europe.

Western Europe does not wish to abandon its nuclear deterrent, saying it has guaranteed peace on the continent for more than 40 years since World War II. Western European nuclear weapons are necessary to maintain a balance with Soviet superiority in conventional weapons.

To alleviate the Western European concerns, the United States has specified that following a U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles, Washington and Moscow must pursue negotiations and set a mutual ceiling on short-range missiles.

The two superpowers will have to decide whether Moscow will take the initiative to reduce its superiority in short-range missiles or Washington will catch up with Moscow in that field.

The United States is reportedly considering shortening the range to 800 kilometers of its 108 Pershing-2 missiles in Federal Germany, and is selecting short-range missiles for deployment in Western Europe. The U.S. move has also worried Western Europe, which is afraid that Washington's option would stifle the disarmament process, because the mutual ceiling, another package deal, would link medium-range missiles with short-range missiles.

It is not the hope of Western Europe to keep the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles, or increase U.S. short-range missiles in Western Europe.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recently met with President Francois Mitterand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Federal Germany to discuss medium-range missiles in preparation for Thatcher's five-day visit to the Soviet Union which began March 28. The West European leaders expressed their hope to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe while calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to continue negotiations on short-range missiles. They stressed that Western Europe would be faced with Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons once medium-range missiles were withdrawn from Europe. Although West European leaders want to see the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe, they cannot comply with their total elimination.

West on 'Defensive'

OW121358 Beijing XINHUA in English 1331 GMT 12 Apr 87

["Round-up: Why Is West so Cautious to Gorbachev's New Initiative? (by Cheng Kexiong)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] London, April 12 (XINHUA) -- The British Government, like other Western allies, is very cautious in its reaction to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new offer last Friday for immediate separate talks on shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The reason behind such caution reaction, according to British analysts, seems to be that the new initiative from Gorbachev has appeared to the West's surprise on the eve of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to Moscow and at a time when their pre-talk consultations have completed. Now there is suddenly a new situation forcing another round of urgent contacts between the Western capitals to assess the impact of the Soviet leader's Prague speech on their agreed stance.

During the U.S.-Soviet Geneva INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) talks following Gorbachev's proposal on February 28 to drop the linkage between an INF deal and the Reagan administration's "Star Wars" space defense program, the West insists that the scrapping of medium-range missiles in Europe be linked to an agreement on shorter-range systems as the Soviets have said to have a superiority over NATO of 9 to 1. They also demand a freeze on Soviet shorter-range forces at present levels and the right for the U.S. to match those figures.

Gorbachev seems to have responded to Western anxieties about Soviet preponderance in shorter-range force by offering to reduce and eventually eliminate them. Such an offer, British analysts said, is likely to appeal more to Western public opinion than to those in power.

But the problem for the British and other Western European governments is that they actually do not want to see all U.S. missiles, shorter-range or medium-range, be removed from Western Europe, thus forcing a "denuclearization of Europe" and reviving the specter of U.S. "decoupling" from Europe.

Gorbachev's new initiative, said the analysts, has therefore left the West once again on the defensive. British official sources indicated last weekend that Gorbachev appeared to be aiming at taking Europe further down the road of nuclear disarmament than the West was ready for. An official response to it, they said, would not be given before full consultation among the Western allies.

Meanwhile, there seems not very much room for optimism for George Shultz' success in Moscow even though the Reagan administration is determined not to let his talks with Soviet leaders be derailed by the present outburst of spying charges between the superpowers, British analysts said.

Press reports show that the secretary of state has been instructed to take a toughened position in a number of important areas of arms control such as nuclear weapons testing, a possible timetable for strategic weapons reduction and the length of time the U.S. might agree to defer deployment of Star Wars systems.

However, time is short for President Ronald Reagan to grab any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union if he wants to re-establish his authority after the Irangate affair and restore his hopes of a place in history, said analysts here.

As British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe noted in Washington last Friday, unless a Euromissile accord can be tied down by the end of the year, it will run up against the constraints of a U.S. election campaign.

A breakthrough now looks possible in the INF talks, as Reagan said last Friday. But it is a gamble for both sides to negotiate a removal of Euromissiles just as it was when the missiles were first being deployed. George Shultz' Moscow trip seems to be a crucial step along the rough road. Whether it will bring any discernible evidence for speculation about the new gamble's outcome is not to be seen before he reports back on his talks in Moscow to a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels Thursday.

FRG Discord Over 'Zero Option'

OW131835 Beijing XINHUA in English 1559 GMT 13 Apr 87

["Round-up: Federal German Officials Divided on "Zero Option" (by Xia Zhimian)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, April 12 (XINHUA) -- In Federal Germany, the strongest supporter of the "zero option" on intermediate-range nuclear force in Europe, discord seems to be growing among government officials on the strategy.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in a policy speech that he hoped the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an early agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. His government spokesman has also made remarks to this effect.

Willy Wimmer, spokesman on defence policy of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), told reporters on April 9 however that the disarmament of nuclear forces should be linked with that of conventional weapons, otherwise the "zero option" on medium-range missiles will bring enormous danger to the security of Federal Germany.

Without comparable nuclear forces in Western Europe, he said, the NATO's "flexible response strategy" becomes absurd and the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons cannot be coped with.

Wimmer said he supports former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's view that prior to any progress in disarmament of conventional weapons, the West has to keep part of its medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

Wimmer's statement gained wide publicity in the local press, which said "the CDU/CSU is considering abandonment of the 'zero option.'"

In order to clarify, Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group made a statement, saying there is no change in the position of the federal government and parliamentary group on medium-range missiles, which he said will stick to Kohl's position on the issue.

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CSO: 5200/4087

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

ALFONSIN ON ARMS PROPOSAL--Buenos Aires, 31 Mar (DYN)--President Raul Alfonsin today voiced his support for the Soviet proposal calling for the withdrawal of all Soviet and U.S. missiles deployed in Europe, Soviet Ambassador Oleg Kvasov said. Kvasov, who was received today by Alfonsin at Government House, conveyed to the Argentine president Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's greetings for Alfonsin's recent birthday. In remarks to the press after the meeting, Kvasov said he exchanged with Alfonsin ideas on international issues, such as disarmament, the end of the nuclear testing, and the nonmilitarization of outer space." Kvasov said: "I called the president's attention on the latest Soviet proposal calling for the withdrawal of all Euromissiles." He said that the president "has given his full support to this proposal." Kvasov delivered to Alfonsin a message from Gorbachev wishing him "great success in his mission with the Argentine people and in his efforts for peace and disarmament. President Alfonsin's personal efforts in pursuing these objectives are highly appreciated in the Soviet Union." [Text] [Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 2302 GMT 31 Mar 87 PY] /9274

CSO: 5200/2003

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: U.S. CONTINUING WORK ON GERM WARFARE WEAPONS

LD091053 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- Commentator Leonid Ponomarev writes:

The convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed 15 years ago, on April 10, 1972, in Moscow, Washington and London.

Along with the USSR, the United States and Britain the convention has been joined by dozens of other countries which have undertaken resolutely to act with the aim of achieving effective progress on the road to general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and liquidation of all types of weapons of mass destruction. They pledged never, under no circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire in any way or retain microbiological or any biological agents or toxins, weapons, delivery vehicles for them, etc.

When Washington signed this convention it must have ignored its binding nature and actually continued the work started way back in 1943 to create bacteriological (biological) weapons. As admitted by the Pentagon (in 1976) bacteriological weapons were tested in eight U.S. cities, including San Francisco and New York, in the period from 1950 to 1960.

In 1962-1969 alone Washington spent 726 million dollars on the development of such weapons. It was already in 1971 that the American delegation at the disarmament talks in Geneva promised that the entire U.S. arsenal of biological weapons would be destroyed within a year. But subsequent publications in the American press show that this was simply a bluff. THE WASHINGTON POST reported in 1975, that is three years after the signing of the convention, that about 100 types of dangerous pathogenic microbes were being "studied" in American Army laboratories.

The virus of the "Rift Valley" fever, causing blindness, intensive hemorrhage, damage to the liver, inflammation of the brain and death was studied in government laboratories in 1980. Judging by American publications, work to create biological weapons was never stopped. SCIENCE magazine reported that in August 1984 the American Senate voted to build a powerful centre "to study aerosols" on the territory of the Dugway military testing range in Utah. In reality this meant the launching of a complex to study especially lethal viruses.

The foundation on economic trends has information that big stockpiles of lethal microorganisms were built up at the biological warfare preparation centre in Fort

Detrick, Maryland, by 1986. Late in the same year about a litre of pathogenic viruses of a dangerous fever encountered mostly in Africa and Asia had vanished from that centre. Even last year the Pentagon allocated 42 million dollars for 57 projects involving the creation of various types of bacteriological weapons.

The representatives of the present administration say that the United States supposedly strictly abides by the convention but at congressional hearings tht same year Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith bragged that the United States has the capability of synthesizing biological substances designed for combat use.

Intensive preparations for biological war are evidenced also by the Pentagon's growing expenditures on these aims. Thus, during the time that the present administration has been in office allocations for the development of biological weapons have grown from 15.1 million dollars in 1981 to 66 million dollars in 1986. Such are only some of the facts. There is a big difference between what they in Washington say and do.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1420

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER HITS U.S. 'HYPOCRISY' ON VERIFICATION

PM121405 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[P. Filippov article: "Criminal Laboratories Operating. Biological Convention and U.S. Hypocrisy"]

[Text] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was opened for signing 15 years ago, 10 April 1972. That document was drafted in an atmosphere of angry world public indignation at the barbarous actions in Indochina of the U.S. military, which was waging a real chemical war there. In this connection the U.S. accession to the biological convention was a forced measure designed to damp protests. At the same time, the signing of the biological convention was a victory for the forces of peace. For the first time in history they secured a decision on the complete removal of a barbarous kind of mass destruction weapon from states' military arsenals.

Over the years more than 100 states, including all 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, have subscribed to the convention. Efforts are now being made to strengthen the document's operating mechanism. Last September's second review conference of participant states emphasized the importance of the convention's provisions and articles and outlined measures to strengthen it and to develop mutual trust among the parties to the convention. The participant states agreed to encourage exchanges of scientists on a reciprocal basis and also to openly publish the scientific works of specified centers and laboratories. A meeting of experts is now being held in Geneva on this topic. The experts are faced with the task of formulating specific proposals on the substance of and the procedure for exchanging information on all scientific centers which use particularly dangerous pathogens of infectious diseases.

In order to rule out malicious speculation, it has been decided to exchange information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases. The task of the experts now working in Geneva includes the elaboration of provisions to govern the procedure for exchanging this information. Continued discussion of the mechanism for lodging complaints about inspection [proverka] procedures in cases where just one state which is a party to the convention requests should also be expected.

As already reported, the Soviet Union together with the socialist countries submitted a proposal to elaborate an additional protocol on this. It was proposed to define in it the procedures for verifying [kontrol] observance of the convention, including international on-site verification [kontrol].

With the support of some of its allies the United States prevented an accord from being reached on this very important question. Here, once again, Washington's hypocrisy over questions of disarmament manifested itself. As is known, the United States was "foursquare" behind international verification [kontrol] only so long as the Soviet Union did not give its consent in principle to such verification [kontrol] and did not propose elaborating corresponding procedures. And the United States at once abandoned its position. It became obvious that Washington had been frankly bluffing here and that international verification [kontrol] of observance of the biological convention was totally unacceptable to the United States itself. It is not hard to understand why.

Any verification [kontrol] could establish, for example, that the conversion announced by former President R. Nixon of the Army bacteriological laboratories at Fort Detrick (Maryland) into an oncological center was a deception. The military department continues to hold sway at Fort Detrick. According to a conclusion by a number of authoritative scientists, it was precisely the Fort Detrick laboratories, which were widely engaged on research into retroviruses, that constructed the HIV virus, which was the pathogen for the previously unknown viral disease AIDS, which has now created exceptionally complex problems for health care throughout the world.

Nor would international verification [kontrol] find it hard to get to the bottom of the fact that the Army center for bacteriological weapons production at Pine Bluff (Arkansas) is still just as it was 15 years ago, and is even developing. It has been reported that Pine Bluff has received a new technological line to equip ammunition with bacterial and toxin compounds [retseptury]. Its conversion into a toxicological center, announced by R. Nixon, was a deliberate lie.

International verification [kontrol] could also be interested in the Baker Bacteriological Laboratory at the Dugway Test Site in Utah. That laboratory, located in a desert region far from roads and prying eyes, has now been turned into the U.S. Army's chief scientific center for the creation [sozdaniye] of new kinds of bacteriological weapons. Millions of dollars were allocated last year to equipping that laboratory and were earmarked chiefly for the construction of a special, large chamber designed for testing the combat properties of bacteriological compounds and ammunition. It has been learned that the simultaneous death of 50 wild horses from a rare African disease, whose pathogen was taken there for genetic engineering manipulation, was noted in the environs of that laboratory.

The United States tries to conceal its unseemly activity in spheres bearing on the biological convention by spreading slander against other states that are parties to the convention. However, in the course of the Geneva conference's work the representatives of a number of countries rightly remarked that every peak in the slander campaign alleging the use of "Soviet-made toxins" in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan invariably coincided with the start of a discussion of the size of the military budget in the U.S. Congress.

The 1972 convention binds the hands of U.S. champions of biological warfare. This is why U.S. Administration spokesmen regularly criticize the convention. At a congressional hearing in August 1986, Feith, a high-ranking Pentagon official, went so far as to call the biological convention "a false advertisement claiming that the problem of biological weapons can be resolved."

The states that are party to the biological convention disagreed with that assessment and "reaffirmed their resolute support for the convention, their immutable allegiance to its principles and aims, and their legal pledge under international law to implement and strictly observe its provisions." This is stated in the preamble to the final declaration of the September conference. And the struggle for this is still being waged today.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW ON U.S. PUSH TO DESTROY OUTDATED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD081521 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Larry Hopkins, a U.S. Republican congressman has told an AP correspondent that the time has come when it is necessary to destroy the stores of old-fashioned chemical weapons which are situated on the territory of the United States. These toxic substances, he noted, present a threat to the country's population. Listen to a commentary from International Journalist Vadim Biryukov.

[Biryukov] As I see it, what is uppermost in this statement by Larry Hopkins is the concern of a legislator for his own fate. The point is that the state of Kentucky, which Larry Hopkins represents, contains eight chemical warfare depots, which are at least 2 decades old. If there were a leak due to the aging of the containers, Yperite, Sarin, and compounds such as the Agent Orange defoliant will begin to affect the inhabitants of Kentucky. Of course, from the viewpoint of Larry Hopkins, this is bad, for we are talking about his home state, and not, say, Europe, where, in the FRG and Britain, thousands of metric tons of U.S.-made chemical rounds are kept, or similarly other regions of the planet.

In the past few years there have been several alarms at the Tooele arsenal, to the south of Salt Lake City in the state of Utah, due to Sarin escaping into the atmosphere. The local authorities are demanding that the Pentagon destroy this dump. But at the same time they are afraid, for the containers would have to be carried through residential areas and this procedure could end in tragedy.

In 1970 an operation was carried out under the codename "Pursuit". The ship (Russel Briggs), with its cargo of concrete containers, was scuttled 150 miles from the Bahamas. World-renowned scientists, including Americans, warned of the danger of this operation. The site of the scuttling is in the region of the powerful Gulf Stream, as a result of which the entire North Atlantic could be contaminated, and then the north of Europe. But clearly this problem is of little concern to the U.S. strategists, who in 1988 intend to set about manufacturing a particularly dangerous chemical weapon -- the Bigeye binary bombs.

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CSO: 5200/1420

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW REPORT ON BW CONVENTION REVIEW CONFERENCE

LD101212 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] The 15th anniversary of an important international document, the convention banning the development, production and accumulation of supplies of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, is marked today. This is what our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev reports from Geneva, where consultations on how this convention is being observed are being held.

[Begin Dmitriyev recording] The time that has passed since the document was signed and since it has been in force has shown the effectiveness and viability of the convention. This was the conclusion drawn by the representatives of the member countries of the convention who have met twice over the past period in Geneva to check on how it is operating and how its points are being implemented.

At the meeting held last September it was decided to hold a conference of scientific-technical experts of the convention's member states. Now the experts have begun to work. Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, the USSR representative, is at the microphone:

[Nazarkin] The purpose of this conference is to strengthen the convention by means of working out confidence measures between its participants. The conference is examining questions of an exchange of information between research centers conducting bacteriological research, and on outbreaks of epidemics and the development of scientific and international cooperation in the field of biology.

The Soviet Union is in favor of other ways, too, leading to a strengthening of the convention banning bacteriological weapons. We are seeking a broadening of the circle of participants in the convention, and are proposing that the effectiveness of monitoring its observation should be improved. We put forward proposals on strengthening the monitoring mechanism at the second conference of the participants in the bacteriological convention. They were supported by many other states, but the United States opposed them. This was evidently a case of pressure from the Pentagon, which allots a certain place to bacteriological weapons in its military plans; with this in mind it is working on developments in the field of biology and genetic engineering. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1420

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET VIROLOGIST DENOUNCES CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD092223 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT 9 Apr 87

["Academician Votyakov Denounces Chemical Weapons" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Minsk April 9 TASS -- Academician Veniamin Votyakov, a well-known Soviet virologist, has said in a TASS interview: "As a scientist and a physician, I regard it as my duty to urge my colleagues in all the continents to do their utmost for disrupting the horrifying plans of preparing a chemical and biological war designed by the U.S. military".

For many years Academician Votyakov headed the Belorussian Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology. He is the author of many research papers on a comprehensive study of forest-spring encephalitis and ways of treating poliomyelitis.

He is taking an active part in the antiwar movement and is a member of the Soviet Committee of the international movement "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War".

Academician Votyakov recalled that the U.S. and other Western countries violated the 1972 convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction. He pointed out that the U.S. had at the moment 250,000 tons of various toxic agents, which is enough for killing all the people in the world many times over.

He emphasized that toxic weapons were fraught with the danger of a biological catastrophe not only in case they were used, but also during tests or leakage. When toxic agents penetrate the soil and water reservoirs, they affect plants and cattle and, consequently, are consumed by man together with food. Since 1976 thousands of leakages have taken place. The greatest threat is hanging over European countries. For instance, 2,000 tons of nerve agents are stockpiled in West Germany. Apart from it, the U.S. plans to deploy more nerve agents at its bases in Britain and Italy.

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CSO: 5200/1420

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRC URGES ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OW161430 Beijing XINHUA in English 1424 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva, April 16 (XINHUA) -- China today urged the elimination of chemical weapons and their production sites at the Geneva disarmament conference.

Fan Guoxiang, head of the Chinese delegation, told the 40-nation conference that states possessing chemical weapons are "obligated to declare and destroy their stockpile and production facilities under international verification so as to ensure the security of all states."

Fan said that since the signing of the Geneva protocol more than 50 years ago, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons, violations have repeatedly occurred.

While urging an international monitoring of production of chemical weapons, Fan also said that legitimate interests of enterprises as well as commercial and technical secrets should be protected.

As for those facilities that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, he said, an effective verification of key facilities would be helpful.

He finally reiterated that China hopes to see "a breakthrough" in reaching a convention on a chemical weapons ban.

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CSO: 5200/4086

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA HITS PENTAGON RETRACTION ON WARHEAD STANDARDS

PM080903 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

["Rejoinder" by Yu. Zhukov: "Punishing Themselves"]

[Text] As is known, Pentagon executive officers, who have the job of annually publishing a diagram comparing U.S. and Soviet armaments, report year after year that there is approximate parity, that is, equality, and in a number of indicators the United States even has an advantage. Naturally, this makes those who study the figures doubt the honesty of their [defense] secretary, who claims day after day that the USSR has established a massive superiority over the United States and is on the point of attacking it.

Someone in the Pentagon was evidently given a dressing down, because recently a document emerged from the military department that is as different from last year's as night from day. It contained a diagram implying that the "relative technical standard" of nuclear warheads is "significantly changing" in favor of the USSR.

On seeing the diagram, Congressman Edward Markey immediately wrote Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral William Crowe a letter bluntly asking him:

"How could the relative technical standard of U.S. and Soviet warheads significantly change in favor of the Soviet Union when the Soviets were observing a nuclear test moratorium for 18 months?"

Commenting on the letter, THE WASHINGTON POST observed that the Pentagon had unsuspectingly refuted the administration's main argument "about the need for nuclear tests to improve warhead design," which the White House was using in its efforts to justify its refusal to endorse the Soviet moratorium.

There was a whiff of scandal. Feelings in Congress in favor of banning appropriations for nuclear tests strengthened again. It was then that an anxious chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to dissociate himself from the statement that had been made to please the military secretary. He published the following reply to Congressman Markey:

"As a result of your request, an analysis was carried out and we were unable to find any significant data confirming the statement." Then the grief-stricken admiral stated that the statement had been made "as a result of an administrative error (!) which we should have discovered," but did not discover.

Markey's comment was sarcastic: "The hardest thing for Washington is to admit errors. It happens to everyone. I am glad Admiral Crowe has clarified once and for all the 'difference in warheads.'"

Once and for all? Hardly! I bet there will be more rubbish tomorrow about the perfidious USSR establishing a twofold and even threefold advantage in armaments over the United States -- after all, that is what C. Weinberger himself keeps claiming.

Nevertheless, Admiral Crowe's apology to Congressman Markey is expensive: After all, he publicly demonstrated that the Pentagon comes out with barefaced lies when its boss needs them!

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CSO: 5200/1419

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA HITS ADELMAN COMMENTS ON SOVIET TESTING POSITION

PM131229 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[Article by P. Lukin: "Adelman's Clear-Cut Position and Designs"]

[Text] In recent days the U.S. mass media have been disseminating speculative stories alleging that the Soviet Union is no longer insisting on a total ban on nuclear tests but is prepared to agree to just their partial limitation. These stories are being made out to be the new position of the USSR, which has allegedly "renounced its demand for a total ban on nuclear tests" and instead has suggested to the U.S. side that they agree on a limitation on the number and yield of nuclear explosions.

K. Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has been particularly zealous in these fabrications and displayed an unrestrained urge to make it seem as though what he wants is reality.

Although he heads an organization which, to judge by its name, should engage in questions of limiting and halting the arms race, Adelman has long been known as a fierce opponent of any measures aimed at reaching accords on real disarmament. This time too he has acted in his usual role and reached the point of totally distorting the Soviet Union's position.

The question arises: What is this -- ignorance of the true state of affairs or malicious intent? Probably the latter. After all, Adelman himself has given the answer to this question by stating that "a total ban on nuclear tests is not a priority task for the United States." He saw fit to ascribe to the USSR the United States' reluctance to decide the question of a total end to nuclear tests and has thus tried to mislead the world public.

The truth is that the Soviet Union has been and remains a determined champion of a total ban on nuclear tests as a very important priority measure in achieving the main aim -- curbing the nuclear arms race and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms completely. The whole world knows that, in seeking to resolve once and for all the problem of halting nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has taken the step of declaring a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which played an exceptionally important part in international life and was welcomed with great approval by all champions of the halting of the nuclear arms race.

It is just as well known that the present U.S. Administration in fact failed to respond to the USSR's proposal to put an end to nuclear tests and has obstinately continued to implement a program of such tests with a view to creating new types of nuclear

armaments and building up its nuclear potential. The Soviet Union's decision to end its unilateral moratorium was an enforced measure dictated only by the interests of security. The Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear explosions does not mean its renunciation of the struggle for their total cessation.

It was the Soviet Union who proposed immediately initiating full-scale talks involving any participants and at any forum on a total ban on nuclear tests with, of course, the participation of the United States. The Soviet side has put forward a specific program of action within whose framework it has expressed the readiness to reach agreement also on the gradual solution of this task by introducing intermediate limits on the number and yield of nuclear explosions.

Here, of course, such measures should, first, be of a material nature and provide for a substantial reduction in the permitted yield of explosions and the number of tests per year and, second, should be of a truly intermediate, provisional, nature, with the establishment of guidelines relating to deadlines for the transition to a total ban on nuclear tests. The Soviet side is not opposed to discussing the question of ratifying the 1974 and 1976 "threshold" treaties during such talks.

During the talks we are proposing methods and forms of control should also be worked out that could form the basis for the control mechanism of a future treaty. The main thing is that the talks should have a clear aim -- a total ban on nuclear tests.

How has the U.S. Administration responded to these proposals of ours? To this day, as is shown by the Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks of experts on questions of halting nuclear tests, the United States is declining to discuss on a practical plane the question of halting nuclear tests. On the contrary, it is insisting on discussing how to carry out these tests and how to monitor them.

The U.S. side, by refusing to embark on full-scale talks on banning nuclear tests, is trying to replace them with the discussion of just one question -- monitoring the observance of the 1974 and 1976 "threshold" treaties. The examination of the question of further intermediate limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions is being put off indefinitely by the United States. Moreover, it is made dependent on the fulfillment of a whole series of additional conclusions and that includes linking it with progress at other talks. As for the question of a total ban on nuclear tests, its solution in general is being deferred until nuclear weapons are removed from the states' military arsenals.

As for the USSR, as before it will do everything in its power to put an end to nuclear tests once and for all. The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union open up a real opportunity for resolving this problem of importance to mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1419

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA ON U.S. REPORT OF OVERSTATED SOVIET TEST YIELDS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jan 87 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Sukhoy: "Beyond the Palisade of Mythical Figures: American Scientists on the Necessity of Thinking in New and Realistic Categories in Politics"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] New York--Over the course of many years, the power of Soviet nuclear blasts was intentionally overestimated both by experts in government departments as well as by specialists that the White House brought in from outside.

In America, especially at the Philistine level, there is a prevailing notion of the dreadfully destructive power of the Soviet nuclear missile potential, which supposedly is several times that of U.S. strategic arms. These dispositions are heated up by Pentagon strategists and in general by all opponents of nuclear arms control. They also prevail in the corridors of federal authority.

No one here takes the trouble to search for any halfway convincing arguments in support of this point of view. Everything is based on unfounded assertions to the effect that the Soviet Union was, as they say, able to attain "nuclear superiority" over the United States in the area of nuclear missile armaments by means of the "insidious utilization of loopholes" in American-Soviet treaties or by openly violating them. The United States, they say, has unfailingly observed if not the spirit then certainly the letter of these treaties and consequently has "been duped." One of the most widespread and popular theses of the current administration boils down to saying that the Soviet Union has supposedly repeatedly violated the agreements on the thresholds of underground nuclear blasts and carried out tests whose yields significantly exceeded 150 kilotons (that is, were more powerful than the explosion of 150,000 tons of TNT--V.S.).

But now this myth is coming to an end. It is crumbling under the pressure of the scientifically founded facts presented by the American scientists Lynn Sykes and Dan Davis in the article, "Power of Soviet Strategic Arms," published in the January 1987 issue of the journal SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. The scientists set for themselves the task, in avoiding any underestimation or overestimation of the Soviet nuclear potential, of giving a true picture of

the situation. Having applied the method for measuring the force of underground blasts that American seismologists have been using over the course of the last decade and that the White House has literally repudiated, L. Sykes and D. Davis demonstrated that over the course of many years the power of Soviet experimental nuclear blasts has been artificially overestimated both by experts of government departments as well as by specialists that the White House brought in from outside.

"Our calculations show convincingly," the American scientists note, "that, in contrast to the conclusions of the administration, no underground blasts carried out by the Soviet Union in recent years exceeded the previously stipulated yield thresholds for nuclear tests." The authors of the article point out that the overestimation of the power of nuclear blasts automatically led to incorrect assessments of the destructive force of the warheads on the Soviet missiles already deployed. And this, in turn, gave a distorted idea of the "height of the nuclear ceiling" of the adversary. This produced a closed circle: from the unrealistic assessments of the power of nuclear tests to the exaggerated calculations of the number of nuclear warheads and then to the pursuit of the "adversary that has suddenly bolted ahead." As a matter of fact, in "catching up" to the nonexistent levels of the nuclear missile arms of the Soviet Union, the United States has actually been violating the strategic balance between the two countries.

The investigation carried out by L. Sykes and D. Davis showed that from 31 March 1976, when the Soviet-American agreement on the thresholds of the yields of underground nuclear blasts became effective, to 6 August 1985, when the unilateral Soviet moratorium went into effect, the USSR has not carried out a single test that would have exceeded the limit of 150 kilotons. Consequently, the authors note, there is no justification for accusing the Soviet Union of violating the agreement, which, by the way, the United States has yet to ratify.

L. Sykes and D. Davis point out that there is the widespread opinion that the striking power of Soviet strategic warheads ranges from 200 kilotons to 50 megatons. These fantastically overstated figures have nothing to do with reality, the researchers note, pointing out the power of the warheads on Soviet strategic missiles actually ranges from 40 kilotons to 1 megaton while the warheads on American missiles range from 50 kilotons to 1.5 megatons.

It was also believed for many years that the total power of the nuclear arsenal of the USSR greatly exceeds the "megatonnage" of the strategic "triad" of the United States. The authors of the publication in SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN are also dethroning this concept of many years duration. The addition of the nonexistent yields of individual warheads produces, they note, an "inflationary sum": the inflated and excessively augmented figures cease to have anything to do with the real number of missiles and warheads. Careful calculations show that in the mid-1970's it was not the USSR but the United States that had somewhat of a lead in the overall power of its strategic systems. At the present time, there is approximate equality in the nuclear arsenals of both countries. But the level of this parity is still extremely high: this puts in question the survival of mankind.

"Is there even a grain of truth in the assertions to the effect that the SALT II Treaty and the agreement on limiting the power of underground tests are more beneficial to the USSR than to the United States?" ask L. Sykes and D. Davis. And their answer is "no." If one takes an unbiased approach to the situation, then one cannot fail to acknowledge that without these agreements the Soviet Union would have had the possibility of deploying substantially more intercontinental ballistic missiles and of arming them with more powerful warheads.

Why is the Soviet Union prepared to go further in lowering the threshold of nuclear tests and why is it proposing to stop nuclear tests altogether? For a long time, they say, it has been thought that it is better to overestimate the military power of the Soviet Union than to underestimate it. Because it is easier to create an image of the "external enemy" by hiding the real situation behind a palisade of biased figures and calculations and because disinformation helps to camouflage the unwillingness to reach important agreements on arms control.

And why, despite the protests of many specialists, has the United States for almost 10 years been applying a faulty method of estimating the power of Soviet nuclear tests? Why is it advantageous for it to see the Soviet nuclear potential in a curved mirror? Why have they been talking for decades from the highest platforms about the "superiority of the USSR in the area of nuclear missile arms."? The American scientists answer these questions as well.

But now, the American researchers write, it is necessary for the United States to begin to think in real categories and to understand at last that the reduction of nuclear arsenals corresponds to the national interests not only of the Soviet Union but of its own as well. The shortest path to this is the observance of the SALT II Treaty and other American-Soviet agreements and, on their basis, the signing of new far-reaching agreements on nuclear arms control.

9746
5200/1396

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: SCIENTIST ON U.S. REASONS FOR CONTINUED TESTING

Reliability Testing Said Unnecessary

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 2, Oct 86 pp 9-10

[Article by Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy, specialist in physics and chemistry: "Explosions in Nevada Are Essential Only for the Development of New Weapons"]

[Text] Neither the USSR, nor the U.S. have been detonating charges with a yield of more than 150 kilotons for 12 years, that is, since 1974 when the treaty limiting nuclear tests became valid. Yet both sides have even more powerful nuclear charges than they had before, and nobody doubts their reliability. Why?

All components of a thermonuclear charge are either stable, such as lithium, deuterium and beryllium, or have a half-life incomparable with the human life span, such as plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,000 years, uranium-235, 800 million years, and uranium-238, 4.5 billion years. The only unstable component used in some types of nuclear weapons is tritium with a half-life of about 12.5 years. So, tritium is the only component which should be replaced from time to time to make a nuclear charge reliable.

Furthermore, every nuclear weapon has a conventional explosive which brings a nuclear charge into subcritical condition and triggers off a chain reaction. There is a detonator, mechanical and electronic components, which can all be subjected to a failsafe test either separately or together without detonating a nuclear charge itself. There are also numerous modern methods of non-destructive analysis, such as defectoscopy, introscopy, etc., which can accurately describe the physical condition and chemical composition of any component, whether nuclear or conventional. And, finally, there are methods of mathematical experiment which make it possible to model on computers even the very test-explosion of standard nuclear weapons.

To sum up, nuclear weapons can be subjected to a comprehensive test for reliability without their detonation. Test explosions which continue to be staged in Nevada are only needed for the development of new types of weapons.

X-Ray Laser Development

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 1, Jan 87 pp 3-7

[Article by Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy: "Nevada Test Range Is Used To Develop the X-Ray Laser"]

[Text] Only a small part of U.S. current tests is concerned with existing nuclear ammunition or one that is to replace the present weapons. Americans are testing, above all, the uprated types of fissile nuclear charges--triggers--designed to set off high-powered thermonuclear detonations. For example, a charge of several megatons can be triggered off by a device of a few kilotons, that is, with a capacity below the limits set by the 1974 Treaty (150 kilotons). Americans also observe how impact pulses, heat, electromagnetic radiation, neutrons, X-ray and gamma-ray emissions produced by explosions affect nuclear charges. But most of the American tests are aimed at improving second-generation weapons and developing weapons of a third generation (see table).

For example, it is possible to seek a more powerful blast and to make such a blast as optimum as possible by increasing initial super-critical compression. One may also conceive some miniature variants of fissile nuclear fuses--for example, by achieving their super-compression through simultaneous pulses from a multitude of powerful optical laser beams. This method is similar to the idea of laser-triggered thermonuclear fusion--a thermonuclear reaction effected through an instantaneous super-compression and heating of pellets of frozen mixture of deuterium and tritium. Incidentally, the American press has recently reported that it is planned to attempt such thermonuclear fusion at underground nuclear tests at the Nevada range. Reduced size and yield of fissile nuclear fuses may prove especially attractive in developing new types of tactical nuclear weapons and enhanced radiation weapons--neutron bombs.

Miniaturisation of nuclear warheads also makes it possible to adapt them to new delivery systems and so augment and widen the catalogue of nuclear delivery vehicles and increase the number of warheads of a new type leads to new vehicles and these in turn give rise to new types of warheads, with the arms race spiralling higher and higher.

More dangerous still is the fact that an increasing part of the present American test explosions is being used to develop weapons incorporating new principles, nuclear weapons of a third generation. Data available in the press indicate that dozens and perhaps hundreds of test explosions are planned.

The possibilities are now being most intensively discussed within the SDI framework are of combining various kinds of selectively directed weapons with the impulse, impact or destruction effects on matter or mechanisms to be achieved through high concentration of effect energies in time and in space, that is, by means of rays from various kinds of lasers (chemical, X-ray or free electron ones), beams of neutral particles accelerated to velocities of the order of tens of kilometres a second by gramme projectiles, etc.

General Classification of Nuclear Weapons

| Generation | Designation | Modern Political Aspects | Varieties | Full-Scale Tests |
|-------------|--|---|---|---|
| First (G1) | "Ancient" | "Horizontal" spread | Fission (U235, Pu) (Supercritical assembly, compression--implosion) | Unnecessary |
| Second (G2) | "Ordinary" (modern) | Deterrence | Thermonuclear weapons (FF--fission--fusion-- FFF--fission--fusion-- fission) | Unnecessary if confidence in stockpiled nuclear arsenals is to be maintained. Necessary for the purposes of nuclear war, for transition from the second to a third generation |
| Third (G3) | "Extraordinary" (Concentrated and selective-action weapons) | Pursuit of the mirage of military superiority. The doctrine of admissibility of nuclear war (for example, a local tactical nuclear war) | Selectively directed (X-lasers and other SDI systems). Selectively enhanced (in yields of radiation, electromagnetic emission and so on) Miniaturised | Necessary |

The central nuclear component of the SDI programme is the project to develop the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser, headquartered at the Livermore Laboratory and initiated by Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, and his associates Lowell Wood and George Chapline.

Underlying the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser project is the idea of converting the energy of a nuclear explosion, which normally spreads evenly in all directions (we disregard here details of energy spread from a ground explosion upwards and downwards), into energy concentrated in space along definite narrow directions.

Each such direction is determined by orienting a long and thin metal needle located next to the nuclear warhead inside the common housing of the X-laser working medium. When this needle is exposed to a powerful flux of X-ray radiation that arises at the moment of a nuclear explosion, the working medium of the X-laser is instantly ionised greatly, with multitudes of electrons leaving both external and deep-lying shells of the medium's atoms, and the metal needle becomes a sort of plasma with a very high density (typical of a solid body). It is assumed that every nuclear warhead's explosion could pump several dozen needles of an X-ray laser, while high-speed computers would train these needles on targets, having calculated the trajectories of missiles already in flight.

This kind of weapon is being advertised as one of the basic ones in the Star Wars programme, although it ought to be said that there are different opinions even within the arms laboratories themselves whose staffs are the chief proponents of continuing the nuclear tests and take an active part in SDI work. There is, however, strong scepticism regarding the prospects of X-ray lasers being developed at Livermore. At Los Alamos and Sandia it is widely believed that such lasers cannot be a reliable anti-missile defence and that hundreds of millions of dollars being appropriated annually for them should be reallocated to other SDI projects. Even at Livermore itself there is some opposition to the overemphasis on X-ray lasers and there are sceptics disbelieving the efficiency of these lasers as an ABM element.

One way or another, it is the SDI programme which is now being used as the main argument for developing the X-ray laser, and at the same time it is the clear-cut nuclear arms nature of these SDI components which is causing the greatest concern among American scientists themselves.

Another source of anxiety is the fact that SDI should be based on an impeccably operating very sophisticated computer programme, including the need for very rapid accomplishment of the very complex task of image identification with a great number of far from identical feedbacks. Basically, the idea is to trust the fate of mankind to computers. Requirements to an SDI programme may be likened to the requirement that a library of 5,000 books, each 300 pages long and issued without proofreading, should not contain a single misprint. "Misprints" in this case signify the threat of accidental outbreak of war, when the entire complex SDI system is activated by an initially false alarm signal.

/9274

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS EXAMINES U.S.-JAPANESE 'SECRET AGREEMENT'

'Scandal' Exposed

LD072100 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 7 Apr 87

["Secret Accord Between Washington and Tokyo -- Analysis" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 7 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

A scandal has erupted on both sides of the Pacific over revelations that Washington and Tokyo have had a secret agreement allowing the United States to take nuclear weapons freely into Japan for some thirty years now.

THE NEW YORK TIMES reported Tuesday that a group of Japanese Communists led by MP Atshushi Hashimoto, who had been searching in the Library of Congress, had found a declassified telegram from the then U.S. secretary of state, Dean Rusk, to American Ambassador Edwin Reischauer in Tokyo, dated February 24, 1966.

The cable instructed the latter to remind Tokyo of the need to honor confidential arrangements with the United States on unimpeded introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan under a "transit agreement" which was appended as a top-secret document to the 1969 U.S.-Japanese "Mutual Security Treaty".

The telegram also expressed concern that the arrangements would be undermined if Japan accepted a proposal that Japan be declared a nuclear-free zone.

The State Department warned bluntly that such a move by Japan "could prevent U.S. from bringing our nuclear capable units -- which would include all warships -- into U.S. bases in Japan".

THE WASHINGTON POST commented that the Rusk document "appears to confirm that US. ships and aircraft routinely brought nuclear weapons into Japan for short transit periods".

The Communist Party of Japan made the contents of the telegram public.

Shioji Niihara, a member of the Presidium and of the Secretariat of the party's Central Committee, told newsmen in Tokyo:

"The Liberal-Democratic governments have always talked about peace and disarmament, but have always acted contrary to those goals.

"We want to expose their lies."

The Central Committee of his party in a representation to the government today officially demanded that it tell parliament what confidential arrangements or secret agreements it had made with Washington in 1960 on visits by U.S. warships with nuclear weapons, use of Japanese airfields by aircraft with nuclear weapons, and stockpiling of U.S. nuclear systems in this country for contingencies.

The Communist Party of Japan said the telegram it had published was evidence that the United States and Japan had a secret agreement allowing American nuclear weapons to be carried in transit through Japan or stationed there.

The expose sent official quarters in Washington and Tokyo in confusion.

U.S. and Japanese politicians had spoken also before about there being a secret accord between their countries, and cases where nuclear minitions, let alone delivery systems, had been brought into Japan had been reported in the press more than once.

But it is the first time the existence of the agreement has been confirmed by an offical document coming to public knowledge.

Acting by habit, in Tokyo they hurried to deny out of hand that there was any kind of secret agreement on introduction of American nuclear arms into Japan.

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone asserted that the existing system of "advance consultations" with the United States in introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan in keeping with the "Mutual Security Treaty" had been abided by "in all sincerity".

In Washington, however, they took a more cautious stand. A State Department spokesman said U.S. officials "are now in the process of checking the authenticity of the document and will not comment on its content until we have done so." Washington's long-standing policy, he added, was of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. vessels and aircraft.

It is behind a palisade of diplomatic tricks like refusal to "confirm or deny" facts and with the acquiescence of Tokyo officialdom that the United States has for all these years maintained a relentless and massive buildup of nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the Asian-Pacific region, including Japan, in defiance of the three non-nuclear principles declared by that country.

The Japanese public, which has been waging an ever more determined campaign for a nuclear-free world, is justly asking by what right it has been deliberately misled all these years and demanding a coherent answer to this question.

Moscow Japanese Commentary

OW080851 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Kalinin commentary]

[Excerpts] As has been reported, the Japan Communist Party [JCP] has submitted to the Diet a secret document that it discovered among old U.S. official documents. The secret document revealed the existence of the Japan-U.S. accord concerning shipments of nuclear weapons to Japan. Radio Moscow's military affairs commentator Kalinin writes as follows:

The document in question contains a secret instruction issued by Rusk, then secretary of state, in 1966. It tells Reischauer, then ambassador to Japan, to stress to the

Japanese Government that it should abide by an agreement allowing nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan. Rusk noted that the Japan-U.S. agreement would not be superseded by a nuclear nonproliferation treaty that was then in the making.

This exposure of a secret deal between Japan and the United States concerning nuclear arms reinforces in documented form the reliability of revelations made by former Ambassador to Japan Reischauer some years ago. In an interview with MAINICHI SHIBUN several years ago, Reischauer revealed the existence of a 1960 secret accord with the Japanese Government concerning port calls by U.S. ships carrying nuclear arms and concerning flights to and landings in Japan of aircraft armed with nuclear weapons. At the time, Reischauer denying what he had revealed.

Incidentally, former U.S. ambassador to Japan Reischauer is not the only person who has attested to U.S. nuclear weapons shipments to Japan. [passage omitted]

How has the Japanese Government responded to the revelations? High-ranking officials of the Japanese Government have never admitted the fact of U.S. shipments of nuclear weapons to Japan. The case the JCP exposed to the Diet was no exception.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly denied the existence of any secret accord with the United States concerning nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Nakasone also issued a statement to that effect. This time however none of these rebuttals are convincing. The reason is that immediately after the exposure of the Rusk instruction in the Diet, former Ambassador to Japan Reischauer reconfirmed in an interview with ASAHI SHIMBUN the existence of a Japan-U.S. agreement concerning nuclear arms shipments to Japan.

According to Reischauer, a U.S. ship carrying nuclear arms was at anchor at the port of Iwakuni, a U.S. military base, at the time he received Rusk's instruction. Meanwhile, retired Rear Admiral Laroque said that he would resort to legal procedures to force the Reagan administration to make the Japan-U.S. agreement public.

Equally noteworthy is the attitude of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo on this matter. An embassy spokesman would neither confirm nor deny the reported receipt of the secret instruction from Rusk, citing the embassy's position that it has no right to comment on official cables of the government.

It can easily be imagined that not only the Japanese Government but the U.S. Government as well, is working hard to cover up the facts. This is because the document, which has stirred up a controversy in the Diet, has also exposed indisputable deception concerning the three nonnuclear principles, a fundamental national policy of Japan.

/9274

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: CPSU OFFICIAL DISCUSSES INF, NFZ ISSUES WITH DANES

Copenhagen Press Conference

PH011351 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CPSU Delegation in Denmark"]

[Text] Copenhagen, 28 Mar -- The CPSU delegation that is in Denmark at the invitation of the Danish Social Democratic Party met with E. Weidekamp, mayor of Copenhagen, 27 March. A.I. Lukyanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and delegation leader, talked about the restructuring under way in the Soviet Union and about the increased role of local soviets in solving the tasks of socialist building and in satisfying the Soviet people's growing needs. The representatives of Copenhagen's local authorities showed interest in strengthening good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Denmark and expressed readiness to promote this process.

The head of the CPSU delegation was received by Danish Prime Minister P. Schlueter. In their talk they touched on questions of ensuring security and peace in Europe. Attention was devoted primarily to questions linked with the implementation of the Soviet peace initiative aimed at eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. The head of the Danish Government showed interest in the processes of restructuring in various areas of Soviet society's life, noting their international importance. The prime minister was briefed on the expansion of Soviet industrial enterprises' rights in implementing ties with foreign firms, and on the creation of joint enterprises with the participation of foreign capital, which expand the opportunities for Soviet foreign economic activity. There was an exchange of opinions on the progress in implementing the accords reached during P. Schlueter's October 1986 visit to the Soviet Union -- accords which are of great importance for developing mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

A news conference was held in the afternoon at the Christiansborg Palace -- the Danish Parliament building -- in which the CPSU delegation and the Danish Social Democratic Party leadership, including party Chairman A. Jorgensen, Deputy Chairman S. Auken, Secretary S. Christensen, and L. Budtz, chairman of the Security and Foreign Policy Commission, took part.

In a statement delivered at the news conference, A.I. Lukyanov made a positive assessment of the results of the talks between the CPSU delegation and the Danish Social Democratic Party leadership and expressed the hope that these meetings will promote the strengthening of relations between the two parties and be of use to both countries' peoples.

The talks with the Danish Social Democratic Party representatives and the meetings which the delegation has had in Denmark have reaffirmed the importance and usefulness of dialogue between Communists and Social Democrats, he stressed.

While well aware of the differences in our ideological positions, we at the same time are convinced that this should not be an obstacle to cooperation for the sake of the main task of the day -- the maintenance of peace, the removal of the nuclear threat, the ending of the arms race, and the destruction of nuclear weapons.

We are profoundly convinced, the head of the CPSU delegation continued, that under present conditions we do not need new thinking alone. We need new practical action and bold and vigorous steps. In this regard he mentioned the Soviet Union's large-scale proposals on nuclear disarmament, particularly those set out in the 28 February statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the motives which prompted the Soviet Union to make the decision.

It was noted that the proposals to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of the European Continent are in line with the general efforts aimed at removing the nuclear threat. Pointing out the Soviet Union's support for these initiatives, the CPSU Central Committee secretary spoke in detail about the USSR's approach to the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region. He stressed that the Soviet Union not only states its support for the idea but is taking practical measures to promote it. In particular, these measures were outlined in Helsinki last November.

In developing this position, the Soviet Union reaffirms its support for the idea of giving nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea within the framework of implementing the proposal for a nuclear-free North, and, as a new manifestation of goodwill, could withdraw 6 submarines equipped with 18 ballistic missiles from the Baltic Fleet if agreement were reached on this issue among the relevant states, he pointed out.

The USSR's readiness to embark on talks on concluding a multilateral agreement with the participants in the zone or on concluding separate agreements with each country, pledging not to use nuclear weapons against them, was reaffirmed.

Talking about the processes taking place in the USSR and in Soviet society's life, the head of the CPSU delegation said that the thrust of the efforts being made to restructure and profoundly renew all aspects of the country's life lies in revealing the potential of socialism to the full. Restructuring means accelerating Soviet economic development on the basis of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution in the interests of meeting Soviet people's needs increasingly fully and creating better living conditions for them. At the same time the restructuring underway in the Soviet Union does not mean the smashing of our political system, he noted. On the contrary, it is a question of strengthening and developing it and deepening its democratic nature.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary expressed the opinion that the talks between the Danish Social Democratic Party and the CPSU are of great importance. They have demonstrated the two parties' identical concern for the state of affairs in the world and their understanding of the need to develop and strengthen Soviet-Danish cooperation in all areas.

We view Soviet-Danish relations as a weighty component in a wider East-West dialogue, the head of the CPSU delegation said in conclusion.

A. Jorgensen, chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party, made a short speech expressing satisfaction at the results of the talks, which, in his opinion, were held in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere.

The news conference participants answered journalists' questions.

The head of the CPSU delegation met with Danish Foreign Minister U. Ellemann-Jensen. During the talk a number of international problems relating to security on the European Continent were discussed. An important place was occupied by an examination of certain aspects of the implementation of the Soviet initiative on withdrawing medium-range missiles from Europe and a discussion of the question of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe in light of the results of the meeting of Nordic countries' foreign ministers in Reykjavik, where it was deemed necessary to set up a unified, expert working group to clarify the opportunities for creating such a zone in the region.

The CPSU delegation had a meeting with the Danish Communist Party leadership, during which there was an in-depth exchange of opinions on the content of the restructuring taking place in the Soviet Union. The Danish Communists stressed that the processes taking place in the USSR are of great importance for world development and the communist movement. They made a high assessment of the USSR's recent steps aimed at improving the international atmosphere, in particular the proposal aimed at ridding the European continent of medium-range missiles. The meeting was held in a friendly and relaxed [nepriyazhdenny] atmosphere.

A.I. Lukyanov met with representatives of Soviet institutions in Denmark. The tasks facing Soviet foreign policy and foreign economic departments and organizations at the present stage were discussed in light of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum.

Lukyanov Completes Visit

PM301327 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Copenhagen, 29 Mar — A CPSU delegation headed by A.I. Lukyanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited Denmark at the invitation of the Danish Social Democratic Party 23-28 March.

During its stay in Denmark, the Soviet delegation exchanged views with Social Democratic Party representatives A. Jorgensen, party chairman, S. Auken, deputy chairman and Social Democratic Party political spokesman in the Folketing; S. Christensen, party secretary, O. Espersen, Folketing deputy; L. Budtz, chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party commission for security and foreign policy questions; and O. Fich, Europarlament deputy.

The talks passed in a friendly atmosphere. The sides discussed primarily questions pertaining to the need to continue efforts to achieve detente and disarmament and in particular problems regarding the elimination of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical weapons from Europe, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, and its possible geographical boundaries and corresponding guarantees. Questions of conventional arms reduction, nonmilitarization of space, observance of the ABM Treaty, and so forth were also touched upon.

The delegation members met with representatives of the Social Democratic parliamentary party and S. Jakobsen, president of the Folketing. The delegation toured the country, visiting Helsingor, where it inspected the school of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, Odense and Aarhus. It had talks with E. Weidekamp, the mayor of Copenhagen.

The head of the CPSU delegation met with Prime Minister P. Schluter and Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen.

The CPSU delegation invited representatives of the Danish Social Democratic Party to visit the Soviet Union.

On 28 March the CPSU delegation left Copenhagen.

It was seen off at Kastrup airport by representatives of the Danish Social Democratic Party leadership and B.N. Pastukhov, Soviet ambassador to Denmark.

On the same day, the delegation headed by A.I. Lukyanov returned to Moscow.

It was met at the airport by I.V. Kapitonov, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Auditing Commission; CPSU Central Committee members V.V. Zagladin and N.I. Savinkin; and others.

/9274

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BULGARIAN OFFICIAL DISCUSSES BALKAN NFZ ON MOSCOW RADIO

LD111035 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1215 GMT 10 Apr 87

["International Situation--Questions and Answers" program presented by Igor Surguchev, with Nikolay Shishlin, political observer; Mariy Ivanov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria; Yuriy Mikhaylovich Kolosov, deputy head of Humanitarian and Cultural Ties Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Sergey Pravdin, Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, and Andrey Ptashnikov, "colleagues" of Igor Surguchev]

[Excerpt] [Surguchev] Many of our listeners continue to inquire into the problem of the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe. Comrades (Logovskoy) from Kyshtym and (Podshebyakin) from Korovograd ask if there is any progress in the creation of such a zone in the Balkans. As you know, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is an active champion of declaring the Balkans a nuclear-free zone.

Over to Comrade Mariy Ivanov, Bulgaria's first deputy minister of foreign affairs. The recording of his speech was made recently by our special correspondent in Sofia.

[Begin Ivanov recording in Bulgarian with superimposed translation] The proposal for creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Balkans is one of the earliest initiatives concerning the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe. The well-known proposals of the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Romania on this matter were made as early as the second half of the fifties. Our country energetically supported them. As you know, in recent years there have been new developments and broad international recognition of the idea of creating nuclear-free zones.

In 1981, Comrade Zhivkov proposed that a meeting of leaders of the Balkan countries be held in Sofia to discuss the problem. The first step was taken on the road to put this proposal into practice. In January and February 1984, there was a conference in Athens of experts from Balkans countries. They reviewed cooperation among themselves in various fields and discussed procedure directed at turning the Balkans into a nuclear weapons-free zone. Agreement was reached to continue this dialogue.

Realistic preconditions exist for turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone. Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey are participants in the nuclear weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. They have all adopted the requirements regarding the use of nuclear power only for peaceful purposes as established by the IAEA. The countries of the region do not have their own nuclear weapons, and, consequently, their

pledges boil down to the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons belonging to a non-Balkan country, to not permitting these weapons on their territory. Nor would the creation of such a zone alter the balance of forces in the region, as agreement on this matter would be the outcome of equal talks, based on the principle of not damaging the security of any state or military grouping.

The international seminar on nuclear-free zones held in Sofia at the end of last year, in which eminent scientists and public figures from East and West took part, promoted further popularization of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is guided by the interests of peace and cooperation. Acting with the aim of consolidating security in the Balkans, Bulgaria is defending the supreme interests of its own people and the cause of socialism and peace on earth. [end recording]

/9274

CSO: 5200/1419

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: BLOC FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Realities of Nuclear Space Era

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 2, 1987 pp 3-7

[Article by Prof. Shalva Sanakoyev]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress evolved and put forward the fundamental principles for a comprehensive international security system. This far-reaching initiative was backed by the fraternal parties of all socialist community countries. It takes account of the complexity of the present international situation and the tasks facing humanity in this nuclear age and fully meets the exigencies of today. "Now as never before," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party Congress, "it is important to find ways for closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, and mass organisations and movements that are genuinely concerned about the destinies of peace on earth, with all peoples in order to build *a comprehensive system of international security.*"

The problem of promoting world peace and security has always been a central one in world politics. But it is particularly acute now that staving off a nuclear catastrophe has become a life-and-death issue for all countries and peoples and that the security of every state hinges directly on international security, which implies *durable world peace and the preclusion of any attempt whatever to prevent nations from independently choosing the path of their development.*

There exists a mechanism for maintaining international peace. It is the United Nations, whose Charter lays down the fundamental principles of international security, to be put into practice by the Security Council, one of the main UN bodies. As far back as 1970, the 25th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. Ever since then, the course of implementation of the Declaration has been discussed at every session. The military, political, socio-economic and humanitarian aspects of the problem are a standing topic in and outside the United Nations.

Until recently, however, international security problems were examined in isolation from one another, and the idea of setting up a comprehensive international security system, of working out its universal principles was not dealt with. As a consequence, even resolutions on various aspects of the problem passed by the UN General Assembly remained a dead letter through the fault of imperialist countries.

In advocating an international security system, including a system for Europe, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries have invariably held that it should serve as a solid basis for restructuring international relations in the spirit of mutual confidence and understanding

and for solving key world political problems, above all those of curbing both the nuclear and the conventional arms race, and should become a dependable guarantee of world peace.

The 27th CPSU Congress developed an integral concept of a comprehensive international security system covering all the military, political, economic and humanitarian aspects that must underlie the system. This is the first time that so complex, all-embracing a concept has been proposed. What is more, the proposal comes at a most opportune time, for it is today that the prerequisites have formed for a constructive discussion and solution of the whole range of international security problems, or, in other words, objective conditions have been created for stopping the warmongers and delivering mankind from global cataclysms for all time. In short, the trend towards building up the potential of peace, reason and goodwill is now both steady and essentially irreversible.

A turn for the better can be made—from the sharp military and political contest between the two systems to a policy of detente and the establishment of a comprehensive international security system. This is ensured by the world socialist community with its mighty military, economic and political potential; the growing struggle of all peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America for peace and social progress; the advances of the non-aligned movement, which comprises dozens of countries and is actively resisting the imperialist policy of aggression and war. Other factors promoting a shift to detente and the creation of a comprehensive international security system are the expanding anti-war movement of all continents, whose peoples realise more and more that today a world war would doom humanity to self-annihilation; the increased awareness of some sections of bourgeois ruling quarters that a military confrontation between the two socio-economic systems would have disastrous effects; and the existence of rough military-strategic parity between the Soviet Union and United States, between the WTO and NATO.

It follows that in today's world there exist *objective* conditions for the contest between the two systems to go on *exclusively* in the form of peaceful competition.

"The course of history and social progress," states Resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress, "requires ever more insistently that states and nations constructively and positively interact all over the world. The combination of competition and historical contest between the two systems with the mounting tendency towards the interdependence of states within the world community is the real dialectics of development of today's world. A controversial but interdependent, and in many ways integral, world is taking shape through the struggle of opposites. World affairs, their present stage, set especially rigid demands on every state, be it in foreign policy, in economic and social activity, or the spiritual makeup of society."

The Soviet concept of international security is a concrete manifestation of a new mode of thinking consonant with the nuclear age. It is aimed at laying the solid groundwork for world relations adequate to the conditions of contemporary scientific and technological progress. In other words, it calls for the establishment of a system of state-to-state relations meeting today's exigencies, ruling out the very possibility of breaching international peace and, most important, freed from the arms race, from material preparations for a nuclear war. This is the noble aim of the whole set of the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries.

The basis for a comprehensive international security system can be provided by the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries for radically reducing strategic offensive nuclear armaments, abolishing US and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and simultaneously reducing missiles of that class in Asia, freezing the number of

missiles with a range below 1,000 kilometres, consolidating the provisions of the ABM Treaty, imposing a complete and definitive ban on nuclear blasts, eliminating chemical weapons as well as all industrial facilities for their manufacture before the end of this century, carrying out substantial cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments at global and regional levels, and exercising effective control in every sphere and at every stage of arms reduction. If accepted these proposals would help lay the foundations for a comprehensive international security system and substantially improve the international situation.

The Soviet-US summit in Reykjavik and the new proposals made there by Mikhail Gorbachev showed that mutually acceptable agreements leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons can be reached. At present, all sensible statesmen and politicians admit that those Soviet proposals offer a real opportunity for breaking the stalemate at the disarmament talks and putting an end to the arms race. Reykjavik showed the world once again the Soviet Union's goodwill in searching for radical solutions in favour of more durable world peace, a peaceful present and future for mankind and the removal of the nuclear danger. At the same time, it again laid bare the attitude of those who refuse to abandon their militarist policy and their insane plans designed to alter the military strategic balance in their favour.

The leaders of the fraternal parties of the CMEA member countries who met in Moscow on November 10 and 11, 1986 exchanged opinions on current international problems. The meeting supported the principled position adopted by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik and stressed the need to step up joint efforts in the interest of abolishing nuclear weapons and reducing conventional armaments, of strengthening international peace and security.

All signs are that the imperialist bourgeoisie goes on closely linking the destiny of the old world with militarism, with the policy of arms race. It sees the build-up of its nuclear potential as a means of heading off the final disintegration and decay of capitalism. Indeed, imperialism, which has chosen the arms race and virtually ignores all proposals for curbing it, is pursuing very definite *class aims*: maintaining an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty and diverting the people from the struggle for social justice by exploiting their desire for self-preservation and survival. Besides, with the arms race on, the imperialist bourgeoisie is in a position to virtually exclude a section of the working class as well as of research and technological personnel from anti-war movements and the anti-imperialist struggle by providing it with a high standard of living.

The class character of the imperialist policy of nuclear and space arms race is particularly obvious in regard to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is manifested in attempts to weaken them economically and to undermine their international positions.

Thus the policy of building up military potential currently pursued by the United States and NATO affects the interests of every single nation and humanity as a whole. Imperialism would like to make the arms race all but the "point of departure" for its class and ideological contest with world socialism. By escalating it again and again, imperialism is committing the greatest crime against the peoples of the world.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Union's steadfast, unrelenting struggle for disarmament is of special importance in mobilising the peoples against the barbarous policy of international imperialism, for organising effective joint actions in defence of world peace and the future of civilisation.

Laying the foundations for a comprehensive international security system would help make peaceful coexistence the highest universal prin-

ciple of relations between countries of the two different systems. It is logical that this initiative comes from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. *The foreign policy of existing socialism is, and has always been, the most humane and purposeful policy in defending world peace and resisting aggression and war.* Seeking to provide peaceful conditions for the creative effort of their peoples, the socialist community countries are at the same time defending the interests of mankind as they strive for the solution of the main global problem of today, that of averting a nuclear disaster and preserving peace and life on earth.

Socialism is a society consistently upholding the independence of peoples and human progress and gearing its international activities to the maintenance and consolidation of world peace. Socialism, Mikhail Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress, *"is setting an example which is becoming more and more influential and attractive, and demonstrating the real humanism of the socialist way of life. By so doing it is erecting an increasingly reliable barrier to the ideology and policy of war and militarism, reaction and force, to all forms of inhumanity, and is actively furthering social progress. It has grown into a powerful moral and material force, and has shown what opportunities are opening for modern civilisation"*.

It is from the standpoint of using objective opportunities that one should also consider the proposal to lay the groundwork for international security in order to lend the development of international relations a stable character and provide a reliable safeguard against the threat of military cataclysms.

We are not inclined to oversimplify matters. The problem of laying the foundations for international security is very complex and will take a good deal of time and effort. Its solution will depend in no small measure on the overall international situation, on the course and outcome of the talks on nuclear and conventional armaments, on the improvements of the political climate in the world, on greater confidence between countries.

In this connection there is no disregarding the diplomatic subterfuges and propaganda stratagems of the Western countries, which often use them as a smokescreen to conceal the real state of world affairs. We are faced with a clear attempt to misrepresent *the overall situation in the world*, to minimise the nuclear danger threatening the peoples, and at the same time to paint an unwarrantedly bright picture of the ongoing East-West talks, especially on curbing the arms race. In so doing, the West is careful to say as little as possible about the results of these talks. What we have here is certainly not an excess of optimism but an attempt to mislead public opinion and throw the anti-war movements into disarray. Thus the imperialist states' "secret diplomacy" takes on yet another highly dangerous form.

A Marxist-Leninist analysis of the alignment of world political and class forces as well as an objective assessment of the overall international situation and authentic information on the talks under way contribute therefore in large measure to a correct understanding by the peoples of today's requirements and mobilise them to resist the policy of militarism and war.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries submitted the proposal for a comprehensive international security system to the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. The move was prompted by deep concern about the fate of peace and the future of nations and had a definite purpose: preventing a drift to the precipice of nuclear self-annihilation and bringing people's way of thinking and action into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age so as to reshape international relations on the principles of cooperation and mutual understanding, thereby preserving and promoting peace.

The socialist countries proposed to the UN to call on its members to concentrate on providing equal security for all, in every sphere of international relations and to contribute accordingly to the drafting of a document containing the fundamental principles of a comprehensive international security system.

The 41st Session of the UN General Assembly, in particular its First Committee, discussed the proposal for such a system. The overwhelming majority of speakers supported the socialist countries' initiative. They stressed that it is in keeping with the requirements of today and with the tasks and objectives of the UN and reflects the interests of all peoples and countries and world peace.

The 41st Session of the UN General Assembly with 102 yes votes passed a resolution "On the Creation of a Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security", thus laying the foundation for the further development of constructive dialogue on the substance of a new philosophy of security in the nuclear-space age and practical ways of reconstructing international relations on its basis. The only no votes came from France and the United States.

In conclusion we wish to stress that today it is particularly important to analyse on scientific lines problems involving diverse aspects of a comprehensive international security system, show the significance of dependable and guaranteed foundations for this system in the nuclear and space era, and bring out and compare the positions of states, political parties and social movements on this key issue of contemporary international relations and world politics. To make everyone more aware of the fact that providing the foundations for security is imperative today, it is necessary, first and foremost, to make an objective analysis of the struggle between diverse trends over this problem, show the course of the current talks on the fundamental security problem, that of curbing the nuclear arms race, and appraise the contribution of the negotiators to the immediate solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament and to the promotion of world peace and security.

These, then, are the considerations that prompted us in organising an exchange of opinion on the problems concerned. The participants are scholars, journalists and practical workers from Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union.

Military, Political Aspects

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 2, 1987 pp 20-24

[Article by Wolfgang Kubiczek]

[Text]

The last decades of this century, associated more and more often with the onset of the nuclear and space era, have seen the rise of an absolutely new situation. This is due primarily to the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on military technology, something which lends the problem of war and peace a qualitatively different dimension. While in earlier wars there were winners and losers, such an outcome is no longer possible. Owing to the enormous destructive power of the weapons stockpiled to date, a nuclear war would spell the self-annihilation of humanity. Under these circumstances, safeguarding the world against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe is increasingly assuming the character of a political task that can only be accomplished by political means.

"The new situation", said Erich Honecker on June 13, 1986, "calls for new thinking, for a new, responsible approach to the issues whose out-

come will determine whether there will be war or peace. To begin with, it is necessary to find solutions leading to the halt of the arms race and to a reshaping of relations between states on the basis of comprehensive and equal security for all." Universal security can be ensured on a durable basis and for the long term given the elimination of the material means whose use would result in destroying mankind. This implies primarily disarmament in the sphere of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, non-extension of the arms race to outer space and substantial cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments.

What is the qualitatively new situation in which the world finds itself?

No state is in a position any longer to safeguard its security by military technological means while ignoring or injuring the security of other countries. The development of new weapons has never contributed to lasting peace. The thesis advanced recently in connection with SDI and alleging that a new, more sophisticated military technology can dependably safeguard the security of the United States is nothing but an illusion. All that such breakthroughs in military technology produce is a marked build-up of military potentials and a depreciation of a peace-preserving factor like military parity.

An analysis of the trend of the arms race over the past decades reveals something peculiar, a distinctive "logic". The military technological projects of one side are depreciated by the other side's counter-measures which, in their turn, prompt the former to act in order to offset them. Inasmuch as each side proceeds in assessing progress in the armaments of the other side from what is the worst for itself, a qualitative advance in the effectiveness of the weapons of mass destruction that are fielded comes fairly soon. This ominous "logic" of the arms race may go so far as to defy political control or even to condition political decisions.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated by its practical moves that this "logic" can be counteracted by reasonable political measures. The most convincing example of this is the repeated extension of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts at a time when the United States pressed forward with nuclear weapons tests. It goes without saying that Soviet goodwill cannot be abused ad infinitum. There is a need for an adequate response from the United States. The "logic" of the arms race must give way to the logic of ending it.

The nuclear arms race, if continued, is bound to increase equal danger and may push it so far that "even parity will cease to be a factor of military-political deterrence", Mikhail Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress. That this conclusion is justified is shown by persistent US attempts to build up a first strike capability by developing strategic and space offensive weapons. This ambition might tempt adventurist imperialist forces to settle political crises by using nuclear weapons.

The performances of the new weapons and the way they are deployed sharply reduce the time for prior notification. Today, if nuclear missiles will be used, this time is measured in minutes, but it will be reduced to seconds once laser beam weapons are used in outer space or from outer space against the Earth. Thus, the time needed for the political leadership of a country to make decisions regarding the nature and scale of retaliation, the issue of war and peace, is shrinking. Such decision-making is inevitably relegated in increasing measure to technical systems and, what is more, failures of such systems are not entirely out of the question, as the sad experience of the past has shown. In a crisis situation the common sense and will of politicians would, in fact, no longer be able to stop a dangerous trend of development.

Rapid changes in military technology eventually give rise to weapons systems whose limitation and reduction would be quite hard to control or could not be controlled at all. In other words, arms reduction encounters growing technical difficulties. At the same time, there is a danger even now that the arms race being whipped up by the United States may go beyond the limits to the buildup of deadly weapons set by existing treaties. The contradiction between the implementation of Star Wars plans and compliance with provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty is evident. The arms race is undermining the existing political mechanism of curbing it; at the same time, it is eroding the general political and technical conditions of reaching new agreements and accords on arms limitation and disarmament.

Such are certain circumstances which should be taken into account in ensuring international security.

Obviously, a comprehensive approach to the problem of promoting international security demands first and foremost removal of the military factor from the global structure of security. This can only be achieved by steadily abolishing the means of warfare, especially nuclear arms. Disarmament is therefore a political task of paramount importance in the struggle for a comprehensive international security system.

The attitude to armed force, to military might and their role in world politics, is becoming a criterion of the existence or lack of new thinking in the nuclear and space age. Mikhail Gorbachev's statement made at the 27th CPSU Congress to the effect that "the modern world has become much too small and fragile for wars and a policy of strength... Not only nuclear war itself but also the preparations for it, in other words, the arms race, *the aspiration to win military superiority can, speaking in objective terms, bring no political gain to anybody*", accords both with the ideal of socialism and with the objective security interests of all nations.

The socialist countries are not trying to achieve unilateral advantages injuring the security of other countries and running counter to their interests. The Warsaw Treaty countries' military doctrine is explicitly orientated to defence. The Soviet Union and its WTO partners are staunch opponents of any variety of war. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have committed themselves to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Treaty countries declared at the Budapest Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in June 1986 that they would start no hostilities against any state unless they become the target of aggression themselves.

In the military field the Warsaw Treaty countries proceed in a way ensuring that no other country feels concerned about its security. They are seeking a drastic lowering of the high level of military confrontation, the abolition of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and a limitation of the offensive capability of the opposing armed alignments in order that the military potential of alliances and individual countries may only serve their defence requirements.

Regrettably, this approach to the military factor is still anything but universal. The leading politicians of NATO countries are stuck in pre-nuclear dogmas. They unhesitatingly extol military strength, hoping to achieve their aims with its help. Early last year the US President, speaking on television, said that the past five years had shown that US strength was again a safeguard of freedom in a dangerous world. He described force as the most conclusive argument that his country had. Thereupon the President repeated the battered allegation that arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union could only be carried on "from a position of strength". He said US strength was an inseparable element of tranquillity

in the world, America's last great hope at the talks on real cuts in nuclear arms, and therefore his country was negotiating with the Soviets "from a position of strength". US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was even more outspoken in one of his articles. He wrote that the United States could achieve its goal even without war provided it was strong enough militarily.

This mode of thinking, which relies on one's own military strength and on the weakness of the other side, is outdated and, above all, politically unrealistic; it conflicts with US interests and the task of preserving world peace. Such thinking is indicative of a political philosophy prompted by the notion of one's exclusiveness, appropriating the right to pass judgment on everyone and everything and denying the political and moral right of other nations to claim a position equal to that of the United States.

And so, two antithetic interpretations of the role of armed force in shaping the future system of international relations is the distinctive background of the current struggle, whose outcome will have a direct bearing on the fate of the world peace. Both interpretations are products of the class essence of the social systems concerned. One of them expresses the inseparable unity of socialism and peace. The other reflects the aggressiveness of imperialism, its inherent tendency towards militarisation, and the interests and objectives of the military-industrial complex.

This being so, is there no contradiction in the very problem of safeguarding international security? Isn't it a fact that the arms race is typical of imperialism and therefore cannot be stopped, to say nothing of any headway towards disarmament? Doesn't it mean that for as long as the capitalist system exists, humanity will inevitably go on drifting towards the precipice of nuclear disaster?

Politically, to present the problem in this way would mean denying the possibility of disarmament in the present epoch, which is characterised by the existence of states with different social systems, and would mean dooming large sections of the public to political passivity and fatalistic thinking. Also, it would discourage those forces that do not subscribe to socialism's goals from the common struggle for disarmament and against a nuclear catastrophe. Yet it is beyond doubt that a broad coalition of common sense and realism involving the overwhelming majority of people, a sizable part of the bourgeoisie included, could bring about disarmament and make a tangible contribution to the establishment of a comprehensive international security system.

The capitalist states are compelled to take account of the balance of international forces, the main trends of world development and the growing interdependence of countries and peoples. Besides, the more aggressive imperialist forces come up more and more often against the fact that there is a limit to the political and economic potentialities of the capitalist system, which they certainly cannot but reckon with.

And now for the chief point. The consolidation of socialism in every respect and its ability to maintain its defence potential at a level necessary for safeguarding its security only and for no other purposes are and will remain a major guarantee of peaceful world development. The results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe are evidence that all the existing differences over the issue of war and peace notwithstanding, it is possible to reach agreements equally meeting the interests of all countries.

In working for the establishment of a comprehensive international security system, it is essential to see the interconnection of all its components. Cuts in armed forces and armaments and disarmament measures leave in the international structure of security a vacuum which must be filled by introducing other guarantees of security. Arms limitation and

disarmament, that is, a diminution of the role of the military factor as a component of the security of states, inevitably lead to a growth in the significance of other spheres, primarily the political sphere. To safeguard international security, it is necessary both to adopt disarmament measures and provide greater political and legal guarantees of national security. The socialist countries bear this interconnection in mind. And they do not regard the achievement of progress in one field as a precondition of progress in another. It is possible to adopt arms limitation and disarmament measures that do not simultaneously require political guarantees. The general principle, however, should be as follows: the more extensive and significant disarmament measures are, the more imperative it is to join efforts for strengthening all other direct and indirect guarantees of security. It is also important to vigorously foster political dialogue between countries with different social systems. It helps create general opportunities for progress in disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic therefore submitted a draft resolution on the need for a constructive dialogue to improve the international situation to the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. It wants to help ensure that political dialogue and talks are carried on with a sense of responsibility and that results are achieved with the aim of promoting peace and international cooperation and drawing interests closer together. Also, the GDR does its best to help strengthen the UN as a forum of collective efforts for the solution of urgent world problems.

In 1986, the socialist countries showed their readiness to take a new approach to the problem of disarmament by proposing a comprehensive programme for a phased reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and appropriate effective control. It is now necessary for policy-makers in capitalist countries to show political readiness and goodwill in their turn by accepting the proposed dialogue, which would make it possible to put the problem of setting up a comprehensive international security system on a practical basis.

U.S. Military Doctrines

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[Article by Laszlo Tolnai]

[Text]

After the Second World War, the plurality of mutually counterbalancing rival international forces admittedly was succeeded by two blocs, socialism and capitalism, which are locked in a sharp struggle covering every sphere. The concept of security and the approach to it from the military standpoint changed as the need for the security of individual countries as well as of each of the two world systems came to the fore.

At one pole stood the United States which set out to create an international political situation that would ensure world domination of this leading capitalist power. To this end it began the intensive build-up of its military potential, in particular in the nuclear field. Besides, Washington proceeded to set up a system of military and political alliances such as would guarantee US military presence in every part of the globe under bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations imposed by them. That was how the concept of "deterrence" appeared, acquiring a specific content.

The Soviet Union, at the other pole, was forced to adopt counter-measures in order to safeguard its own security and the security of its socialist community partners. The chief task from the point of view of this security was not only to achieve and keep up general military parity with the United States but to bring about parity in other regions with due regard for the conditions prevailing there.

Thus one side made the problem of military parity, closely linked with the idea of equal security, central to its policy while the other banked on "deterrence", which is part and parcel of the US strategy of "containment". This strategy presents the Soviet Union as the chief enemy which must be held in constant dread of the disastrous aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons against it. This approach was generally intended to stress the "defensive" nature of US military plans whose real and chief purpose was to make the adversary refrain from activities restricting the global influence of the United States. This, for its part, necessitated a continuous build-up of armaments and ever greater fighting efficiency. One of the arguments in support of this policy was that without quantitatively and qualitatively adequate "deterrents", a collision with the socialist countries was inevitable, for the reason why the enemy did not use military force was not due to lack of aggressive intentions but because it was contained by US fighting strength.

Western sources estimated that by the early 1950s the Soviet Union had no military aircraft with a range large enough for striking a crashing blow at US territory and that the US Air Force could therefore aim with impunity at Soviet installations. In response to the provocative US activity, the Soviet Union could only have posed a direct threat to Western Europe.

It was not long, however, before the Soviet Union fielded missiles which thoroughly altered the strategic situation. US military experts had to reckon with the chances of the Soviet Union endangering certain installations on US territory. A special subcommittee which the US National Security Council set up in 1952 to ascertain the likelihood and presumable proportions of the military damage threatening the United States pointed out that the country's vulnerability was a fact and that an atomic attack would be an unacceptable hazard for the American people.

And so the original model of "deterrence" fell apart, and "deterrence" based on a second-strike capability came to the fore. The new version implied that after a first strike the receiving side would retain its ability to retaliate. This was to be achieved both through large-scale arms build-up and by setting up a defence system under which the population and the forces assigned to deliver a second strike would suffer but insignificant casualties. It was on these lines that the United States carried on its main efforts in the 1960s. But US strategists soon realised that neither the build-up of "deterrents" nor the deployment of an anti-missile defence system served the goal set and merely led to an endless arms race and modernisation of offensive weapons.

It became evident that the idea of making "deterrence" effective by achieving military superiority was unrealistic, since every attempt to this end naturally prompted the other side to counteract it. Nevertheless, the search for "deterrents" went on. The loss of the nuclear advantage and the growing vulnerability of the United States presented it with new problems, for this shook the West European allies' confidence in US "guarantees" of "extended deterrence". Hoping to remedy the situation, the United States forced its NATO partners to adopt the concept of "flexible response", thereby shifting the emphasis in Europe from the doctrine of "deterrence" to possible use of nuclear weapons at the disposal of conventional troops units. But even this was no solution to the problem of defending Western Europe from the alleged Soviet threat, since the use of US nuclear weapons was still hard to imagine, at least as long as there was no direct threat to the United States itself.

Nor did the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe solve the problem. The US side believes that these weapons provide confidence in US "nuclear guarantees", in the certainty of US action in the event of an attack on Western Europe. However, the stationing of US intermediate-range nuclear missiles on West European soil did not lessen doubts about the effectiveness of "extended deterrence". Indeed, many in Western Europe affirmed that the deployment of these weapons had virtually shifted the nuclear hazard to Europe by the will of the United States, conjuring up the spectre of possible nuclear war only on the continent. This gave rise to covert and in some cases even to overt contradictions between the United States and the West European NATO countries. And while not all of them were due to political causes, they inevitably affected the military sphere.

At this point I would like to call attention to two facts. One of them is the rise of obvious differences inside NATO over certain aspects of the US position. While the United States generally attributes changes in the developing world to Soviet attempts to "penetrate" into an individual country, West European states often tend to regard these changes as an objective result of the development of the regions concerned. The other equally noteworthy fact is disagreement over West European security. Influential political forces in Western Europe consider that universal security should be based not only on Western "defence capability" but on a system of treaties with the Soviet Union as well as with other Warsaw Treaty countries.

The overall result is that the US "policy of achieving security through deterrence" has been in permanent crisis ever since strategic parity was attained. Furthermore, the use of the factor of "deterrence" as a questionable basis for various theories, doctrines and methodologies has seriously injured US military and political thought by bringing the military aspects of the problem of preserving peace to the fore. As a consequence, the US took a biased view of, or simply ignored the socialist countries' fundamental ideas and foreign policy moves aimed at safeguarding security.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries rejected the US concept of "deterrence" from the outset. Military and political experts in socialist countries pointed out that "deterrence" had a virtually destabilising effect on the military balance of forces.

In light of the US build-up of military might, the socialist countries' response was perfectly logical: they strengthened their defences and increased their military potential to the requisite proportions. The military-strategic parity brought about by the socialist community, primarily the Soviet Union, through tremendous efforts benefited the international situation. It made possible the pursuit of a policy of detente and paved the way for talks on lowering the level of military confrontation. This means that while Western politicians, relying on "deterrence", tried to achieve "security" by military means, the socialist countries sought solutions above all on the basis of political guarantees: witness is their constructive proposals for renouncing the use of force, for peacefully settling disputes, and refraining from interference in the affairs of other countries and cutting military spending.

The parity achieved in the military sphere posed new questions. In spite of irreconcilable ideological and social principles, countries with different social systems must work together to ease tensions, carry on a dialogue, build mutual confidence and extend cooperation. Besides, a security policy based on military parity poses a number of specific problems. The quantitative indicators of military parity may create a situation in which figures or other concrete quantities have a differing impact.

This means that any discrepancy between them may be taken as "superiority" or a "lag", which can easily provoke an escalation of the arms race in accordance with the traditional military-political mode of thinking, as in the case of "deterrence". What contributed to the creation of such a situation was also the fact that the outwardly cogent arguments of military experts based on calculations often had a stronger effect on decision-making than the abstract categories of quality or intricate geographical, economic, scientific, technological and occasionally even psychological elements of security capable of moderating the shortcomings of a quantitative "imbalance".

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the definition of military equilibrium or the "superiority" and "lag" involved, primarily in strategic armaments, may easily clash with the concept of "adequate security", since with the present level of armaments the difference (in delivery vehicles or warheads) is immaterial. After all, both sides possess a more than adequate destructive capability, and a further increase in it cannot bring them any substantial advantages. Therefore, while a new weapon can nominally increase offensive strength, the overall effect cannot really be changed any longer. The advantages that are thus gained cannot have any effect on the military balance as a whole or on destructive power, and hence cannot increase the chances of survival.

The socialist countries' efforts are aimed at achieving military security by lowering armaments level to the minimum as well as at preventing the other side from stepping up the arms race. This is not to say that the socialist countries are against maintaining strategic parity. On the contrary, they consider it a component of security.

Developments over the past decades and today's realities have made the socialist countries more confident than ever of the need to revise seemingly unshakable truths of earlier centuries. The Romans' motto "If you wish peace, prepare for war" is hopelessly obsolete. In our age, the use of existing weapons, let alone new and more sophisticated ones, would inevitably result in a global catastrophe. It is necessary to jettison a mode of thinking and action based on the centuries-long idea that wars and armed conflicts are acceptable and permissible.

In these conditions security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, that is, on the doctrines of "containment" or "deterrence", as Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress. The situation is becoming even more absurd and amoral with the world made a nuclear hostage. Doctrines fraught with this danger spur on the arms race, which is bound to get out of hand sooner or later. All this suggests the need to substantially lower the level of military confrontation. What can guarantee security today is the lowest possible level of armaments ruling out all nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

In the present situation, cooperation among all countries is the only basis for equal and reciprocal security. It is the only way to provide objective conditions enabling the struggle between capitalism and socialism to go on exclusively in the form of peaceful competition and cooperation.

Confidence-Building Measures

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[Article by Helga Schirmeister]

[Text]

At a time when there is no realistic and acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, it is particularly important to create and build up an atmosphere of confidence between nations. But due to distinctions between capitalist and socialist countries, such an atmosphere cannot develop automatically; considerable efforts are required to bring it about.

In the nuclear missile age, it would be hard to overrate the importance of achieving a climate of confidence to prevent armed conflicts of any kind. Hence the need to preserve the positive factors already operating in East-West relations. This valuable confidence includes experience gained both at general European level and in bilateral relations between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States and the rest of Western nuclear powers, on the other.

The confidence- and security-building measures specified in Stockholm are a new element in addition to the existing instruments of strengthening confidence, that is, the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the measures to reduce the war danger agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States. What the Soviet Union and other socialist countries proposed as far back as 1958 - an agreement on preventing a surprise attack by working out appropriate confidence-building measures - seems feasible today, and Stockholm is an important step in this direction.

The Stockholm document is the first accord on military and political security between socialist and capitalist countries since the signing of SALT-2 (1979). It comprises all the WTO and NATO countries plus neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe.

The appreciable results achieved in Stockholm are also an important step forward in the European process. This agreement, a fruit of the consensus reached by the 35 participants in the CSCE, is evidence of the vitality and efficiency of the European treaty mechanism based on the Helsinki Final Act. Now that the relations between socialist and capitalist countries, like the whole international situation, are burdened with distrust and tension, it is particularly obvious that the issue of confidence between nations is not an abstract marginal problem of their relations but an indispensable condition for easing international tensions. In the interdependent world of the nuclear age military strength cannot at all be used as a lawful political means. To find political solutions to the challenging problems of the contemporary world, countries with different social systems, world-views and ideologies need to trust one another, for this is what makes negotiations based on equality and reciprocity possible. Today the East and West "are objectively linked with each other in a security partnership whether they like it or not", to quote Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the CC SED, Chairman of the Council of State, GDR. Since this partnership presupposes a minimum of confidence, it should be evident that every joint solution of problems and growing cooperation between states contribute most effectively to the creation of new elements of confidence. Its growth requires the negotiating partners' readiness, proved in practice, to make serious mutually acceptable decisions meeting the principle of equality and equal security, which implies renunciation of ultimatums, a desire to reach reasonable compromises, and compliance with the agreements concluded.

Such political thinking and practice meet present-day exigencies and help create the requisite climate of confidence between nations, making possible political solutions to pressing problems of humanity. The more fruitful talks on security problems are, the more tangibly they contribute to the spirit of confidence in every sphere of state-to-state relations. This is why the significance of the results achieved at the representative Stockholm meeting goes far beyond that of the very subject of these talks.

Problems of international security in the military political sphere are the most sensitive aspect of international relations. In the present situation, characterised by a dangerously high level of military confrontation in both nuclear and conventional armaments, it is clear that the necessary elements of confidence between nations can be brought about and built up only through a long and complex process. The use of every opportunity to reduce distrust and increase mutual understanding and stability in international relations, especially in the military and political areas, depends therefore on every country's sense of political responsibility. This calls for restraint with regard to military confrontation for unilateral steps expressing a political resolve to decrease the war danger, reduce the likelihood of one's behaviour being misinterpreted by the other side and help negotiate arms limitation and disarmament. Therefore the Warsaw Treaty countries, whose military doctrine is strictly defensive, as they stated again in their Budapest appeal of June 11, 1986, are guided by restraint in the military sphere; taking unilateral confidence-building steps, they invariably stress their willingness for and interest in appropriate measures on a reciprocal basis.

The graphic example of the point is the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, whose explicit political aim is to stop a further "perfecting" of this dangerous weapon, prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space and clear the decks for abolishing all nuclear weapons, as Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in his statement on January 15, 1986. The moratorium is one instance of the socialist community countries' general policy of promoting security, stability and confidence between nations which also finds expression in other unilateral steps. There is, for instance, the unilateral commitment not to use nuclear weapons first made by the Soviet Union at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly, as well as the commitment of the Warsaw Treaty countries, confirmed in their Budapest appeal, not to carry on military operations against another state either in Europe or in any other region of the world unless the WTO countries themselves are attacked. And lastly, the fact that the Warsaw Treaty countries have for years refrained from holding major military exercises near the frontiers of neighbouring countries is a contribution to confidence-building that is of special importance in the context under discussion. The significance of these unilateral measures for fostering the spirit of confidence is obvious. However, it is also clear that the cause of security and confidence does not depend on one side only but requires appropriate steps by other countries, primarily the United States and its militarily most powerful NATO allies.

The difficult Stockholm negotiations, which took more than two and a half years, produced an important result. The states which signed the final document recognised the decisive character of the principle of renouncing the use of military force in international relations, a fact which laid political foundations for a new stage in the elaboration of confidence- and security-building measures in the military and political spheres that will prevent misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the military activities of the sides and hence stave off armed conflicts. Reciprocal concessions at the negotiating table yielded a positive result: the participants worked out a set of measures for prior notification and inspection of major military exercises, including transfers or displacements of large

forces such as may cause particular concern and have destabilising consequences. The Stockholm accords are a first step which should be followed by others with a view to building confidence and stability in Europe.

The Stockholm agreement, Mikhail Gorbachev has said, contains shoots of new thinking in world politics that are sprouting on European soil. Stockholm has proved that even in a complicated situation agreement can be reached on security matters given political will and desire. This manifestation of new political thinking can also end the deadlock in the solution of the chief problem, stopping the arms race and subsequent disarmament. The Stockholm Conference paved the way for all the 35 countries to move to discussing these problems in conformity with the Madrid mandate of the CSCE. The proposal for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe contained in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty countries is a specific, far-reaching, long-range programme whose realisation would go a long way towards lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. If the approach to security problems which enabled Stockholm to achieve real results is kept up, meaningful progress can be made in this sphere as well.

The Stockholm accords raised hopes for progress on key problems of disarmament and prevention of the extension of the arms race to space. From this point of view, the Conference and the political will expressed at it by the 35 participating countries are factors helping create a climate of confidence that can make progress towards solving these problems easier. The states on which the results of relevant talks depend in the first place contributed their share to the fruitful outcome of the Stockholm Conference, and as for the Soviet Union, its specific proposals played a decisive role in the triumph at the Conference of new political thinking, which should also prevail in respect of problems of nuclear disarmament.

The new confidence- and security-building measures agreed on in Stockholm and due to come into force as of January 1, 1987 must pass the test of state-to-state relations. With due regard to the requirements of today, the socialist community countries are weighing the possibility of perfecting this relatively new instrument of international relations. The Budapest Appeal of the WTO states provides for several lines of action to strengthen security and the spirit of confidence in Europe. They may be listed as follows:

Continuing the elaboration of norms, rules and political obligations concerning peaceful, non-aggressive and non-provocative behaviour in the military and political spheres. It is a question of formalising in terms of international law the renunciation of military force in any form and the pledge of non-aggression. An important step in this direction could be taken through agreed reciprocal renunciation of first-use of both nuclear and conventional arms. Also very important in the same sense would be the dialogue on the true content and trends of the two blocs' military doctrines between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO.

Agreeing on the substantial limitation of military activity likely to have destabilising effects and cause particular concern, as well as restricting the zones where it is carried on. Such measures could play the role of definite guarantees of removing the threat of armed conflicts by limiting the nature and scope of military exercises as well as by reducing the military activity of both alliances. To the same end, the countries concerned could agree on measures for the reciprocal self-limitation of the activities of the two blocs—from reducing troop concentrations along the line dividing the WTO and NATO countries to establishing zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons, that is, measures relating to diverse regions of the European continent and resolutely supported by the socialist countries as well as by many other countries of Europe. To be sure, such zones would likewise necessitate appropriate effective guarantees,

and the Soviet Union has therefore signified its readiness to undertake obligations on these eventual nuclear-free zones.

To avoid misinterpretations of military activity, the negotiating parties could also come to terms on steps to exchange information as well as to verify compliance with confidence measures.

A further idea worth considering is initial steps towards setting up a multilateral European consultative commission that would concern itself with an exchange of relevant information and the inspection of military activities and, on the basis of acquired experience, with other tasks of political dialogue on security and reduction of the threat of conflicts.

Given appropriate actions, confidence building measures in the military and political spheres could become an effective instrument for lessening the threat of a surprise attack and preventing the outbreak of conflicts due to misinterpretation of the intentions of the other side as well as go a considerable way towards promoting arms limitation and disarmament.

Summing up, I would like to stress that confidence as a requisite for international security should be as comprehensive as security itself. Hence it is only right to expect greater confidence in the military and political spheres to provide new incentives to consolidating security and developing multiform cooperation in other areas of state-to-state relations. Increasingly close cooperation will add to the importance of practical steps to build confidence and cooperation in every sphere of international relations. With this conception of things, any progress in the European process will contribute notably to more durable peace and security throughout the planet.

Problems of European Security

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 2, 1987 pp 54-56

[Article by Yevgeni Silin]

[Excerpts] | Lately the close connection between the European line of the socialist community countries' peaceful foreign policy and the struggle for peace at the universal level is becoming more and more clear. It reflects both the realities of the presentday world and the manner in which they are projected in the attitudes of contending and interacting international forces and in public sentiment.

A mechanical application of the lessons of the struggle for European security to the solution of similar problems in Asia or even in the Mediterranean, an area adjoining Europe, would certainly be wrong. At the same time, given goodwill on the part of the parties concerned, the strenuous but generally positive evolution of the European process could serve as a beacon in sailing the still unexplored seas of, say, Asian or Mediterranean security.

"Going on in Europe with varying success," Mikhail Gorbachev stresses, "is the Helsinki process of dialogue, talks and agreements. This provides a degree of stability, reduces the probability of armed conflicts." As for the Asian and Pacific region, there is no such dialogue there or hardly any. Militarisation and the war menace are gaining dangerous momentum in the region. As a WTO country, the Soviet Union keeps strictly within the geographical framework of this European defence alliance. If our country proposes negotiating, for instance, the dismantling of both US and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, it means precisely their scrap-

ping, including that of the SS-20 missiles deployed in the European zone and not their transfer to Asia or any other area, as opponents of a reduction of rivalry in nuclear missiles allege.

This attitude held by the Soviet Union no doubt meets the interests of both European and Asian countries. By contrast, US attempts to extend NATO's "jurisdiction" to the whole world, including Asia and the Pacific, are plainly at variance with the security interests of the peoples of both this region and the rest of the world.

✓ The Soviet Union advocates cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region. A goal put forward in Vladivostok though not for the near future was that of convening a Helsinki-type Pacific conference of all the countries gravitating towards this ocean, with Hiroshima as one of the possible venues. This new constructive proposal met with a wide and favourable public response in Asian and Pacific countries and throughout the world.

Just as consistently and thoroughly our country is elaborating its approach to the question of turning the Mediterranean into a zone of lasting peace. This matter is highly important to the peoples of Europe, Africa and the Middle East alike. The achievement of this goal would unquestionably be expedited by realisation of the Soviet proposal for withdrawing US and Soviet nuclear-capable ships from the Mediterranean on a reciprocal basis and, as a more radical measure, for the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet war fleets from that area.

The record of the Helsinki process could serve all Mediterranean nations if the countries concerned accepted the proposals set out in a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The letter, dated July 9, 1986, called for the convening of a Mediterranean conference analogous to the CSCE. The conference could involve not only all Mediterranean countries and countries adjoining the area but the United States and other interested countries. It could come to terms on working out recommendations for establishing a peace and security regime for the Mediterranean.

The problem of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean was discussed specially at the CSCE, the Madrid follow up meeting and other forums held as part of the Helsinki process. The new Soviet proposals concerning the Mediterranean, if accepted, would meet the desire of the non-European countries of the region to see the principles and accords which should govern relations between the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act extended to them.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR COVERAGE OF UN ASIA-PACIFIC DISARMAMENT PARLEY

Speakers Cited

PM251301 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "UN Regional Conference"]

[Text] Beijing, 24 Mar -- The participants in the 14th UN regional conference which has opened here within the framework of the world campaign for disarmament for the Asian and Pacific countries are discussing topical problems of disarmament and international security. Representatives of 16 countries of the Asian and Pacific region, including the Soviet Union and the United States, are taking part in the work of the forum, which is being held in the PRC capital for the first time. For 5 days there will be an exchange of opinions on questions of disarmament and the safeguarding of security and the search for ways of halting the arms race and easing tension.

Wan Li, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and deputy premier of the PRC State Council, who spoke at the opening ceremony, said that the escalation of the arms race and its spread to space not only swallow up enormous resources but also seriously threaten international peace and security. Touching on the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks, he noted: We sincerely hope that the USSR and the United States will conduct talks in a businesslike manner and reach as soon as possible a disarmament agreement which would favor the relaxation of tension and would not harm the interests of other countries. The PRC opposes the arms race in any form and advocates a total ban on and the definitive destruction of nuclear, space, biological, and chemical weapons and a substantial reduction of conventional armaments.

Wan Li recalled the PRC's undertaking never and in no circumstances to make first use of nuclear weapons or carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, who spoke at the conference, said: Reykjavik convinced us still further that in the nuclear and space era security must be ensured not by military-technical but by political means. The Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles is a step of exceptional importance aimed at reducing military confrontation in both

Europe and Asia. Resolutely advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union also puts forward a program for the reduction of conventional armaments and the establishment of equilibrium at a level of rational sufficiency.

Touching on the Asian aspect of the disarmament process, the Soviet spokesman pointed in particular to elements which put the international public on its guard -- the buildup of U.S. nuclear arsenals in the region, plans to create a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangle and to turn Micronesia into a major U.S. strategic base, and attempts jointly to create nuclear weapons in the Tel Aviv-Pretoria-Taipei triangle. A path to the creation of a system of reliable security in Asia is opened up by the proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech in Vladivostok which provide for a wide selection of measures to limit and reduce armaments and build confidence in this vast region.

Swedish representative Maj-Britt Theorin noted the inadmissibility of the extension of the arms race into space. Touching on problems of banning nuclear tests, she stressed that the Soviet moratorium was a positive step in this field and expressed regret that the United States is insisting on continuing nuclear tests.

In his speech, (Linn Khansen), acting head of the U.S. delegation at the disarmament conference, tried to justify the United States' buildup of nuclear armaments by citing the need for "nuclear deterrence."

Issues Under Discussion

PM011430 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov report: "Dialogues on Peace in the Yanxiang Hotel"]

[Excerpts] Beijing--"A proposal was put forward to hold a conference on peace and security in Asia and the Pacific under UN auspices, which would discuss all aspects of the region's security, including the reduction of armed forces and nuclear weapons, the security of sea routes, the limitation of naval fleets, the elimination of foreign bases, and the creation of confidence-building measures..."

That is just a line from the chronicles of the 5 days of heated discussion, thoughts, comparisons, excursions into the past, and predictions about the future of the Asian and Pacific region which were heard in Beijing's Yanxiang Hotel. The 14th UN regional conference within the framework of the world campaign for disarmament for the countries of Asia and the Pacific was taking place. Representatives of public, trade union, religious, and government organizations and the press from some 20 countries were present, and prominent diplomats, scientists, and experts on various problems of international relations and disarmament had been invited.

A dialogue was in progress on the role of this region in world politics and economics. The future of the world will depend largely on how events develop here. It is nearly half the globe. Asia accounts for more than two-thirds of mankind. Peace is indivisible. M.S. Gorbachev noted in Vladivostok: Complications and conflicts in one region of the world are inevitably transmitted to other regions by a chain reaction. In Europe -- for better or for worse -- a coordinated machinery for dialogue exists. In Asia there is none. How can this vast region be incorporated into the system of universal international security? This was discussed at the Beijing forum. Experts note that this was the first time a dialogue on such a scale had taken place. The participants were seeking opportunities to erect barriers in the path of the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race. A large-scale buildup of military-strategic facilities (above all American) is taking place here. The participants spoke of the common destiny which binds the peoples of the continent, which has awoken to a new life in the 20th century.

Nuclear weapons were used for the first time in Asia. The tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki... The auditorium was silent when (M. Kobuti), Japanese parliamentary deputy for Nagasaki and a survivor of the atom bomb, came to the microphone. He survived by chance. To this day he remembers carrying out the bodies of the dead and he can still hear the moans of those injured by the explosion. "In the name of reason, let us stop the madness. There are two atom bombs on mankind's memory. Let a third never explode." After these words, the hall erupted... People spoke of how there are hundreds of foreign bases in the region and troops on other countries' territories, how nuclear weapon tests are carried out.

American representative L. Hansen tried to instill into the participants the idea that it is possible to live with nuclear weapons, they are simply necessary for "nuclear deterrence." The participants replied that the "doctrine of deterrence" is immoral and dangerous. Things did not go at all easily for L. Hansen. Why does the United States not pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as the USSR and China have long since done? Why does the American government not support the idea of nuclear-free zones?

At the same time the idea of zones free from nuclear weapons is, it seems, gaining mastery of the consciousness of the region's peoples. The PRC recently adhered to the Rarotonga Treaty, named in honor of the island on which the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific first came into force. The Soviet Union was the first of the nuclear powers to sign the protocol to this treaty. We in the Soviet Union also felt satisfaction: Here is another sphere where our position coincides with China's. Beijing's signature came soon after Washington's refusal to adhere to the treaty.

I asked Ali Altas, Indonesian permanent representative to the United Nations, for his view on the possibility of holding a Helsinki-type conference in Asia:

"We welcome what was achieved in Helsinki. This experience is an asset for the entire world community. But if Europe is characterized by the

homogeneity of its problems, in Asia the picture is far more varied. We have very varied problems: Some are inherited from the past, others were born in the course of present-day development. The conflicts and problems of different subregions are entirely dissimilar. What is to be done? Solve regional problems first, or at least alleviate them to a certain level, and then tackle the broader tasks. Or act in parallel? I cannot judge. I am convinced that it is necessary to widen the dialogue and accumulate experience, focusing attention on what has been achieved. In this respect the idea of a regional center for peace and disarmament is a very useful one."

It was not very easy to get a meeting with V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister. Twice he was delivering reports, then he was taking part in debates, meeting with Chinese diplomats and scientists, and giving interviews to newspapermen.

"Here I have sensed how actively Asia has become involved to constructive dialogue and the quest for ways of creating a secure world through disarmament. The interest in our disarmament program is indisputable. This program is democratic in its very nature. We are convinced that the strength and superiority of a state must be associated not with nuclear or other weapons, but with reason, humanism, democratic behavior, and the contribution to the establishment of common human values. The phrase 'the Vladivostok speech' has entered the political vocabulary. That is a fact. Many people pin hopes on it for the creation of a secure peace in Asia. It is noteworthy that everyone is convinced that such a system is vitally necessary. The question is only when and how to set it up. It has been said, for instance, that crisis situations must be settled before disarmament. But other voices have also been heard: This artificial sequence of events is not necessary. Otherwise you cannot break out of the vicious circle. Everyone realizes that the time has come to act. Our argument is simple: We must begin with ourselves. Restructuring is the best argument in favor of our peaceful intentions. The main thing is not to slacken our efforts."

(Yasusi Akasi), deputy secretary general of the United Nations, was clearly pleased with the Beijing forum:

"It took place at a noteworthy time of serious political dialogue between the USSR and the United States. China -- the host country -- has recently been taking a far more active part in debates on disarmament within the United Nations and elsewhere. The debates," (Yasusi Akasi) noted, "were on a high level, in an atmosphere of frankness. We realize that progress is hard. But hope has appeared."

"Are you an optimist?"

"A cautious optimist, perhaps. Despite the frequent disappointments and lost hopes, we dare not be pessimists. After Reykjavik people realized that it is possible to agree. I have just been to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva: Serious work is in progress and efforts are being made to reach agreement on chemical weapons. And if there is one agreement, a second will follow... So let us be optimists, without exaggerated hope."

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RELATED ISSUES

BEIJING REVIEW DISCUSSES UN CONFERENCE

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 30 No 14, 6 Apr 87 pp 8-9

[Article by Jiang Wandl]

[Text]

The 14th United Nations Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was held in Beijing from March 23 to 27.

Attending the conference were more than 30 officials, experts and well-known figures from the Soviet Union, the United States, Sweden, Canada and 14 Asian and Pacific countries.

The world disarmament campaign was launched by a unanimous decision of the second special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament on June 7, 1982. Its purpose, as defined by member states, is to inform, educate and generate public understanding and support for the United Nations' goals in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. During the five years since then, a great number of non-governmental organizations have made use of the forum to call for disarmament and the easing of localized conflicts.

In this regional disarmament conference, participants concentrated on both nuclear and

conventional disarmament, as well as relationship between disarmament and security on the one hand and development on the other.

The five-day meeting was held at a time when turbulence and unrest are smouldering throughout the world. The arms race between the two superpowers is in full swing, posing a serious threat to world peace and development. Currently, the world expenditure for military purposes has exceeded US\$1,000 billion a year.

The deepest concerns of the participants centred around nuclear disarmament. There are now 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world with a destruction capability equivalent to more than 1 million Hiroshima bombs. But the production and storage of conventional weapons as well as their import and export also worried the participants. Since conventional weapons are most frequently used in local skirmishes and regional conflicts, they have cost hundreds of thousands of casualties and unbearable debt for some third world countries. Though rarely used, chemical and biological weapons were denounced strongly and participants called for a motion to prohibit them altogether because such

weapons are easy to store and hide and can cause tremendous personal and environmental damage.

Many participants paid serious attention to issues relating to the verifications of disarmament. These delegates pointed out that obscure provisions in existing disarmament agreements, inadequate information given to other countries and even development in technology have increased the difficulty of verification. Delegates from Canada, Pakistan and other countries put forward some concrete proposals at the conference. They applauded the practical measures taken by such international bodies as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose safeguard system is regarded as a model of efficacious verification.

All the participants shared the view that each nation, large or small, has vital security concerns rooted in its history, geographical location and global outlook, and each has a legitimate right to its national security. Talking about the world disarmament campaign, Bangladesh delegate Syed A. Hossain said that without the efforts of small countries, the goal of the movement can never be reached. The Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR Vladimir Petrovsky said it was this kind of conference that gave not only high-level decision makers but common people themselves the chance to take charge of affairs and to see who is who in the question of disarmament.

Mutual trust and mutual confidence were discussed at the conference. Lynn M. Hansen, the head of the Delegation of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament told *Beijing Review*, "One of the greatest difficulties is the suspicion between the major powers and other concerned countries—each thinks the other is cheating, and this is what we would deal with on this occasion."

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CSO: 5200/4084

RELATED ISSUES

PRC PREMIER REITERATES DISARMAMENT STAND

OW040226 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1431 GMT 3 Apr 87

[Excerpt]

Beijing, 3 Apr (XINHUA) — Premier Zhao Ziyang said tonight that China is willing to join the peace-loving peoples of Sweden and other countries in making continued efforts to achieve genuine disarmament and safeguard world peace.

At a banquet in honor of Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and his wife in the Great Hall of the People, Zhao Ziyang reiterated China's independent foreign policy for peace. He said: Opposing the arms race to promote effective disarmament is an important part of China's foreign policy. The two superpowers, possessing the greatest nuclear arsenals and conventional armaments in the world, bear a special responsibility for nuclear and conventional disarmament. They should take the lead in drastically reducing their arms.

He said: China, as a nuclear nation, has never shirked its responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. Since the first day that China had nuclear weapons it has declared that under no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that accordingly, it will not use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and nuclear-free zones. China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and holds that nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament are inseparable and should be carried out simultaneously.

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CSO: 5200/4083

RELATED ISSUES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON WASTE OF RESOURCES IN ARMS RACE

HK151238 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 13 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Yi Yun (0076 0061): "The Arms Race Is a Scourge to the Common People"]

[Text] Reportedly, by the end of 1986, the total debts owed by developing countries amounted to \$1,035 billion; while in 1985, the world's total military expenses increased to some \$1,000 billion (with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, accounting for more than half of this figure). These two startling figures may give people much food for thought.

On the one hand, so much money has been spent on making all kinds of weapons and on the arms race; on the other hand, so many nations cannot make ends meet and are so heavily in debt. What a miserable imbalance this is! What the people of the Third World countries long for is peace and development, or a rise in their living standards. They hate the arms race of the superpowers. Even in the developed countries, a large number of elderly people, women, and children are still living below the poverty line and urgently need care and relief.

If a part of the world's military expenses, even a very small part, is used to help the developing countries, then many good things may be done. For example, a modern tank costs about \$1 million, and this money can be used to build 1,000 classrooms for 30,000 children. Last year, the United Nations spent the equivalent of half of the world's military expense for one hour and succeeded in stopping a locust disaster in Africa and protecting the food grain for 1.2 million people in one year.

It seems that there is no relation between the \$1,000 billion debts and the \$1,000 billion military expenses. In fact, a certain relationship does exist between the two. They show that the huge military expenses have harmed the interests of the less developed countries, intensified the lopsided development of the international economy, and brought deep sufferings to the common people throughout the world.

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CSO: 5200/4085

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